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Abstract
Functionality, simplicity, appearance, and the price are the influencing factors when 
consumers are choosing a phone. Thus, smartphone companies seek intellectual 
property protection to  prevent others from replicating the ir creations as a way to  
maintain their competitiveness. Nonetheless, intellectual property rights, especially 
patent, have become a means to create hurdles to competitors in smartphone 
markets like telecommunication, handset functions and operating systems. This is 
due to the nature o f a patent, which awards patentees w ith exclusivity and allows 
them to  exclude competitors from accessing their patent. It gives right holders a 
chance to  dominate the given markets and it is one o f the main factors that 
constitute monopoly.
Patents can lead to the dominance of the market by a single company and they can 
also be utilised by non-practicing entities fo r profit-making purposes. They may 
refuse licensing competitors/inventors to use essential techniques or threaten 
patent litigation and demand extortionate fees; competitors/inventors would have 
to  design around to research fo r advanced products. If the patent is essential as a 
standard, the ir products may be eliminated in the competitive market. Apart from 
hindering innovation, such patent holders may also impact the price o f products.
In the light o f this, this study focuses on the problem in smartphone industry. The 
US and EU competition cases and policies are analysed fo r identifying the problems 
in the smartphone industry and investigating the balance between patent protection 
and the competitive market. It should be possible to  ensure benign competition in 
the smartphone industry so that, rather than using patents to  strangle innovation, 
patents and competition law will work together in a way that responds to  the needs 
o f the information society. Hence, more advanced technology could be introduced 
to  society, at a reasonable cost, which would boost the economic development of 
innovative industries.
Abbreviation
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Chapter 1
Introduction
The aim of patents is to encourage innovation, right holders are given a limited 
period o f time to exclude others from utilising the ir intellectual efforts. This also 
enables the holders to authorise the ir right to  obtain licensing fees or royalties. Yet, 
patent holders are required to  disclose the ir patent in return.
In information society, the social driving force has been evolved from physical assets 
to intellectual knowledge.1 The ability to generate knowledge and process becomes 
the key factor of competitiveness.2 The large number o f overlapping patents in the 
smartphone industry form a dense network which is known as a patent thicket and 
the holders' competitors and subsequent innovators need to hack the ir way through 
these patents to commercialise a new or updated smartphone.3 While patent 
ensures the holder's exclusive right over its patent, its opponents face more difficulty 
in seeking resources for further development and commercialisation because they 
need to be authorised to lawfully utilise the patents in the thicket environment.
When the fierce patent war launched in 2011, Apple and Samsung began to take 
legal action against each other in more than ten countries around the world asserting 
patent infringement or challenging the validity of each other's patents.4 The
1 HAUNSS, Sebastian (2013). Conflicts in the Knowledge Society: The contentious politics of 
intellectual property. 1st ed., Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, p. 63.
2 Ibds., at p66.
3 SHAPIRO, Carl (2001). Navigating the patent thicket: Cross licenses, patent pools, and 
standard-setting. Innovation Policy and Economy, Volume 1, pp. 1-2.
4 Foss Patents (2012). List of 50 plus Apple-Samsung lawsuits in 10 countries. [Online] 
Available from:
ever-growing volume of patent litigation in the industry indicates that some patent 
holders block their competitors from the market by raising the entry barrier by 
means o f patent licensing fees or patent lawsuits. Moreover, there are also some 
patent holders who do not practice patent for industrial application and, rather, 
assert patent against to those to need to access it. This naturally increases the cost of 
research and development (hereafter "R&D") and reduces the level of competition. 
The phenomenon can be attributed to the strong protection which enables patent 
holders to increase the cost o f transactions by unduly expanding the ir right.5 Besides, 
the ambiguous patent scope creates opportunities fo r speculators to make patent 
enforcement a lucrative business. It is also noticed in this study that the different 
interpretations on patentability and patent infringement in different regions bring 
uncertainty to patent holders and other innovations. It increases the possibilities of 
unintentional infringement and therefore patent abuse problem in current patent 
system is exacerbated.
Such strategic patents against competitors have dramatically increased the burden of 
patent offices and courts. It can be seen that Apple expressed its intention to "go 
thermonuclear" against Android and launched many lawsuits in the smartphone 
patent war against rivals who have a considerable market share in operating 
systems.6 On the other hand, Google declared that the considerable patent portfolio 
it obtained from its acquisition o f Motorola would be used for innovation and
http://www.fosspatents.com/search?updated-min=2014-01-01T00:00:00%2B01:00&update 
d-max=2015-01-01T00:00:00%2B01:00&max-results=50. Last accessed on 3 April 2014.
5 CASTLE, Matthew (2012). Mobile patent wars: Is the patent system broken? [Online]: 
Available from :. http://cblr.columbia.edu/archives/12337. Last accessed on 6 April 2014.
6 SEGAN, Sascha (2012). Infographic: Smartphone patent wars explained. [Online]: Available 
from: http.7/www.pcmag.com/article2/0,2817,2399098.00,asp. Last accessed on 3 April 
2014.
protecting its Android partners from being threatened by competitors.7 These firms 
both have an adverse impact on society because the high cost and risk o f litigation to 
utilise these patents may deter future inventors.
The significance of patents as an incentive to attract innovative activities has grown 
w ith the change in the social pattern from an industrial and labour mode to a 
knowledge-based economy.8 Patents certainly provide short-term benefits to  society 
because the exclusivity granted by patent right is more likely to encourage inventors 
to invest in innovation by virtue o f the return they obtain by utilising the patent. The 
long-term effect o f the current patent system depends on whether it has been 
modernised to accommodate this change and whether it effectively enhances the 
benefit to society. The innovation encouragement presumption is not always the case 
in smartphone industry where enhancing products for more income and robust 
competitiveness are the main concern of a company. Patent, adversely, becomes a 
means of increasing competitiveness by limiting the accessibility o f a work and 
blocking competitor's opportunities on the same market. How to  intensify patent 
system to prevent the problems occurred in such emerging industry is the main 
concern of this study.
The current patent law and litigation in the smartphone industry not only force 
individuals and small start-ups to pay unaffordable fees to put the ir products into the 
market, but it also costs giant companies like Apple, Samsung and M icrosoft a 
fortune to raise or defend law suits. It is also worth examining if the numerous patent
7 ORR, Justin R. (2013). Patent aggregation: Models, harms, and the limited role of antitrust. 
Berkeley Technology Law Journal, Vol. 28:525, p. 525, note 2.
8 TIAN, George Yijun (2011). Competition law and IP abuse prevention in Australia: a 
comparative study. W.I.P.O.J., 2(2), p 217.
litigations brought to  the court necessarily benefits society. If not, the current patent 
system seems to favour large companies because only innovators who can afford to 
access patents and bring infringement lawsuits can create revenue from patents. 
Vulnerable innovators w ith smaller patent portfolios and less financial strength have 
to overcome many hurdles before they can enjoy the advantages brought by patents.
The smartphone patent thicket is believed to be necessary to  reach equilibrium in 
the marketplace and is a milestone in the evolution o f such a complex product.9 A 
robust patent system is vital to help innovators and the whole industry to progress. 
In the meantime, it is also important to find a proper balance between patent law 
and competition law to ensure patent holder's right and to deter the abuse of paten, 
and further enhance the efficiency of patent system and insure the aim of patent 
promote innovation incentives.
Many anticompetitive investigations were held by the relevant authorities all over 
the world to monitor possible patent abuse that may damage market competition. 
The striking case o f Google's acquisition o f Motorola M obility is one o f the cases that 
attracted great attention in the EU and the US. It reveals that major company's 
purchasing and accumulating patents has endangered com petition.10 Apart from the 
famous market sharers, non-practicing entities are another considerable problem. 
Since they do not commercialise and ultilise patent, they are not afraid o f being 
blocked from accessing other's patent and countersuits by other patent holders.
9 LEWIS, Jeffrey I.D. (2013). The sky is not falling: Navigating he smartphone patent thicket. 
[Online] Available from: http://www.wipo.int/wipo magazine/en/2013/01/article 0002.html. 
Last accessed on 10 October 2013.
10 See pp.103-112 of this study for details of how the EU and the US antitrust authorities 
consider Google's acquisition of Motorola may harm competition.
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This study agrees that patents are a beneficial and necessary incentive for innovation; 
yet it argues that the effectiveness o f the current patent system is crippled by some 
underlying problems. Intellectual property has a growing significance to the economy 
and social benefits in contemporary society and is the driving force o f technological 
development. In spite of the fact that standard setting organisations (hereafter the 
"SSOs") like the European Telecommunication Standard Institute (known as "ETSI") 
have established a system to ensure the accessibility of standardised technologies as 
a method to prevent the abuse o f patents, patent lawsuits related to standard 
essential patents (hereafter the "SEPs") remain. This is an admirable system that 
facilitates the acquisition o f useful information and technology by gathering them in 
a pool. SSO should provide a clear guidance of licensing terms to ensure that the 
patents are available to other inventors under the appropriate conditions and 
establish clearer criteria for licensing essential patents to prevent the circumvention 
o f this system.
It can be observed in lawsuits in the patent wars that the payoff from litigation and 
driving competition is more profitable than merely engaging in research and 
development (hereafter "R&D").11 In many circumstances, patent holders are eager 
to  file litigation, rather than negotiate for cooperation. This study intends to  resolve 
this problem by seeking to control the quality o f patents to reduce the number o f 
patent lawsuits on insignificant patents. When it comes to SEPs, antitrust authorities 
should provide an appropriate mechanism to encourage private agreement.
11 For example, the "patent troll" Lodsys and MarcoSolve in the US earn profits by alleging 
patent infringement and ask for licensing fees against unwittingly infringers. See pp.48-51 of 
this study for more details.
Imposing licensing obligation to patent holders should be the very last device, 
Therefore, in order to minimise the damage to patent holders and maximise the 
benefits o f information society, it is fundamental to ameliorate patent system and 
enforcement than rely on anticompetitive remedies.
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Chapter 2
Literature review
2.1. Patent
The relationship between intellectual property holders and the whole o f society is 
regarded as being a type o f social contract.12 Intellectual property is a bargain 
primarily for the benefit o f the public.
Agreement on the Trade-Related Aspect o f Intellectual Property Rights (hereafter the 
"TRIPS Agreement") states that any invention in all fields o f technology is entitled to 
be protected by patent if it is new, involve an inventive step, and is capable of 
industrial application.13 This principle is implemented in the patent law of World 
Trade Organisation (hereafter the "WTO") members such as European Patent 
Convention (hereafter the "EPC") in the EU, Title 35 o f the US Code (also known as 
"the US Patent Act"), and Patent Acts 1977 in the UK.14
One of the purposes o f the patent system is to impose an obligation on patent 
holders to  disclose the essence of their innovation so that relevant products or 
services can be improved by others. It is argued that to regard patent rights as 
normal property with a monopoly over the patented work is insufficient; rather, a 
patent not only confers a positive right on holders to make, produce and sell the
12 PUGATCH, Meir Perez (2011). Intellectual property policy-making in the 21st century. 
W.I.P.O.J., 3(1). p. 73.
13 Article 27 (1) of the TRIPS Agreement.
14 Article 52 (1) of the EPC, Section 101 Title 35 of the US Code, and Article 1(1) of the UK 
Patent Act 1977. More precisely, an invention is patentable as long as it does not form part 
of state of art, is not obvious to a person skilled in the art, and can be made or used in any 
kind of industry.
work, but also a negative right to  exclude others from using it.15 Therefore, its 
policy-making should focus on balancing incentives to invention and accessibility.
2.2. Mobile telephony industry in the information society
According to sociological theories, social evolution has entered a new era, in which 
the key elements that drive social dynamics are knowledge and technological 
inform ation.16 This explains the growing importance o f intellectual property in 
contemporary society in which the economic development and political power is 
generated by controlling the content knowledge.17 However, due to  the nature of 
knowledge, it can be transferred and replicated easily; it is hard to  ensure inventor's 
complete exclusivity. In addition, the technology industry is becoming more complex 
because every product or service consists o f lots o f knowledge that is patented by 
different holders.18 Although patent aims to secure holder's hard work, it is noticed 
that the patenting intensity gives patent holders in the mobile communication 
industry greater bargaining chips, especially when their patents are standardised.19 
Against this background, patent issues are more complex than they used to be.
This study agrees that the changing society needs a changing patent system to 
coordinate social demand. Yet, to  inspect the needs o f every single industry is hard to
15 ORR, Justin R. (2013). Patent aggregation: Models, harms, and the limited role of antitrust. 
Berkeley Technology Law Journal, Vol. 28:525. pp. 528-529.
16 HAUNSS, Sebastian (2013). Conflicts in the Knowledge Society: The contentious politics of 
intellectual property. 1st ed., Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, pp. 53-55.
17 Ibid., pp.76-78.
18 ZHANG, Liguo (2010). Refusal to license intellectual property rights under article 82 EC in 
the light of standardisation. E.I.P.R, 32(8). p. 42.
19 ZHANG, Liguo (2010). How IPR policies of telecommunication standard-setting 
organisations can effectively address the patent ambush problem. IIC, 41(4). p. 384.
be achieved; this study tend to carry on an intensive understanding o f the problems 
o f the smartphone industry and find out solutions that can possibly improve the 
patent protection in it. Given that smartphones are essential in this 
technology-driven age, the fiercely competitive marketplace of smartphones is the 
most intense and rapidly changing business environment today, which is why the 
patent controversies among smartphone and tablet companies in the past five years 
are referred to as chaotic frontier o f innovation and development.20 Therefore, this 
study focuses on patent issues in this industry to determine if the patent system 
facilitates smartphone development and enhances the benefits o f the whole 
information society.
2.3. Patent and innovation
It has been argued that the exclusivity associated w ith patent right is not for the 
purpose o f creating incentives per se; rather, it is an instrumental means to  support 
the aim of making creators' inventions accessible to those who can use them. In 
other words, the ultimate goal of patent is to  disseminate the invention which is 
socially beneficial by virtue o f using the instrumental means to prevent the 
disruption to  such acts21. Some may have similar claim and say that not all patent 
infringers are pirates, and "inventing around" the outside o f a patent's scope should 
be encouraged. Patent authorities should ensure others' freedom to im itate and 
compete as long as the invention is outside the scope of the exclusivity associated 
w ith the patent.22
20 HOYLE, Ben (2013). Apple v Samsung: lessons from a global intellectual property war. 
C.T.L.R., 19(4). p. 63.
21 OVERWALLE, Geertrui Van and SCHOVSBO, Jens (2007). Policy options for the 
improvement of the European patent system. IIC, 38(7), p. 835; LIIVAK, Oscar (2013). 
Establishing an Island of patent sanity. Cornell Law School research paper No. 13-06, p. 4.
22 ANN, Christoph (2011). Patents, piracy and competition. IIC, 42(8). pp. 877-878.
This study does not intend to reposition the patent system. It agrees that promoting 
incentive is undeniably the essential goal o f the patent system; however, this theory 
is not necessarily true in the smartphone industry, where maximising a profit is the 
goal o f most device and service providers. Patents do not always play the role of 
encouraging R&D; rather they become a tool for monopoly in an intensely 
competitive market. Therefore, the inspection here will not only focus on the 
efficiency o f innovation promotion, but also more importantly, how patents can 
facilitate the distribution o f useful information rather than constrain it.
2.4. Abuse the exclusivity of patent
The most common form of abuse the exclusivity o f patent is patent trolls who seek to 
make money by alleging infringement.23 It is also called "patent assertion entities".24 
Although patent trolls are deemed to prevail in the US patent system,25 empirical 
research provides evidence that non-practicing patent companies do not solely 
operate in the US; they also appear in several European countries.26 Therefore, here 
it is regarded as an international issue w ith the change of economic dynamics, 
although the US still has the most patent trolls. Many proposals have been made to 
address the problem of patent trolls. This study w ill further discuss other forms of 
abuse patent holders may exercise in the smartphone industry by taking speculative 
actions to increase other participants' innovative costs or even block their entry to
23 LIM, Daryl (2010). Post eBay -  a brave new world. E.I.P.R., 32(10). p. 485.
24 CHIEN, Colleen V. and LEMLEY, Mark A. (2012). Patent hold-up, the ICT, and the public 
interest. Cornell Law Review, Stanford Public Law Working Paper No. 2022168. p. 102.
25 SUBRAMANIAN, Sujitha (2008). Patent trolls in thickets: who is fishing under the bridge? 
E.I.P.R., 30(5). pp. 185-187.
26 FUSCO, Stefania (2012). Markets and patents enforcement: A comparative investigation of 
non-practicing entities in the US and Europe. Michigan Telecommunications and Technology 
Law Review, pp. 115-119.
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the market.
Not only may patent assentation entities who engage in trolling behaviour be 
detrimental to  the accessibility o f patents, it has been noted that this irregular use of 
patents (rather than unlawful use because some are legally exercising the exclusivity 
that comes w ith patents) has resulted in "too-many patent" problems, which have 
further exacerbated the problems of patent trolling and ambush.27
Noting that patent litigation and injunction requests had been filed worldwide, 
commentators referred to Judge Posner of the US District Court who used the term 
"chaos" to  describe the US patent system and declared that an injunction required by 
players in the industry would be "contrary to the public interest."28 Judge Posner is 
not the only one to have observed that the patent system is problematic. Many have 
argued that the reason companies are eager to collect large portfolios it that the 
patent system grants patent holders too strong protection29 Indeed, a patent w ith an 
over-broad scope is argued to be a serious roadblock to competition in the 
information technology industry,30 and a "flood of trivial patents" can be seen to be 
spreading across the world.31 It is also argued that patents fo r emerging technologies 
are normally granted w ith an overly broad scope because patent offices are unable
27 SCHREPEL, Thibault (2013). Patent troll through the US and EU antitrust law: when 
co-operation is no longer an option. E.C.L.R., 34(6). p. 318.
28 LEVINE, Dan (2012). United States: Intellectual Property -  patents. C.T.L.R., 18(8). pp. 
N212-N213.-
29 OLSON, David S. (2013). Removing the Troll from the Thicket: The Case for Enhancing 
Patent Maintenance Fees in Relation to the Size of a Patent Owner's Non-Practiced Patent 
Portfolio. Boston College Law School Legal Studies Research Paper No. 303. pp. 10-15.
30 HOVENKAMP, Herbert J. (2012). Competition in information technologies: 
Standard-essential patents, non-practicing entities and FRAND bidding. U Iowa Legal Studies 
Research Paper No. 12-32. p. 1.
31 SCHADE, Jurgen (2010). Is the Community (EU) patent behind the times? Globalisation 
urges multilateral cooperation. IIC, 41(7). p. 812.
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to deal w ith such a large number o f new, complex patent applications.32 This study 
refers to commentators' criticisms and finds that "bad patent" is an imperious 
problem that needs to be resolved in order to maximise the function o f patents. 
However, some of those call for reform and the making o f specified patent rules for 
different industries, which this study believes may intensify the chaos in the current 
system.33 At this stage, reinforcing patent-issuing rules and moderately applying 
competition law to cope w ith undue patent exercise seem to be more appropriate 
options.
2.5. Interaction between intellectual property protection and competition law
Some regard patents as being a potential stumbling block to competitiveness, since 
there is no measuring tool to prove the effect o f monopoly on the promotion of 
innovation.34 Therefore, the aim of patent system is envisioned by the authorities 
rather than referring to the empirical facts in the competitive market. This comment 
seems too simplistic, since it neglects the positive influence o f patents and solely 
justifies the impact from the perspective o f enhancing a competitive economy. 
However, it does properly refer to  the expression of the US Supreme Court and 
highlights a vital point, which is that it is necessary to "balance the need to  promote 
innovation" and the notion o f "im itation and refinement through im itation."35
32 SCHOVSBO, Jens (2011). Constructing an efficient and balanced European patent system: 
"Muddling through". [Online] Available from:
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm7abstract id=1932690. Last accessed on 31 January 
2014.
33 SCHREPEL, Thibault (2013). Patent troll through the US and EU antitrust law: when 
co-operation is no longer an option. E.C.L.R., 34(6). pp. 320-321.
34 GIFFORD, Daniel J. and KUDRLE, Robert T. (2011). Antitrust approaches to dynamically 
competitive industries in the United States and the European Union. J.C.L & £., 7(3). pp. 
710-711.
35 Bonito Boats, Inc. v Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141,146 (1989).
It has been noted that not all patent ambushers or non-practicing patent holders are 
detrimental to competition; some of them, like universities, may want to  use the 
patents for research purposes and/or do not intend to seek licensing fees to  recover 
the ir investment. Moreover, there are companies whose business are to aggregate 
patent portfolios and license them to those who need them for innovative activities 
or even for defensive purposes.36 They may provide licensed to  entire patent 
portfolios; thus the licensees are able to apply the relevant patents w ith less 
transaction fees and more efficient progress.37 It is actually conducive to maximising 
the function o f a patent. This study does not challenge such patent usage because it 
does not harm competition, nor does it appreciate it, because it does not help to  
circulate patents and promote incentives for innovation. It aims to improve the 
current patent system and thus mainly focuses on problems that are detrimental to  
the public interest.
2.6. Standard essential patents and license to access
Patent law and competition law are often regarded as "conflicting in means, yet 
harmonious in purpose."38 In order to facilitate the interoperability and compatibility 
o f products, which serve the same functions, standard-setting organisations are 
established to ensure essential technology is accessible w ith a license under fair, 
reasonable, and non-discriminatory terms (known as "FRAND" terms). Many have 
illustrated the advantages this can create and the difficulties faced when 
standardised patent holders deliberately hold-up such patents.39 They also refer to
36 LIM, Daryl (2010). Post eBay a brave new world. E.I.P.R., 32(10). p. 485.
37 ORR, Justin R. (2013). Patent aggregation: Models, harms, and the limited role of antitrust. 
Berkeley Technology LawJourna\, Vol. 28:525. pp. 526-527.
38 DEVLIN, Alan (2009). The stochastic relationship between patents and antitrust. J.C.L.& £., 
5(1), p. 75.
39 CARRIER, Michael A (2012). A roadmap to the smartphone patent wars and FRAND
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the inherent problems of the standardisation procedure and the blurred definition of 
licensing terms.40 Aware of these problems, this study discusses them by referring to 
famous patent ambush cases and analyses the deceptive conduct during the 
standardisation process.
To address the abuse o f standardised patents, "five golden rules" were proposed by 
commentators to make the standardisation process and results open, transparent, 
non-discriminatory and w ithout any predefinition o f the standard at the early stage 
o f standardisation.41 However, this study disagrees w ith the fifth  rule, which 
suggests developing competing standards or products. Standardisation should make 
essential patents available to those not able to evade them rather than developing 
other standards to fragment the application o f given technology. Preventing the 
abuse of standardised patents is more essential than finding a possible substitute 
standard. For example, one o f Nokia's patents which is adopted as a part of 
international GSM (Global System for Mobile) standard; it has been widely accepted 
in the smartphone industry. Smartphone providers have to apply such standard to be 
able to provide relevant service. It is hard to  find a substitute to challenge or replace
licensing. CPI Antitrust Chronicle, April (2). p. 2.
See also CHRONOPOULOS, Apostolos (2009). Patent Standards -  a case for US antitrust law 
or a call for recognising imminent public policy limitations to the exploitation rights 
conferred by the Patent Act? ICC, 40(7). pp. 786-789; and TORTI, Valerio (2012). IPRs, 
competition and standard-setting: in search of a model address hold-up. E.C.L.R., 33(9). pp. 
388-389; and SATTLER, Sven (2011). Standardisation under EU competition ru les-the 
Commission's new horizontal guidelines. E.C.L.R., 32(7). p. 344.
40 GERADIN, Damien (2013). The years of DG competition effort to provide Guidance on the 
application of competition rules to the licensing of standard-essential patent: Where do we 
stand? pp. 9-12. [online] Available from
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm2abstract id=2204359. Last accessed on 15 
November 2013.
See also LANG, John Temple (2011). Patent pool and agreements on standard. E.LRev., 36(6). 
pp. 889-890.
41 KOENIG, Christian and TRIAS, Ana (2010). Some standards for standardization: a basis for 
harmonization and efficiency maximization of EU and US antitrust control of the 
standard-setting process. E.I.P.R., 32(7), pp. 329-331.
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such patent.42 Once Nokia hold-up this patent against its competitors or other 
inventor, the will cause dramatic disadvantages to the latter's products. Hence, the 
discussion in this study assumes the precondition that only one standard exists in 
each technology in the market.
2.7. Licensing intellectual properties in the smartphone industry
Opportunistic firms are engaging in patent ambush w ith increasing frequency. It is 
suggested that SSOs need to formalise clear policy statements regarding relevant 
patents and patent application disclosure early in the formal standard development 
process.43 One of these is that a unilateral disclosure o f the maximum licensing terms 
may be required to eliminate patent hold-up.44 The ex ante disclosure o f enables 
licensees to envision what conditions may be applied if the patent becomes standard; 
it also allows SSOs to take into consideration the possible costs o f standardisation. 
Alson, the ex ante disclosure of most restrictive non-pricing terms can impede patent 
holders from imposing unfair obligations on certain licensees.45 This suggested model 
makes sense and can help ease hold-up problems at a certain level. Nevertheless, it 
offers limited help if patent holders refuse to  license their patent, or in some 
circumstances, SSOs and licensees may be misled into adopting the standardised 
patent because the patent holder is hiding the patent information. Moreover, if the 
SEP holder asks for fees or imposes obligation on licensees w ithout complying w ith 
the disclosure it made, licensees may still have no choice but accept licensing terms if 
vast investment has been put into innovation. It seems likely that requiring a FRAND
42 Anonymous (2011). United States: intellectual property-patents. C.T.L.R., 17(6), N144.
43 LAYNE-FARRAR, Anne (2011). Assessing IPR disclosure within standard setting: An ICT case 
study. Accessed via SSRN 15 June 2013. pp. 3-6.
44 TORTI, Valerio (2012). IPRs, competition and standard setting: in search of a model 
address hold-up. E.C.L.R., 33(9), pp. 390-391.
45 Ibid.
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type of commitment is a more practical and flexible solution to exorbitant licensing 
terms in these cases.
To make patent accessible, many stress the merits o f a voluntary patent agreement, 
such as patent pools and cross-licensing.46 These are certainly ideal solutions to 
reducing the tension between patents and competitive benefits, yet it is doubtful if 
they can actually help to moderate the fierce patent war in the smartphone industry. 
The patent wars show that voluntary licensing is less possible in an industry where 
patents are used as a weapon to  create profits. On other hand, many commentators 
support the view that compulsory licensing is an appropriate regime to mitigate the 
harm patents may cause to competition.47 The smartphone industry is rife w ith 
strategic patents that are used to derogate rivals' competitiveness, and a compulsory 
license is a fair way to make an essential patent available to the market. Yet, it should 
be aware that the imposition of a compulsory license violates the patent holder's 
exclusivity. This study analyses current application and believes that any antitrust 
authority needs to avoid applying it before an appropriate standard is established.
2.8. Procedural problems under the current patent system
Products like smartphones, which consist o f a dense assembly of patented works, are 
more likely to  generate cross-border patent lawsuits because the components may 
be produced, manufactured, and sold in different regions.48 This urges the need for a
46 SHAPIRO, Carl (2001). Navigating the patent thicket: Cross-licenses, patent pools, and 
standard-setting. Innovation Policy and Economy, Volume 1. pp. 12-19.
See also LEMLEY, Mark A. and MELAMED, Douglas (2013). Missing the forest for the trolls. 
Columbia Law Review, Vol. 113. pp. 1013-1014.
47 NG, Elizabeth Siew Kuan (2009). Patent trolling: innovation at risk. E.I.P.R., 31(12). pp. 
599-604.
48 ROMANDINI, Roberto and KLICZNIK, Alexander (2013). The territoriality principle and 
transnational use of patented inventions-the wider reach of a unitary patented system and
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harmonised global patent system, or at least, a certain level o f coordination between 
patent authorities. It was criticised that being awarded a patent was a lengthy and 
expensive process at the best of times, and the inconsistent approaches used in 
different jurisdictions in the world intensify this problem.49 The lately adopted 
enhanced European patent system which is believed can alleviate the uncertainty 
and high costs caused by divergent patent systems50 and is regarded as a big step 
forward toward this goal in Europe w ith a unified patent courts.51 The unitary patent 
package in this regime including the regulations to enhance co-operation among 
participating states on the unitary patent issues and its translation arrangement; it 
also contains an international agreement on the unified patent court.52 Under this 
regime, the EPO is entrusted by 26 EU Member States (the "MSs") to  deliver and 
administer unitary patents although Span and Italy have filed actions to challenge the 
language arrangement.53
Yet, the smartphone industry is an emerging industry w ith many unforeseeable 
challenges; it is questionable that this system can facilitate improvement. In addition 
to the merits of the unitary patent system, this study will also mention the demerits, 
especially those that influence the smartphone industry.
the role of the CJEU. IIC, 44(5). pp. 527-529.
49 DESCHAMPS, Carole (2011). Patenting computer-related inventions in the US and in 
Europe: the need for domestic and international legal harmony. E.I.P.R., 33(2). pp. 106-107.
50 KAZI, Ilya (2011). Will we ever see a single patent system covering the EU, let alone 
spanning the Atlantic or Pacific? E.I.P.R., 33(8). pp. 538-541.
51 XENOS, Dimitris (2013). The European unified patent court: assessment and implication of 
the federalisation of the patent system in Europe. Scripted, Volume 10, Issue 2. p. 247.
52 EPC (2012). European Patent Office welcomes historic agreement on unitary patent. 
[Online] Available from: http://www.epo.org/news-issues/news/2012/20121211.html. Last 
accessed 29 September 2013.
53 Ibid.
2.9. Conclusion
The aforementioned arguments and comments have indicated how the underlying 
problems w ith the current patent system may unduly expand patent protection and 
undermine the development of technology. Although they contribute to mitigating 
deep-rooted problems, these problems are not eradicated.
While many commentators emphasise certain types o f issues, such as controversial 
computer-related innovation or innovative business methods, which is deemed 
unpatentable in some countries54, this study does not seek to address whether it is 
reasonable to challenge this patent or not. Instead, it focuses on how to improve the 
patent system and embrace the idea o f preserving the rights o f these beneficiaries in 
contemporary society. Therefore, it considers all types o f patents and observes how 
the ir application can influence this goal.
In doing so, this study starts by analysing the changes in society to  determine if 
patents can influence the driving force o f the current society. It moves on to  explore 
the problems in the current patent system and how they can damage the 
information society w ith a special emphasis o f the chaos of the current patent war. It 
then examines the countermeasures taken in legal practice and the market and 
discusses the extent o f their usefulness, the ir insufficiency and the result it may 
cause. It concludes by answering the question o f whether the current patent system 
is efficient or not, and suggesting the most urgent task at the current stage while 
proposing possible solutions derived from the discussion.
54 DESCHAMPS, Carole (2011). Patenting computer-related inventions in the US and in 
Europe: the need for domestic and international legal harmony. E.I.P.R., 33(2). pp. 108-114.
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Chapter 3
How does patent law enhance the information society and communication 
technology?
3.1. The new economy and patent law
Different from the traditional industries that produce and sell physical goods, The 
technology industry has gradually been converted into an information-based mode. 
This reflects the fact that the value of most products and services in this industry is 
based on the information they deliver, including the "know-how" o f information to 
invent manufacturing and operating products and services.55 The circulation o f such 
knowledge has grown in significance to lead the technology market into the era of 
the "knowledge economy".56 In order to ensure that economic activities are lawful, 
intellectual property rights (hereafter "IP" rights) is one o f the vital factors that 
influence the dissemination of knowledge and its cost.57
3.1.1. Patent systems in the US and EU
3.1.1.1. US
US patent law is one o f the laws that adopt these principles.58 The US Congress is 
authorised by the US Constitution to provide a patent system to "promote the
55 DEVLIN, Alan (2009). The stochastic relationship between patents and antitrust. J.C.L. <££., 
5W ,p82.
56 TIAN, George Yijun (2011). Competition law and IP abuse prevention in Australia: a 
comparative study. W.I.P.O.J., 2(2), p 217.
57 Ibid.
58 Sections 102 and 103 the US Patent Act list the conditions of patentability, which reflect 
the principle of novelty and non-obviousness.
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progress o f science and useful arts" by securing inventors exclusive rights for a 
limited period.59 Consequently, according to the wording of Section 101 of the US 
Patent Act, a patent can be awarded to "whoever discovers any new and useful 
process, machine, manufacture, or composition o f matter, or any new and useful 
improvement thereof" US patents are examined and issued by the United States 
Patent and Trademark Office (the "USPTO") which was primarily established to 
support innovation in the US by granting patents to those who meet the patent 
requirements in patent law and practice.
Patent infringement can be brought to the federal district court under the US federal 
court system, and patent holders can be granted an injunction or ask for damages 
based on the verdict o f the court.60 It is worth noting that patent holders in the US 
can also choose to lodge a lawsuit with the International Trade Commission 
(hereafter the "ITC"), an agency responsible for providing an independent quality 
analysis, information, and "support on matters relating to tariffs and international 
trade and competitiveness."61 This also involves directing actions to  cope w ith unfair 
trade, which includes patent infringement. Appellate cases involving patents from 
both the district court and the ITC are sent to the US Court o f Appeals for the Federal 
Circuit, which has exclusive jurisdiction over such cases.
59 Article 1, Section 8, paragraph 8 of the US Constitution.
60 WILLIAMS, Fred I. and SAFIULLAH Rehan M. (2012). The smartphone patent wars: A US 
perspective. The Licensing Journal. June/July, p.18.
61 United States International Trade Commission. Mission Statement. [Online] Available from: 
http://www.usitc.gov/press room/mission statement.htm. Last accessed 13 November 
2013.
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3.1.1.2. EU
Elsewhere in the world, the EPC provides a simple definition of patentable inventions, 
namely that they are susceptible o f industrial application, new, and involve an 
intensive step.62 There are currently two ways to acquire patent protection in Europe, 
one o f which is to file a patent application with the competent national authorities 
that grant national patents in individual European countries, while the other is to be 
granted a European patent by filing a centralised patent application w ith the EPO in 
line w ith the requirements and procedure o f the EPC.
What is confusing is that the European patent system is not a regime w ith in the 
European Union. It is operated by the European Patent Organisation (hereafter the 
"EPOrg"), which is governed by the EPC but exists independently outside the EU. The 
states contracted to the EPC include 28 EU MSs States and 10 non-EU members.63 
Applicants can file a single patent application w ith the EPO to  obtain a European 
Patent, but this patent is only valid in respect of the state in which it is granted.64 
Patentees who want to  enforce their patent right have to  validate the patent in the 
state in which they seek patent protection, since according to the EPC, the 
infringement o f a European patent is dealt w ith by national law.65 Therefore, 
European patents are normally regarded as being "a bundle o f national patents."66
62 Article 52(1) of the EPC.
63 Croatia was one of the non-EU contacting states of the EPC yet it joined the EU in July
2013.
64 Article 64(1) of the EPC.
65 Article 64(3) of the EPC.
66 PEERS, Steve (2011). The constitutional implication of the EU patent. E.C.L Review, 7(2), 
pp. 203-231.
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It is believed that the EU and the US have developed noteworthy regulations and 
policies to deal w ith the intricacy between IP law and competition law in the past 
two decades.67 Moreover, US law is the forerunner in the world's intellectual 
property field, and EU institutes have global importance in terms of 
telecommunication standardisation because members come from various regions on 
earth, such as the US, Canada, Taiwan, Japan, Israel, Russia.68 Therefore, this study is 
mainly directed toward the experienced legal systems of the EU and the US, which
mainly represent the global trend on patent protection in the communication
industry.
3.1.2. Patent and innovation incentives
It is assumed under the current patent system that innovation w ill be induced if 
patentees have the maximum liberty and leverage to  use their inventions.69 Since 
patents award patentees w ith the exclusive right to utilise their inventions and make 
a profit, the remuneration acquired from patent rights is a necessary incentive for 
further innovation.70 It is undeniable that advanced technologies enhance the
quality o f life for the public's benefit, and inventive activity is the pathway to
achieving this goal; however, some sceptics and economists doubt that it is possible 
to  stimulate innovation in this way. Incentives and accessibility to  innovations are 
both vital for inventive activities and an ineradicable difficulty is encountered when
67 TIAN, George Yijun (2011). Competition law and IP abuse prevention in Australia: a 
comparative study. W.I.P.O.J., 2(2), pp. 219-220.
68 LAYNE-FARRAR, Anne (2011). Assessing IPR disclosure within standard setting: An ICT case 
study. At p. 5. Accessed via SSRN 15 June 2013.
69 MANNE, Geoffrey A. and WRIGHT, Joshua D. (2009). Regulating innovation: Competition 
policy and patent law under uncertainty. Lewis & Clark Law School Legal Research Paper 
Series, Paper No. 2009-19, p. 29.
70 Ibid.
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attempting to strike a balance between them .71
The recent patent disputes hotly reported in the press reveal the extent to which 
patentees o f such works rely on patent protection to secure their invention, while 
simultaneously demonstrating the tangled litigation and irregular decisions made on 
a worldwide scale.72 Many underlying impacts and sensitive issues o f patents have 
emerged in this respect. In some circumstances, enforcing patents is not merely 
about rewarding hard work. W ith the exclusive power conferred by patents, holders 
can not only seek remuneration, but it is also possible for the patent to  be a talisman 
to ensure their status when other similar products invade the market.
Unlike pharmaceutical inventions, which are fundamental to creating viable 
technological bases for least-developed countries and require flexible patent 
enforcement,73 information and communication technology (hereafter the "ICT") 
patents normally provide strong protection to patentees, which enable them to 
practice their patent in most cases. In this regard, an updated patent law to 
accommodate various new patterns o f patent issues is one o f the crucial factors to 
decide the progress o f technology and the development and enjoyment this can 
bring to  society.
71 LIIVAK, Oscar (2013). Establishing an Island of patent sanity. Cornell Law School research 
paper No. 13-06, p 13.
72 BUI, Jessica H. (2013). Apple vs. Samsung: smartphone patent war, practical implication 
and repercussions of Samsung verdict within the smartphone industry, pp. 12-18. [Online] 
Available from: http://www.buigarcia.com/docs/Apple%20v%20Samsung.pdf. Last accessed 
on 7 March 2014.
73 Article 66 and Article 70 of the TRIPS Agreement.
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3.2. Communication technology and the information society
3.2.1. Transition of society to a knowledge-based one
Physical resources have gradually lost their influence in the contemporary world, 
giving way to actionable knowledge, which may encompass information like data, 
images and symbols as the major social and economic support.74 Information has 
become the key element to develop society, and while sociologists may have a 
different cognition of the knowledge society, they commonly believe that it is closely 
linked to technology and economic development.
The US sociologist, Bell, sensed that knowledge and information was replacing the 
industrial society in developed countries in the second half o f the twentieth century 
and referred to this new social order as the post-industrial society.75 He proposed his 
theory in the 1970s and influenced later social observations. Intellectual knowledge 
is the primary driving force of the post-industrial society and it even affects economic 
and political decisions. According to Bell's theory, the control and ownership o f 
knowledge is the cornerstone o f society.76 Castells advanced a theory o f a network 
society, in which the social structure is a capitalist one that operates around a 
network. This theory emphasised the close link between the economy, society and 
culture in the information age. He also defined the new economy as one in which 
corporations and similar forms of organisation in the world operate the ir businesses 
using the internet or the information technologies they utilise through it.77
74 WEBSTER, Frank (2004). The information society reader. 1st ed., London, Routledge. p. 31.
75 HAUNSS, Sebastian (2013). Conflicts in the knowledge society. The contentious politics of 
intellectual property. 1st ed., Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, p. 59.
76 Supra., at pp. 60-61.
77 WEBSTER, Frank (2004). The information society reader. 1st ed., London, Routledge., p.
150.
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Productivity is one o f the features o f the new economy in Castells' network society 
and this relies on the application o f knowledge and the practice o f innovation; 
therefore, these are essential to increase productivity and enhance the economy. In 
the internet age, knowledge relates to  ICT.78 Competitiveness and networking are the 
other two important features o f Castells' theory. Competitiveness represents 
globalisation because this new economy enables firms and even individuals and 
countries to create a market share and cooperate w ith others in an interdependent 
global environment. In an industrial society, networking reflects the same concept of 
large-scale standardisation and vertical organisations, but in the new economy, it is 
represented by the flexibility and adaptability o f assembling resources w ithin 
information technology. This networking feature enables the application o f elements 
in the same network to different projects.79 However, this feature generates a risk in 
that one firm  can be easily edged out if it is not involved in the network, and one firm  
can eliminate others in the market through competition in the same way.80 For 
example, a large corporation w ith vertical bureaucracy, which it proliferates 
throughout the world by means o f competing, can make other organisations either 
transform into the network or disappear because of not being in line w ith the trend.
Castells' network society makes it clear that the contemporary society has been 
transformed from a material-based industrial society to an information society and 
the social economy has been driven to an informational, global, and networking 
trend. Another sociologist, Stehr, who proposed a theory o f the knowledge society,
78 Ibid., at pp. 151-152.
79 HAUNSS, Sebastian (2013). Conflicts in the knowledge society. The contentious politics o f 
intellectual property. 1st ed., Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, p. 66.
80 Supra., note 65 at, p. 153.
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reiterated the idea that the socio-economic base has been changed from material to 
monetary and is now symbolic. He made the salient point that knowledge has 
become an important political and social issue,81 which permeates society w ith its 
characteristic of being easy to transfer and replicate. Nonetheless, knowledge 
applied as information today is usually produced by intelligence as opposed to the 
way it just "happened" in other types o f society in earlier times, and legislation is 
required to control the access and distribution o f this valuable commodity.82 In this 
respect, Stehr's knowledge society has led to attention being paid to social and 
political considerations of IP protection, which regulates the availability o f knowledge. 
This illustrates the significance of protecting IP in this knowledge-based age by 
means o f managing innovative activities and controlling the information distributed 
to society.
3.2.2. Mobile communication and the smartphone industry
A good information exchange network has become crucial to productivity and 
development as society has been propelled into the information era. Unlike 
traditional landline telecommunication, mobile phones not only enable people to 
communicate by means o f a conversation or text message in a wireless environment, 
but their enhanced functionality also enables the use of other content and services 
via the internet. Handset devices have become smarter and more powerful w ith the 
advanced innovation o f mobile technologies. They make it possible to connect to the 
World Wide Web and provide built-in or applied software, which has the capability of 
processing and disseminating a huge volume o f data across boundaries.
81 HAUNSS, Sebastian (2013). Conflicts in the knowledge society. The contentious politics o f 
intellectual property. 1st ed., Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, pp. 74-77.
82 Ibid.
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Nevertheless, the problems that underlie the mobile phone industry are usually 
more complex. Due to  the complexity o f smartphone devices, a handset can be 
designed in A country, assembled in B country w ith the components from C, D, and 
more countries, and finally sold to dozens o f regions throughout the world by an 
alliance o f E and F countries.83 The smartphone industry is an extremely lucrative 
business in this information society and it attracts a great many technology 
companies that devote time and money to inventing advanced functions, accessories, 
and software to respond to the demands of society, and o f course, to make a profit. 
Furthermore, according to  Castells' theory, network technologies can be applied in 
one project and re-organised to  be applied in another. In other words, a patented 
technology in a network can also be applied in other network, which indicates that 
an invention today is actually based on many overlapping technologies. Therefore, 
while communication technology continues to progress and has a positive effect on 
society, it also increases the complexity o f IP disputes.
3.3. Effect of the current patent system
3.3.1. Concept of exclusivity in patent law
The concept of patent protection can generally be determined from the patent rules, 
such as the wording in the TRIPS Agreement and the previously-mentioned EU and 
US patent regulations. The legislation is intended to promote creative activities by 
granting right holders the monopolistic right to  their works.84
83 LIN, Rich and DONNER, Jonathan, 2009. Mobile communication. 1st ed., polity press, 
Cambridge, p. 129.
84 CULLIS, Roger (2007). Patents, inventions and the dynamics of innovation. A 
multidisciplinary study. Edward Elgar Publishing, Inc., Cheltenham, pp. 135-136.
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In fact, the exclusivity that accompanies a patent is not an absolute untrammelled 
right. Compared w ith copyright, w ith which the right holders enjoy a lifetime 
protection, the exclusive right granted by patent entitles right holders to  monopolise 
their invention for a limited period of time, which is normally no more than 20 years. 
In addition, since patent law also requires right holders to  disclose any useful arts, 
valuable knowledge can be accessed by inventors, researchers and manufacturers,85 
and bring advantages to consumers in the market and even the entire economy of 
country. This is why a patent is regarded as being a bargain fo r the ultimate benefits 
o f society86.
3.3.2. Potential problems with patents in the ICT industry
When considering the benefits derived from these inventions in ICT industry, it is 
easy to overlook the cost o f implementing patent law and its impact on competition, 
which may have a negative effect on innovation in the long term. When patent 
protection allows patent holders more exclusivity to  preclude competition than they 
actually need to stimulate innovation, it can lead to  an increase in market prices and 
the cost o f allocating research resources.
It is possible that a previous work may be a partial component of the later invention; 
in an industry in which technologies are highly fragmented, latecomers need to  pay a 
large license fee for collecting the patents. An enormous amount o f money is
85 GIFFORD, Daniel J. and KUDRLE, Robert T (2011). Antitrust approaches to dynamically 
competitive industries in the United States and the European Union. J.C.L. & £., 7(3), p. 710.
86 DESCHAMPS, Carole (2011). Patenting computer-related inventions in the US and in 
Europe: the need for domestic and international legal harmony. E.I.P.R., 33(2), p. 106.
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invested in advanced products in the ICT industry, 87 and the mobile 
telecommunication sector is one example o f this due to the stack o f various patents 
in one device. Accordingly, abusing patent rights in this sector is not merely a matter 
o f putting potential inventors off, but technology companies' hesitation to  invest in 
better products also eventually hinders economic development.88 Hence, the 
concern here is not only the substance o f patent law, but also the way in which 
patent right holders apply the monopolistic right granted to them.
3.3.3. Abuse of dominant position
In Europe, the European Court o f Justice (hereafter the "ECJ"), which is now the 
Court o f Justice o f the European Union (the "CJEU"), provided its observation o f the 
"dominant position" in Article 82 of the EC Treaty89, which was the prior provision to 
Article 102 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (hereafter the 
TFEU).90 According to the court, a "dominant position" is a position o f economic 
strength enjoyed by an entity, which "enables it to  prevent effective competition 
being maintained on the relevant market by affording it the power to  behave to an 
appreciable extent independently" o f its competitors, customers, and consumers. 
Further, in another case, the ECJ also expounded that IP right holders may be found 
to  abuse their dominance position if  they prevent the appearance o f a new product 
by refusing a license w ithout justification, and reserve the secondary market for 
themselves by excluding all the competition in the market.91 This is commonly known
87 ZHANG, Liguo (2010). How IPR policies of telecommunication standard-setting 
organisations can effectively address the patent ambush problem. IIC, 41(4). p. 384.
88 TORTI, Valerio (2012). IPRs, competition and standard setting: in search of a model 
address hold-up. E.C.L.R., 33(9). p.390.
89 The Full name of the treaty was "Treaty establishing the European Community" which is 
renamed "Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union".
90 United Brands Company v Commission [1987] ECR 207, paragraph 65.
91 Magill [1995] E.C.R. 1-734. This description was originally applied to copyright, but it can
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as the "exceptional circumstances tes t"92. (See Chapter 5 for more discussion)
In the US, one of the antitrust regulations is recorded in Title 15 o f the US Code, 
which is also known as the Sherman Act. The provisions o f this Act do not include the 
idea of "dominance"; rather, they stipulate that it is an offence to  engage in or 
attempt to engage in monopolistic activities.93 An early US case concluded that a 
monopoly offence had two key elements, namely "the possession o f monopoly 
power in the relevant market" and "the w illfu l acquisition or maintenance of power 
as distinguished from growth or development as a consequence of a superior 
product, business acumen, or historic accident."94
The competition systems of both the EU and the US have the shared goal of 
advancing consumers' interests, securing the circulation o f goods, and ultimately 
securing consumers' freedom of choice and protecting providers' freedom to  access 
a competitive market. Nevertheless, there are differences in practice when applying 
these competition laws. The provision o f the TFEU prohibits undertakings that abuse 
exclusivity; in other words, it targets those who already have a dominant position, 
but does not forbid the conduct whereby entities can obtain dominant power. Based 
on the stipulation, Article 102 o f the TFEU is only applicable if undertakings, the IP 
right holder, refuse to  grant a license or impose unreasonable licensing conditions, 
such as excessive licensing fees. On the other hand, the US Sherman Act prohibits 
those who already monopolise, attempt to monopolise, and those who cooperate or
also be valuable in patent cases.
92 TOTH, Andras (2008). Protection of investments in European abuse of dominance cases. 
E.C.L.R., 29(12), p. 712.
93 Section 2, Title 15 USC.
94 United States v. Grinnell Corp 384 U.S. 563 (1996), p. 571.
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conspire w ith any person to monopolise trade or commerce. In addition, the Act 
does not only apply to entities that constitute a monopoly, but the provision also 
applies to  person/persons who engage in monopolistic conduct.95
The aforementioned competition-related provisions reveal that IP right abuse issues 
are normally regulated by competition laws or policies, at least in developed 
countries like the US and most European nations. However, it is evident that there is 
not yet a global consensus on competition policies; indeed, international treaties like 
the TRIPS Agreement merely establish a principle on preventing the abuse of the IP 
rights of their members96; but it relies on member nations to  create specific rules for 
such issues.97
3.3.4. Patent trolls
The lack of guidance to right holders in patent law is criticised by commentators who 
propose that IP law should form a more disciplined concept o f IP injury to  present a 
clearer picture o f patent exclusivity and remedy.98 Patent law only requires right 
holders to  disclose information about the inventions; they are not obliged to engage 
in a technological exchange under the law.99 Namely, patent law focuses on the aim 
of incentivising innovation; the friction in the market is not a concern o f the current 
patent system.
95 SCHREPEL, Thibault (2013). Patent troll through US and EU antitrust law: when 
co-operation is no longer an option. E.C.L.R., 34(6), p. 324.
96 Article 8(2) of the TRIPS Agreement.
97 TIAN, George Yijun (2011). Competition law and IP abuse prevention in Australia: a 
comparative study. W.I.P.O.J., 2(2), p. 219.
98 LIIVAK, Oscar (2013). Establishing an island of patent sanity. Cornell Law School research 
paper No. 13-06, pp. 13 -14.
99 Supra., p. 15.
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To continue the above analysis, it seems that this contrarily contravenes the idea o f a 
patent as being granted to promote the progress o f useful art; instead, it allows the 
inventors to  patent every little  piece of a new creation, even if it is negligible and 
hardly assists the development of technology. On the other hand, it is also possible 
that speculators may purchase useful inventions or patents from right holders and 
license them to those who need to access the invention. Both o f these patent 
holders have one thing in common. Rather than obtaining patents in order to exploit 
and develop useful inventions in the market, they do so to make a profit from the 
huge gap between the cost o f obtaining the patent and the advantages after they 
assert patent infringement from others who have to  refer to it. They are called patent 
tro lls.100
Patent trolls usually target technology firms, especially those that are unaware they 
have infringed the patent and then threaten to file litigation. Since these patent 
holders do not create new technologies or refine existing works, but rather increase 
the difficulty for inventors to access necessary patents, this results in unfavourable 
consequences to the patent system and even harms the information society101.
("Patent trolls in the thickets environment" w ill be discussed in Chapter 4)
3.3.5. Patent hold-up and patent ambush in the smartphone industry
Apart from patent trolls, who take advantage of the shortcomings o f patent law, 
patent hold-up is another problem. As shown by the brief definition in the earlier
100 YEH, Brian T. (2013). An overview of the "patent trolls" debate. CRS Report o f Congress, 
pp. 4-5.
101 NG, Elizabeth Siew Kuan (2009). Patent trolling: innovation at risk. E.I.P.R., 31(12), pp. 596 
-597.
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section, patent holders' competitors may be unable to  enter the market because 
they cannot apply the essential creation; thus, they are blocked from selling their 
products and suffer great losses. Motorola was found misusing its SEPs by European 
Commission related to mobile and wireless communications just few months ago for 
the reason that it hold-up the SEPs and sought for injunction relief against Apple.102
A similar trick worth mentioning at this stage is patent ambush, which may also occur 
in the business world under the current patent system. Patent holders may quietly 
wait for an infringement o f the ir works and then demand an exorbitant price when 
someone accidentally utilises the ir patent, which constitutes patent infringement. 
This is a tactical strategy, particularly during the standardisation o f patent works.103 
More specifically, patent ambush occurs when an entity invests a great deal o f effort 
and money in a product and unconsciously violates the right holder's patent, 
especially when trying to implement an essential standard technology in the industry. 
The famous Rambus case is an example o f this in which the SEP holder concealed 
patent information during standardising process and asked ETSI members to pay 
unreasonable fees after its patent was adopted as standard.104 In these cases, the 
infringer may tend to pay the royalty as long as it is lower than or equal to  the cost o f 
transferring to an alternative technology.105
102 European Commission (2014). Antitrust: Commission finds that Motorola Mobility 
infringed EU competition rules by missing standard essential patents, [online] Available from: 
http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release IP-14-489 en.htm. Last accessed on 20 June 2014.
103 CHRONOPOULOS, Apostolos (2009). Patent Standards -  a case for US antitrust law or a 
call for recognising imminent public policy limitations to the exploitation rights conferred by 
the Patent Act? ICC, 40(7), pp. 782 -  783.
104 European Commission, COMP/38.636, December 9, 2009. The Rambus case will be 
discussed in detail in Chapter 6.
105 ZHANG, Liguo (2010). Refusal to license intellectual property rights under Article 82 EC in 
the context of standardisation. E.I.RR, 32(8), p. 404.
The aforementioned problems have been observed in patents granted for 
telecommunication technology in the past decade, when the main disputes have 
involved mobile telephony components. It is worth considering why patents are so 
important in the smartphone industry.
Samsung, which is the one of the famous mobile handset providers, has asserted 
patent infringement against other providers and sought for injunctive relief in pools 
various MSs in the EU106. These patents are essential to the industry standard and 
Samsung has made an irrevocable commitment to license them under FRAND terms 
to ETSI members. The European Commission initiated a formal proceeding against it 
in January 2012 and began to investigate whether or not Samsung had failed to 
honour its commitment, was abusing its dominant position, and hence distorting 
competition in the market107. The Commission believed that Apple, the defendant, 
was willing to license, yet was not able to do so. (Case analysed in Chapter 4)
The Commission's investigation against Samsung is a good example o f a firm  holding 
up a standardised patent makes it even more possible to constitute the abuse of a 
dominant position under the TFEU because the patent holder may obtain market 
power and obstruct the implementation o f its patent108. When Samsung's 3G and 
wireless technologies become the standards in the market, its rivals w ill have no
105 ROTONDO, Elisabetta (2012). European Commission initiates proceedings against 
Samsung for abuse of dominance by failing to license its standard-essential patents on fair,
reasonable and non-discriminatory terms. E.C.L.R., 33(8), p. 347.
107 European Commission (Press release), 2012. Antitrust: Commission opens proceedings 
against Samsung. Available at:_
http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release IP-12-89 en.htm?locale=en. Last accessed on 30 
March 2014.
108 TORTI, Valerio (2012). IPRs, competition and standard setting: in search of a model 
address hold-up. E.C.L.R., 33(9), p. 387.
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option but to refer to its patents to make their products acceptable in the same 
market. It is not hard to  imagine that Samsung will exert its patent rights on other 
smartphone providers and charge excessive fees, or even refuse to  license the 
implementation o f its patents. As a result, the company that owns the essential 
patents becomes the sole provider and is able to  control the quality and price o f such 
smartphone devices.
3.4. Brief conclusion
It is certainly true that not all the patent litigation filed in a competitive market is an 
abuse of patents. Patents allow holders to maintain the ir legitimate rights by 
enforcing them. Asserting patent against competitors is a legal way to  carry out the 
protection associated w ith a patent. Since the need to protect IP is derived from the 
fact that such creations require a high input o f intelligence but can be reproduced for 
a low cost, the legal monopoly is granted to right holders based on the ir need to 
recover their investment and to secure them from the disadvantages o f market 
fa ilu re .109 Therefore, the appropriate exercise o f IP rights enables inventors, 
individuals or companies to  profit from the ir creative work, and this stimulates the ir 
desire to engage in further creative activities.110
However, it is well-known that Apple and Samsung, the major companies in the 
smartphone market, had launched more than 50 patent litigations against each other 
in 10 countries across the US, Europe, Asia and Australia by 2012.111 Regardless o f
109 TOTH, Andras (2008). Protection of investments in European abuse of dominance cases. 
E.C.L.R., 29(12), pp. 710-711.
110 TORTI, Valerio (2012). IPRs, competition and standard-setting: in search of a model 
address hold-up. E.C.L.R., 33(9), p. 387.
111 Foss Patents (2012). List of 50 plus Apple-Samsung lawsuits in 10 countries. [Online] 
Available from:
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these lawsuits being lodged to protect the patentee's legitimate right or to restrain 
competitors' business, the current patent system has shown its risk of increasing the 
number o f patent suits. The smartphone industry is an emerging industry and one 
tha t is rife w ith innovation. Due to the incremental and fragmented nature o f this 
industry, the current patent system fosters an environment in which patentees can 
hamstring competitors by asserting infringement. Moreover, the ambiguous patent 
scope issued under the system also attracts more infringement because infringers 
can easily challenge the validity of the patents.112
Such a litigious environment will undermine the opportunity to  further advance 
technology because, even if inventors have valuable ideas, they may hesitate to  take 
the risk o f being sued. In the end, this will create obstacles to  technological research 
regardless of whether its purpose is to  make a profit or not and increase the difficulty 
o f the creative process, as well as delaying the move from existing products to those 
imbued w ith next-generation technology.113 Innovators may not be able to afford the 
high cost o f searching for resources and patent litigation under the current patent 
law. On the contrary, companies that can afford to  do so are utilising the m ajority of 
the ir capacities and resources for competitive purposes rather than R&D. Although it 
is not certain that patent effectively promote innovation by minimising patentees' 
risk o f being utilised w ithout authorisation, it appears that the patent system leads to
http://www.fosspatents.com/search?updated-min=2014-01-01T00:00:00%2B01:00&update 
d-max=2015-01-01T00:00:00%2B01:00&max-results=50. Last accessed on 3 April 2014.
112 POSNER, Richard (2012). Do patent and copyright law restrict competition and creativity 
excessively? [Online] Available from:
http://www.becker-posner-blog.com/2012/09/do-patent-and-copvright-law-restrict-competi 
tion-and-creativitv-excessivelv-posner.html. Last accessed on 7 April 2014. (The author is he 
Judge of the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit)
113 Shaver, Lea (2012). Illuminating innovation: from patent racing to patent war. Wash. &
Lee L. Rev.,69. p. 57.
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Chapter 4
Examples and Problems
4.1. Introduction
This chapter examines the current status o f patent system and the way in which it is 
implemented in practice before identifying the problems derived from patent cases 
in different territories.
The patent dispute between Apple and Google's Android operating system-based 
mobiles and the famous patent tro ll case in smartphone handset industry and 
relevant information communication technology will be taken as the main example 
to reflect and identify the omissions in the patent system and ascertain the way in 
which it is connected to  competition rules. The doubts raised in this chapter w ill be 
analysed in subsequent chapters.
4.2. Patent types and case laws as examples
Mobile phone manufacturers and their software providers are not only established in 
developed countries; Samsung, the South Korean technological giant, is an 
outstanding example o f a successful smartphone company located outside 
developed territories. However, statistics show that thirty-nine percent o f worldwide 
smartphone sales in 2013 were by companies w ithout a high market share, while the 
top five best-selling smartphone providers had more than sixty percent o f market 
share.114 Some device providers may not be as well-known as those embroiled in the
114 GARTNER (2014). Garner says annual smartphone sales surpassed sales of feature 
phones for the first time in 2013. [Online] Available from:
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recent patent war, but the ir products still have a market share in the domestic 
market of their specific countries. It may also be necessary for the ir products to 
refer to  others' patents to meet the public demand, and this is another reason to 
believe that patents in relation to smartphones and communication technologies are 
a worldwide issue.
Before identifying the inefficiency o f patent system in competition market, it is worth 
exploring how the current patent system w ithin the smartphone handset and 
telecommunication technology industry works; in other words, how technology 
companies put their patent rights into practice and how this affects the industry's 
competitive market.
4.3. Types of patent in the smartphone industry
4.3.1. Background
Patent consciousness has been elevated in the industry and an increasing number o f 
patent applications are being filed in patent offices. This consciousness also results in 
more patent lawsuits being filed in the courts.115 There are numerous examples o f 
patent litigation by well-known companies such as Apple, Microsoft, Motorola 
Mobility, Samsung, and so on.116 Due to  the highly sophisticated components and 
software in a handset and the rapid industrial progress o f advanced functions, most 
o f these cases have several common grounds, one of which is that the companies
http://www.gartner.com/newsroom/id/2665715. Last accessed on 20 April 2014.
Different from smartphones, the so-called feature phones refer to the mobile phones which 
have limited or no ability to support web access and to run third-party applications.
115 CARRIER, Michael A (2012).A roadmap to the smartphone patent wars and FRAND 
licensing. CPI Antitrust Chronicle, (2), p. 2.
116 Ibid.
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hold a massive number o f patents; for instance, Apple's famous product, the iPhone, 
has more than 200 patents, and as a result, Apple is the sole supplier o f its specific 
patented techniques and devices.117 Another common ground is that these 
companies seek to take legal action when competitors apply their patents or impose 
unreasonable licensing obligations on them rather than create patent pool and share 
patents.118
In terms of mobile handsets, conventional mobile phones are mainly manufactured 
fo r basic communication purposes, such as making and receiving phone calls. Since 
providers o f such devices normally focus on developing the hardware and wireless 
communication technologies, they own patent portfolios related to 
telecommunication operating techniques, some of which are established as standard 
technologies in the industry. Long-developed device manufacturers like Nokia and 
Motorola have a significant influence on the market share in the mobile phone 
market.119
Motorola is a good example o f this, since its portfolio includes a large number o f 
patents related to wireless communication hardware, although it was purchased by 
Google in 2011. Some of its patents are even adopted as standards in the field o f 3G 
(a standardised network support service fo r the transfer o f information) and 4G (an 
enhanced service of the 3G standard, which provides mobile ultra-broadband
117 COX, M.B. (2012). Apple's exclusive distribution agreements: a refusal to supply? E.C.L.R., 
33(1). P. 15.
118 An example can be seen that Samsung filed lots of patent litigation regarding its SEPs in 
the EU although some of the alleged infringers like Apple had tried to negotiate patent 
licensing with Samsung. More details of European Commission's antitrust investigation on 
this will be discussed in Section 4.3.2.I..
119 HOYLE, Ben (2013). Apple v Samsung: lessons from a global intellectual property war. 
C.T.L.R., 19(4), p. 63.
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internet access) technologies in telecommunications.120 On the other hand, Nokia, 
confronted Apple w ith an infringement lawsuit because Apple used its patents on 
phone cameras, power management, and other mobile phone applications;121 
besides, its patents regarding 2G (Global System fo r Mobile Communications)122 and 
3G communications were also adapted as SEPs to  telecommunication technology, 
which is essential as follow-up mobile phone development.
The first indication of the concept o f smart phones initially appeared at the 
beginning o f this century, when some computer characteristics were added to 
conventional mobile phones, and they were able to  connect to  internet; thus, they 
were capable o f being a personal digital assistant, a web browser and a provider of 
email services.123 Ever since the success o f 2G network in Europe, which then 
expanded outside Europe, mobile communication technologies have continued to  be 
enhanced and have moved on to advanced networks. The 3G network enables 
internet connection on a handset and seamless global roaming, which thus boosts 
the speed of communication and diversifies communication services. The 
communication network has now progressed to  a 4G system, which makes services 
available anytime, anywhere and provides a greater rate o f data.124
120 HOEHN Thomas and LEWIS Alex (2013). Interoperability remedies, FRAND licensing and 
innovation: a review of recent case law. E.C.L.R., 34(2), p 110.
121 Anonymous (2011). United States: intellectual property -  patents. C.T.L.R., 17(6), p.144.
122 ZHANG, Liguo (2010). How IPR policies of telecommunication standard-setting 
organisations can effectively address the patent ambush problem. IIC, 41(4), p.380.
123 WILLIAMS, Fred I. and SAFIULLAH, Rehan M. (2012). The smartphone patent wars: A US 
perspective. The Licensing Journal. June/July, p.16.
124 ZHANG, Liguo (2010). How IPR policies of telecommunication standard-setting 
organisations can effectively address the patent ambush problem. IIC, 41(4), 383.
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The telecommunication network is not the only means by which smartphones have 
been enhanced. W ith the production o f more advanced features, smartphones are 
now equipped w ith high-definition built-in cameras and voice recorders and even 
the ability to download data. Apart from the functional improvements, the mobile 
telephone evolution could also be seen by the appearance and usage-pattern o f the 
phone. A touchscreen keypad became the mainstream instead of the traditional 
keyboard input and more convenient operational modes, like slide-to-unlock and 
pinch-to-zoom, were introduced based on this technology. Mobile phone 
manufacturers began to attract consumers' attention by focusing the ir efforts on the 
user interface.125
Moreover, another characteristic of smartphones is the variety of software available 
fo r application, which allows them to  provide services such as maps, users' global 
position system, entertainment, social networking, and even intelligent assistance. 
However, booting an application programme, whether a bu ilt-in  or added app, relies 
on the operating system of the mobile device. Although each operating system on 
the market may only have a marginal level o f different software organisation or 
operating procedures, many legal actions have been launched in the recent patent 
war between the systems of the famous Apple iOS and Google's Android. This 
feature is one o f the decisive factors when customers are choosing a smartphone 
handset; it may also cause competition concerns because providers have to  ensure 
that they can support regular, attractive and distinctive software to  increase the ir 
market share.
125 HOYLE, Ben (2013). Apple v Samsung: lessons from a global intellectual property war. 
C.T.L.R., 19(4), p. 63.
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4.3.2. Formidable opponents and chaotic results
Ever since the first smartphone was introduced, the heady pace and number of 
patent disputes filed on different continents have become too rapid and widespread 
to be comprehensively followed. In the light of the observations in last section, a 
smartphone device contains different types o f patents that can be roughly 
categorised as communication networks, including wireless technologies; the design 
o f in-house hardware and the user interface; and application software and operating 
systems. A series o f cases, although not exhaustive, is discussed in this section in 
order to reflect the problems caused by the overflow of litigation and the damage 
likely to be caused to the information society.
These examples are chosen because they clearly reflect the underlying damage on 
the development o f each categorised technology. The main issues o f concern in this 
study include patent validity, FRAND licensing, and patent assentation entities, and 
an overall observation is given in the next section.
4.3.2.I. Communication network patents
The Hague District Court in the Netherlands refused an injunction request on a SEP in 
2011 when Samsung asked for an injunction to restrain Apple from applying its 
3G/Universal Mobile Telecommunication System standard.126 One of the reasons 
made by the Court is that Samsung was obliged to license its SEP to  Apple as it made 
a FRAND commitment. Moreover, based on the principle o f exhaustion, Apple's
126 D.C. Hague, Mar. 14, 2012, Dkt. Nos. 400367/HA ZA 11-2212,400376/
HA ZA 11-2213,400385 /  HA ZA 11-2215 (Samsung Elecs. Co. Ltd/Apple
Inc.) Cited from GREENFIELD, Leon B. et al. (2013). SEP enforcement Disputes beyond the
water's edge: A survey of recent non-U.S. decisions. Antitrust, vol. 27, No. 3. pp. 51-52.
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purchase of SEP work from Qualcomm made it licensed by extension; Samsung's 
term ination o f its license to Qualcomm did not impact Apple because it had made a 
commitment to SSOs to grant irrevocable licenses on the SEP.
Similarly, Samsung requested an interim measure against Apple's sale o f the iPhone 
4S in Italy, claiming that the operation of the iPhone 4S 3G system infringed 
Samsung's patents.127 However, Samsung's request was rejected by the Tribunal of 
Milan in Italy in early 2012 due to doubt o f the validity o f its patent and whether it 
was eligible to be a standard.128 In this case, the Tribunal denied Apple's claim that 
Samsung had abused its dominant position based on the fact that the two parties 
had actually negotiated the licensing o f the given patent. Moreover, the Court 
proposed meaningful principles to determine the reasonable royalties o f a patent in 
order not to constitute the abuse of a dominant position. Accordingly, patent 
holders should be able to determine the royalties o f their patent if it does not restrict 
the licensee's activities, and as long as the royalties are not discriminatory compared 
to other licensees.129
The European Commission noted that, in 2011, Samsung claimed various patent 
infringements of its SEPs against its competitors in the smartphone market and 
sought injunctive relief in many MSs. It was suspected that Samsung was attempting 
to  protect its dominant position by seeking injunctions. Therefore, the Commission 
opened an antitrust proceeding in Brussels in January 2012 to investigate whether or 
not Samsung had distorted the competition in the European mobile devices market
127 Samsung Electronics Co Ltd v Apple Inc. Unreported January 5, 2012 (Trib (Milano)).
128 SIRAGUSA, Mario (2012). Italy: Tribunal of Milan -  Samsung v Apple, January 5, 2012. 
6.C.L.R., 5(3), pp. R 32-R33.
129 Ibid. at p. 32.
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and breached the EU's anticompetitive rules.130 However, it is assumed that the 
Commission is likely to  close the investigation w ithout further action based on two 
signs, one of which is that the US Antitrust Division in the DOJ closed a similar 
investigation against Samsung in February 2014 in which it closely worked w ith and 
consulted its colleagues at the European Commission.131 The other is that the 
Commission received a proposal from Samsung in October 2013 which stated that it 
would no longer seek a ban on its competitors by asserting its SEPs if they were 
willing to acquire the license for smartphones and tablets w ith fair terms in the 
following five years.132
This again reflects the antirust concern on the negative impact of overflowing patent 
litigations and the inevitable combination of patent law and competition law. 
Samsung, which is one of the most influential enterprises in the telecommunications 
industry, owns many patents related to wireless communications, and since it is 
committed to the ETSI, its SEP should be made available to the public under FRAND 
terms unless there is any objective justification.133
130 Available online from http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release IP-12-89 en.htm. Last 
accessed 3 June 2013.
131 The United States Department of Justice (2014). Statement of the Department of Justice 
Antitrust Division on its decision to close its investigation of Samsung's use of its 
standards-essential patents. [Online] Available from:
http://www.iustice.gov/opa/pr/2014/February/14-at-129.html. Last accessed on 21 April
2014. Although the anticompetitive provisions are not complete the same in the EU and US, 
the DOJ indicated that "the cooperation underscores the agencies' common concerns over 
the potential harm to competition that can result from the anticompetitive use of SEPs."
132 GILBERT, David (2014). Almunia: EU antitrust investigation into Samsung patent abuse to 
end this April. International Business Times. [Online] Available from: 
http://www.ibtimes.co.uk/almunia-eu-antitrust-investigation-into-samsung-patent-abuse-en 
d-this-april-1435552. Last accessed on 21 April 2014.
133 ROTONDO, Elisabetta (2012). European Commission initiates proceedings against 
Samsung for abuse of dominance by failing to license its standard-essential patents on fair, 
reasonable and non-discriminatory terms. E.C.L.R., 33(8), p. 347.
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4.3.2.2. Design of in-house hardware and user interface
Before beginning to discuss this kind of patent, it is necessary to clarify that, although 
this study mainly focuses on the patent protection of technical devices and software 
o f products, a reasonable amount o f attention is given to  registered design, since this 
is inseparable from some patent disputes in the patent war in some cases. Apple is a 
conspicuous example o f a firm  that makes good use of its design and blocks its 
competitors' business opportunities via patent allegation. An example is given that 
Apple was successful in the US when it asserted that Samsung had used a design of 
one of its icons on its operating system. However, it failed in courts in countries like 
South Korea and the UK, where the judges tended to construe the protection of 
design narrowly.134
"Design" refers to the registered rights that may be simultaneously asserted in some 
patent cases because o f their close connection to a patented work.135 A registered 
design, known as a design patent in the US, is a kind o f IP right that mainly protects 
the overall visual appearance of the whole or part o f a product.136 In other words, 
while patents protect the functionality o f a product, registered design protects its 
ornamental non-functionality appearance. It is common for a smartphone company 
to lodge a prosecution for the patent and design infringement of the same product. 
Different from telecommunication technology patents, which are normally the core 
o f technology and essential to mobile phone production and practice, patents for
134 HOYLE, Ben (2013). Apple vs. Samsung: lessons from a global intellectual property war. 
C.T.L.R., 19(4), p. 64.
135 Ibid., at p. 63.
136 The legal definition of registered design can be found in article 25 (1) of the TRIPS 
Agreement, section 2 of the Designs Act 1953 in the US and section 1(2) of the Registered 
Design Act 1949 in the UK.
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user interfaces are usually related to registered design. With regard to in-house 
hardware, it is can be a subject patent; yet it can also be a subject o f registered 
design, such as Apple's bespoke system-on-chip design.137
In practice, user interface issues appear to be more common than in-house hardware 
disputes. The US District Court made a ruling in August 2012 based on the decision of 
the federal court jury,138 when it presented the verdict that Samsung had infringed 
Apple's patents on a bounce-back technique, pinch-to-zoom, and the design o f the 
iPhone. The jury judged that Samsung knew or should have known that it was 
infringing Apple's patents. Samsung had filed a countersuit claiming that Apple 
infringed its patents related to wireless communications and camera phones. 
However, it was believed that the Korean company had breached US antitrust laws 
because it was trying to monopolise the wireless market by holding the relevant 
patents, and the court ruled in favour o f Apple's assertion fo r these reasons. 
Samsung lost this case and compensated Apple w ith almost 1.05 billion dollars fo r its 
violation of Apple's patents on smartphones and tablets.
The verdict in this case did not only represent a financial loss for Samsung; in fact, 
the amount of patent infringement compensation was only a tiny part o f Samsung's 
annual revenue.139 However, this verdict undoubtedly had an earth-shaking impact 
on the business. As far as Samsung, the losing party, was concerned, the verdict not 
only resulted in the removal of the products that had applied the said patents, but
137 HOYLE, Ben (2013). Apple v Samsung: lessons from a global intellectual property war. 
C.T.L.R., 19(2). p.64.
138 TOTHILL, John (2012). The mobile phone patent wars. C.T.L.R., 18(4), p. 95.
139 LOVE, Brian J. (2012). Past unlawful injunctions shouldn't cloud Samsung Galaxy S Ill's 
future. TechCrunch. Access via SSRN on 1 May 2013.
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also made it more difficult to innovate future products because its future investment 
costs will be increased since it w ill have to evade Apple's patent or pay to  use it. 
Furthermore, the verdict may make consumers have less confidence on Samsung and 
it may impact the sale o f Samsung's products.
On the other hand, Apple once lost the case it asserted against HTC in the UK in July 
2012, in which the UK's High Court ruled that HTC had not infringed Apple's four 
patents. However, this case was lodged to enter an appeal and part o f the asserted 
patents related to the invalidation o f a computer device w ith touch-sensitive screens 
which handled the multi-touch function o f Apple's product, was allowed.140
The Court o f Appeal held that the Judge in the Patent Court rightly applied the 
reason of obviousness to deny the patentability o f the claim on a handling method of 
"multi-touch at a time." However, it stated that the Judge in the Patent Court wrongly 
denied the patentability o f an added feature for the method for the same reason.141 
Apple's patent related to computer programmes and thus is not excluded from 
patentability in the EPC and the UK Patent Act.142 It recognised that a judge had 
erred when inspecting whether or not the asserted patent fell w ithin computer 
software and was excluded from patentability. It emphasised the technical 
contribution to  the basic internal operation o f a device and having a new and 
improved effect on the product. Using a computer programme to implement the 
device was found not to render the device unpatentable. Apple's appeal on this claim 
was thus allowed.
140 HTC Europe Co Ltd v Apple Inc [2013] EWCA Civ 451.
141 Paragraph 91, [2013] EWCA Civ 451.
142 Section (2)(c), article 52 of the EPC; Section 1(2) of the Patent Act 1977.
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4.3.2.3. Application software and operating system
The operating system is the basic software o f a smartphone device. It contains a 
collection of software to manage the device's hardware and provide services for the 
application programmes. It is the core component that supports the operation o f the 
smartphone, with the function to support the mobile phone, development 
environment, power management and multimedia capabilities.143 The operating 
system classified in this category mainly concerns its substantial function in the 
system.
The most prevalent operating system is Google's Android platform which had more 
than a seventy-eight percent market share in worldwide smartphone operating 
system market in 2013 and the second biggest market sharer, Apple's iOS system, had 
nearly sixteen percent, whereas the remaining operating systems combined only had 
six percent o f market share.144
It is true that most operating system providers are capable o f developing distinctive 
software to attract consumers. However, in some circumstances software patent 
holders are individuals or small and medium enterprises (hereafter "SMEs"). They 
may choose to license popular operating systems to  obtain the best royalty rates, 
which causes competition concerns because consumers will choose the operating
143 DAPONTE, P. et al. (2013). States of the art and future development of measurement 
applications on smartphones. Measurement, 46, p. 3298.
144 GARTNER (2014). Garner says annual smartphone sales surpassed sales of feature 
phones for the first time in 2013. [Online] Available from: 
http://www.gartner.com/newsroom/id/2665715. Last accessed on 20 April 2014.
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system that can support more software operations. Moreover, smartphone providers 
may also choose to employ such operating systems to elevate the ir handsets sales. 
Operating systems w ith smaller market shares may be gradually eliminated and only 
those w ith a high market share can survive. Yet, this scenario is not the only 
possibility in the smartphone market. When other operating system providers 
introduce more fascinating software, the patent holder can ensure its dominance by 
attracting consumers to choose its system. As a result, software patent competition 
may encourage market participants to innovate. This is advantageous to  the 
smartphone industry and gives the public a variety o f choices.
Nevertheless, compared to the fierce battle over user interface design and operating 
methods, application software seems to be a less attractive subject for assertion in 
patent litigation. This phenomenon can be ascribed to the fact that the alleged 
infringers are usually apps developers, who are less influential than operating system 
vendors and device makers in the smartphone market. In fact, apps developers are 
normally small entities or individuals. These developers would find it hard to defend 
a lawsuit unless a well-developed company is behind the app or the ir app is widely 
accepted and circulated in the business.145 It is more likely that they w ill compromise 
and thus become an easy target to patent assertion entities to threaten patent 
infringement and demand fees for incomes.
Several lawsuits were filed in the US against small apps developers rather than the 
major companies in the industry. Lodsys alleged that the apps provided to Apple's
145 MULLER, Florian (2011). New smartphone suit also targets app developers: H-W 
Technology sues 32 parties. [Online] Available from
http://www.fosspatents.com/2011/03/new-smartphone-patent-suit-also-targets.html. Last 
accessed 10 November 2013.
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iOS and Google's Android operating system by developers infringed its patents.146 
The patent concerned the methods and systems for gathering information that 
enable consumers to purchase online via the app's software.147 Moreover, another 
patent-holding company in the US, MarcoSolve, launched a legal action against small 
app developers by asserting its patent on system and method for data 
management.148 MarcoSolve targeted the developers of the two major operating 
systems; therefore, developers' apps, which inevitably collect information online or 
in smartphones and evaluate and send data over the internet, can easily constitute 
patent infringement.149 It is believed that MarcoSolve targeted the developers based 
on the consideration that there was no sign that they would intervene in such 
litigation or petition fo r re-examination.150 This verifies the aforementioned reason 
of why individuals and small entities are targeted.
When considering the background of the patent holders in these cases, it seems that 
they are all companies that do not really focus on app software and programme 
development. The patent asserted by Lodsys was not invented by it, but was
146 SHURKIN, Joel (2011). Fighting patent 'trolls' -  there's no app for that. New Scientist, 210, 
2817, p. 26.
147 US Patent No. 7222078. Available from
http://patft.uspto.gov/netacgi/nph-Parser?Sectl=PT01&Sect2=HITQFF&d=PALL&p=l&u=%2
Fnetahtml%2FPTO%2Fsrchnum.htm&r=l&f=G&l=50&sl=7222078.PN.&QS=PN/7222078&RS
=PN/7222078.
148 US Patent No. 7822816. Available from
http://patft.uspto.gov/netacgi/nph-Parser?Sectl=PTQl&Sect2=HITOFF&d=PALL&p=l&u=%2 
Fnetahtml%2FPTO%2Fsrchnum.htm&r=l&f=G&l=50&sl=7.822.816.PN.&OS=PN/7.822,816& 
RS=PN/7,822,816.
149 ARTHER, Charles (2011). More app developers sued over patent claims. Available from 
The Guardian:
http://www.theguardian.com/technologv/2011/mav/18/app-developers-sued-over-patent-cl 
aims. Last accessed 7 November 2013.
150 GOPAKUMAR, Anoop (2011). Angry bird attacked -  Mobile app developers targeted in 
patent litigation. [Online] Available from:
http://wiki.piug.org/displav/PIUG/2011/09/06/Angrv+Bird+Attacked+-+Mobile+App+Develo 
pers+Targeted+ln+Patent+Litigation. Last accessed on 21 April 2014.
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purchased from another individual.151 With regard to MarcoSolve, it may actually 
engage in the creation of apps, but it is notorious for filing patent lawsuits w ithout 
warning the defendant parties. Indeed, patents award holders the right to  prevent 
unauthorised third parties from making, using, and selling their work. MarcoSolve's 
behaviour is the lawful exercise o f a patent. Yet, it does not commercialise its patent; 
rather, it had filed over seventy-five lawsuits in the eastern district o f Texas by early 
2014152 as the Eastern District o f Texas is regarded as the playing field for patent 
tro lls .153 Plaintiff's wins patent litigation against companies easily here thus 
defendants normally choose to settle.
In March 2014, a coalition o f MarcoSolve's defendants fought back by banding 
together, and stopped paying. MarcoSolve finally dismissed all the remaining 
cases.154 This was a victory for genuine innovators who actually engage in R&D. 
However, application software is often accused of patent infringement in the US, as 
illustrated by these cases. This is assumed to be because patent examination is 
relatively flexible in the USPTO than the patent offices in European countries; 
therefore, patents are easily deemed to be valid in the US court and patentees can 
enjoy the rights that accompany patents.155 This is certainly a disadvantage to  other
151 SHURKIN, Joel (2011). Fighting patent 'tro lls'-there's no app for that. New Scientist, 210, 
2817, p. 26.
152 MASNICK, Mike (2014). Newegg gets patent troll Marcosolve to "fold like a cheap suit". 
[Online] Available from:
https://www.techdirt.com/articles/20140402/14293426778/newegg-gets-patent-troll-macro 
solve-to-fold-like-cheap-suit.shtml. Last accessed 24 April 2014.
153 PATRICK (2011). Eastern District of Texas -  Leaving the playing field. [Online] Available from 
http://gametimeip.com/2011/01/07/eastern-district-of-texas-leveling-the-playing-field/. Last 
Accessed on 16 June 2014.
154 MULLIN, Joe (2014). Newegg and friends crush a patent troll. [Online]Available from:
http://arstechnica.com/tech-policv/2014/04/newegg-and-geico-stop-patent-troll-that-sued- 
dozens-over-forms-on-apps/. Last accessed on 24 April 2014.
155 DESCHAMPS, Carole (2011). Patenting computer-related inventions in the US and in 
Europe: the need for domestic and international legal harmony. E.I.P.R., 33(2). p.113.
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app developers and the companies that implement the asserted apps.
In the case of Lodsys, the defendants are small app developers who have insufficient 
ability to sustain long lasting and costly lawsuits, and in this case, the plaintiff 
company w ill be in the ascendant and can ask for payment, even if its patent is 
invalid or not as broad as it asserted. What is worse, despite not aiming to  sue a 
major or small-scale company, MarcoSolve adopted a strategy of 
sue-first-ask-questions-later, which renders the defendant companies less 
opportunity to seek remedial measures outside the court. Unlike Lodsys, who at least 
sent letters to the defendants before filing the litigation, MarcoSolve seems to more 
aggressively pursue business development than most patentees in the patent battle 
o f apps.
Apple once reacted to the lawsuit filed by Lodsys, arguing that it paid license fees to 
the previous owner o f the asserted patent, so that the developers of its iOS platform 
were not liable to pay fees to Lodsys. Unfortunately, the court dismissed this motion 
in September 2013 and allowed the plaintiff company to  settle all the cases w ith the 
defendants.156 What is worrying is that, if small companies or individuals are 
threatened by a lawsuit they cannot afford, they w ill either end up paying 
unreasonable fees or give up the development, even if they are actually devoted to 
innovation. Such a patent policy adopted is in danger o f strangling the opportunities 
for application software and limiting the prospect of smartphone operating systems. 
This will not only damage the benefits o f the companies and app developers in the
156 Decision made in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Texas 
Marshall Division. Available from:
http://zh.scribd.com/doc/171996136/Apple-Motion-Dismissed. Last accessed 18 November 
2013.
53
lawsuit, but also represent a huge loss to society.
4.3.3. Patent disputes -  Not just a matter of a single patent type
Communication technology patents in the smartphone industry are normally SEPs; 
patent holders are liable to license their patent to any individual under FRAND terms. 
Holders o f such a SEP may face investigation by antitrust authorities if they refuse 
the license or impose unreasonable terms on licensees. In contrast, patenting 
software and design features are more likely to prevent patent holders' rivals from 
mimicking their work and thus, place the patent holder in an advantageous position. 
This might be one of the reasons of why more smartphone companies have begun to 
focus on patenting software features and the design of user interfaces in business 
strategies. Even Samsung, which owns a considerable communication-related 
portfolio, has exploited the function to apply it to the software features in its 
lately-produced Galaxy 4.157
Nonetheless, patenting software does not necessarily mean placing the game in the 
applicant's hands; rather, the strict interpretation o f the patentability o f software in 
Europe creates a risk o f not being granted a patent. This is especially more potential 
in Europe than in other countries, like the US and Korea, despite the increasing 
importance o f software feature inventions in the smartphone industry. As mentioned 
in the case o f Apple and HTC, computer programmes are excluded from patentable 
inventions in Europe. Although this does not mean the negation o f patenting 
software features fo r smartphones, more rigorous requirements need to be fulfilled 
to  make a software invention patentable. Moreover, patent applications related to
157 HOYLE, Ben (2013). Apple v Samsung: the art of war. E.I.P.R., 35(9), p. 496.
54
such inventions usually face careful examination in case the claim may lead to a 
computer programme product, which does not constitute patentability.
Patenting ideas like the features and design o f a device is also confronted by other 
disadvantages under the current patent system. Patent protection granted to such 
inventions is relatively narrow.158 Namely, the protection is specific to  the feature in 
the patent claim, and the patent holder's competitors can easily avoid applying the 
same techniques or technology and create a substitute feature w ith a similar 
function. An interesting case is that Apple once won a patent litigation against 
Motorola over its slide-to-unlock patent in the German court in 2012.159 This victory 
enabled Apple to require the removal o f Motorola's products that applied the said 
feature. Although being ruled invalid by the appeal court in Germany later in 2013 for 
the reason of obviousness,160 the validity of Apple's slide-to-unlock patent does not 
seem to be too important because its competitors have created other unlock designs 
and implemented them in their smartphones. From the perspective o f the software 
feature inventors, this seems to be a deficiency of patent protection; nevertheless, it 
can be regarded as being beneficial for consumers since it facilitates a variety of 
smartphone features and designs to choose from. It also stimulates smartphone 
companies to engage in further R&D o f attractive and elaborate products.
4.4. Problems
158 TOTHILL, John (2012). The mobile phone patent wars. C.T.L.R., 18(4), p. 95.
159 Landgericht Munchen [Apple v Motorola) Unreported February 16, 2012 (Germany).
160 Foss Patent (2013). Apple's slide-to-unlock patent invalidated in German (decision is 
appealable). [Online] Available from:
http://www.fosspatents.com/2013/04/apples-slide-to-unlock-patent.html. Last accessed on 
10 April 2014.
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4.4.1. Patent trolls in a thicket environment
Technological devices like smartphones and tablets have taken a good deal o f the 
market share from the sale o f conventional mobile phones, personal computers, and 
even laptops.161 Such sophisticated devices are usually comprised o f various 
components that may be held by more than one patent owner; this feature leads to 
the fact that communication techniques are fragmented as a consequence of the 
different proprietary functions. In other words, an inventor has to "hack through" the 
patents necessary for an advanced product if he intends to create a new one.162 It is 
inevitable that inventors have to obtain multiple licenses from the right holders of 
the overlapping set o f patents to access each useful art and such a case o f stacking a 
dense network o f overlapping patents is known as a "patent thicket".
In the patent thicket environment, companies are burdened w ith being licensed to 
lawfully use certain technologies and commercialise products. If a SEP holder asserts 
its patent rights for trolling purposes, inventors may be in a worse position because 
the patent holder may ask for fees and inventors who have no alternative technology 
to apply, can only accept it if  they have sunk large funds into developing the product 
or abandon commercialisation if they cannot afford to  pay.
In the US case o f eBay Inc. vs. MercExchange, L.L.C., Kennedy J. o f the US Supreme 
Court concurred with an opinion against firms that do not use patents for producing 
and selling products, but only to  obtain licensing fees. In his statement, he indicated 
that an injunction or relevant sanction "can be employed as a bargaining tool to
161 HOYLE, Ben (2013). Apple v Samsung: lessons from a global intellectual property war. 
C.T.L.R., 19(4), p. 63.
162 SUBRAMANIAN, Sujitha (2008). Patent trolls in thickets: who is fishing under the bridge? 
E.I.P.R., 30(5), p. 183.
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charge exorbitant fees to companies that seek to buy licenses/'163 He also declared 
that, if  the patent concerned only relates to a small component o f the product, an 
injunction should not be awarded to the patent owner because the "undue leverage 
in negotiation" is harmful to the public interest.
It is understandable that some companies would like to collect patents as a defensive 
means; for example, if a company is accused of infringing another's patent, it has the 
chance to mitigate the damage from a lawsuit by making a counterclaim w ith one of 
the numerous patents in its portfolio. However, unfortunately, some ensnare 
unwitting users who utilise the patent and use it to institute proceedings. Such a 
threat of legal action is likely to constitute a patent hold-up.164 Therefore, trolling 
damages the market economy of the industry because it contravenes the essence of 
patent protection and exacerbates the incompatibility between the legal interests of 
patent and competition law.
4.4.2. The different US and EU approaches
It is worth noting that there are varying degrees of patent tro ll incidents in the US 
and Europe due to a somewhat different cognisance of anti-competitiveness in these 
two regions. Section 101 o f the US Patent Act is interpreted to mean that Congress 
intended to grant a patent to "everything under the sun that is made by man."165 Any 
method or process is eligible to be awarded a patent as long as it meets the other 
requirements of patentability. By virtue o f this, companies are able to  patent their
163 eBay Inc.et. al. v MercExchange, L.L.C. 547 U.S. 388 (2006). Concurring opinion available 
at: http://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/Q5pdf/05-130.pdf. Last accessed 11th October 
2013.
164 CHIEN, Colleen V. and LEMLEY, Mark A. (2012). Patent holdup, the ICT, and the public 
interest. Cornell Law Review, Stanford Public Law Working Paper No. 2022168, p. 102.
165 Diamond v Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303 (1980).
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works or purchase them from other entities, which simultaneously results in a deluge 
of patent infringement lawsuits because the more patents in the market, the easier it 
is to innocently infringe them .166 Such an environment spontaneously fosters the 
rampant growth of patent trolls in the US; conversely, trolling activities seem 
relatively less common in Europe.
The EPC lists the inventions that are not regarded as being patentable,167 and these 
include business methods and computer programmes. Although a directive 
regulating software patents was proposed in the EU, it was rejected by the European 
parliament in 2005.168 Thus, since acquiring a patent is not as simple as it is in the US, 
patent trolls are less active in Europe.
Other factors that deter trolling activities in Europe are caused by the configuration 
o f jurisdiction o f European patents and the way in which European courts charge 
litigation costs. The EU is formed of many European countries; however, due to  the 
absence of a community patent court and precise criteria for filing a patent lawsuit, 
patent enforcement mainly relies on the national courts of MSs and the ir patent 
policies. Hence, patent holders have to lodge lawsuits in different countries w ith 
various patent rules. As a matter o f course, these courts may have multiple 
explanations o f patent laws and hold different rulings when determining 
infringement,169 and this is definitely a factor that does not appeal to  patent trolls.
166 OHKUMA, Yasuo et al (2007). Patent trolls in the US, Japan, Taiwan and Europe (Digest). 
Tokugikon, I. 30. No. 244, p. 80. Available from;
http://www.tokugikon.jp/gikonshi/244kikole.pdf. Last accessed on 11th October 2013.
167 Article 52(2) of the EPC.
168 HAUNSS, Sebastian (2013). Conflicts in the knowledge society. The contentious politics o f 
intellectual property. 1st ed., Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, p98.
169 SUBRAMANIAN, Sujitha (2008). Patent trolls in thickets: who is fishing under the bridge?
E.I.P.R., 30(5), p. 187.
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W ith regard to the litigation costs in patent cases, a loser-pays system is applied in 
civil cases in Europe. Unlike the lawyer's contingent fee in the US, it is uncommon for 
a party and its lawyer to arrange the fee in Europe.170 This raises the risk of paying 
litigation and attorney fees if the trolling patent owner loses the lawsuit. 
Furthermore, since litigation fees are lower in Europe than in the US, the effect of 
threatening unsuspecting infringers w ith litigation may not be as attractive as it is in 
the US.171
Accordingly, although the US approach is in patent holder's favour; it also creates 
patent protection that fosters patent trolls. Adversely, being granted patent in the EU 
is relatively uneasy and troublesome; yet, patent tro ll has less chance to practice its 
strategies. However, sometimes, it only requires one valid patent to form a patent 
tro ll; such as the example demonstrated by MarcoSolve. Hence, it can be seen that, 
for solving patent tro ll problems, to  deploy prudent patent examination seems more 
important than restrain patent enforcement or antitrust sanctions.
4.4.3. A desirable international harmonised patent system
Since a smartphone device contains thousands of patents, it is normal that a device 
can infringe multiple patents from many countries in one time. Moreover, a type o f 
smartphone can be sold to worldwide; patent holders have to enforce its rights in 
each territories to acquire the injunctions against the infringing device. This reveals 
that, both to patent holders and infringers, the lack o f consistent patent system
171 OHKUMA, Yasuo et al (2007). Patent trolls in the US, Japan, Taiwan and Europe (Digest). 
Tokugikon, I. 30. No. 244, pp. 85-86. Available from;
http://www.tokugikon.ip/gikonshi/244kikole.pdf. Last accessed 11th October 2013.
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brings inconvenience when they get involved in patent disputes.
In the EU, the lack o f a uniformed patent litigation mechanism means that patent 
holders need to be familiar w ith the interpretation o f the patent rules o f different 
nations, and lodging many arguments in many regional courts constitutes a burden 
for patent holders. This predicament can be extended to a global context because 
patent owners may hope to acquire a global patent to protect the ir works on a 
worldwide basis. For this reason, there are calls for a harmonised patent system in 
the EU and even a global patent system in order to  ensure that a patent can be 
appropriately enforced w ithout troublesome, time-consuming, and costly 
proceedings.172
To begin w ith a problem that has long existed in the EU, there is, in fact, a legal basis 
for the procedure o f granting a European patent. According to the EPC, a single 
patent application can be filed at the EPO, central industrial property office, or other 
competent authority in the context o f not conflicting w ith the law of contracting 
states.173 What leads to this being unsatisfactory is that such a legal basis only 
provides fo r the possibility of acquiring an EU patent from the EPO and practicing it 
in the contracting states, but not gaining a patent that is approved and enforceable 
right across the EU. In other words, if patent holders hope to accuse a third party of 
infringing the ir patent in more than one country in Europe, they have to have the ir 
patent validated in those countries and have filed patent litigation in each o f them in 
order to enforce patents.174
172 PEHLIVAN, Ceyhun Necati (2012). The creation of a single European patent system: from 
dream to (almost) reality. E.I.P.R., 34(7), pp. 455-456.
173 Article 75(l)(a) and (b) of the European Patent Convention.
174 Supra., note 152 at p. 453.
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The first key factor in calling for a harmonised patent system in the EU is the 
burdensome expense of patent application and litigation. According to  the principle 
o f the primacy of claims, a patent claim provided by the patent applicant is the 
crucial basis for determining the patentability o f an invention at national patent 
offices.175 According to the EPC, a European patent that is applied for at EPO has to 
be filed in one o f three official languages.176 However, the most costly expenditure is 
the translation fees after the patent is granted and the annual renewal fees, which 
have to be paid individually in each country.177 Apart from the translation fees, the 
costs o f launching patent enforcement in national countries is also a financial burden, 
especially when the patent holder wants to file a lawsuit in multiple countries. 
Additional expenditure is also needed fo r a national expert in the prosecuting 
country, as a national professional representative is required in most European
178countries.
Next, another reason for a harmonised patent system is the quest for a specialist 
patent court, which only considers patent disputes w ith Europe-wide decisions and 
injunctions. Cross-border patent cases are normally dealt w ith by the national courts 
of MSs, and referred to GEU for a preliminary ruling in case o f further questions.179 
Notwithstanding the CJEU receiving referrals, its duty is not particularly to  settle
175 ROMANDINI, Roberto and KUCZNIK, Alexander (2013). The territoriality principle and 
transnational use of patented inventions -  the wider reach of a unitary patented and the role 
of the CJEU. IIC, 44(5), 530.
176 Article 14 (1) of the European Patent Convention stipulates that its official language shall 
be English, French and German.
177 KAZI, Ilya (2011). Will we ever see a single patent system covering the EU, let alone 
spanning the Atlantic or Pacific? E.I.P.R., 33(8), p. 539.
178 Ibid, p. 455.
179 Article 267(b) of the TFEU.
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patent disputes, but to deal w ith the controversies o f European law. W ith its sharply 
increasing number o f caseloads due to recent European developm ent,180 a 
centralised European patent court could not only slightly moderate this burden, but 
more importantly raise the quality of patent judgment w ith its professional expertise. 
As far as patentees are concerned, they would only need to file  a single litigation for 
such a patent w ithout having to struggle w ith the complex jurisdiction defined in 
different national laws; yet, the court's decision or injunction would be recognised 
across the whole o f Europe.181 On the other hand, it could also prevent "forum 
shopping", 182 which means that it could reduce the number o f choices o f national 
courts to  bring an indictment by speculators w ith a patent policy that is in favour of 
the patent holder. Hence an integrated patent system w ith a unified court is sought 
to create more efficient patent protection in Europe.
Furthermore, the patent litigation systems in each European country are not quite 
the same, nor are the patentability and estimation of patent validity and its 
infringement. Based on the principle of territoriality, a European patent is only 
effective w ithin the territo ry where the right is awarded to the patent holder. Thus, a 
national court other than that o f the patent territory has no jurisdiction to  judge its 
patent disputes and should refuse enforcing relevant judgment in the light o f this 
principle.183 Due to the lack o f a single patent court in Europe, patent holders file
180 PISTOLESI, Roberto (2013). The role of the CJEU in relation to patent disputes, particularly 
under the UPC. [Online] Available from:
http://www.dragotti.com/images%5Crp articoli%5CThe%20role%20of%20the%20CJEU%20i 
n%20relation%20to%20patent%20disputes.pdf. Last Accessed 26 October 2013.
181 PHELIVAN, Ceyhun Necati (2012). The creation of a single European patent system: from 
dream to (almost) reality. E.I.P.R., 34(7), p 459.
182 KAZI, Ilya (2011). Will we ever see a single patent system covering the EU, let alone 
spanning the Atlantic or Pacific?E./.A./?., 33(8), p. 539.
183 ROMANDINI, Roberto and KLICZNIK, Alexander (2013). The territoriality principle and 
transnational use of patented inventions -  the wider reach of a unitary patented and the role
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parallel litigation based on the same facts, which unfortunately sometimes leads to a 
contradiction in the decision of different national courts.
This inconvenience may be considerably mitigated in Europe by virtue o f the 
lately-adopted system in pan-European territory which is discussed later in Chapter 6 
w ith other legal approaches adopted to  assist the patent system.
4.4.4. Legal certainty of patent protection
Patent protection enables right holders to accuse a third party who engages in 
unauthorised utilisation, and competition policies are adopted to prevent 
speculators from using this right to  interfere w ith market competition. Yet, if 
competition policies interfere with patent rights, it is undeniable that innovation will 
be restricted because such an intervention is likely to confine the nature o f the 
patent.184 In this case, whether competition law should be applied over the 
protection awarded by patent law is questionable. A patent is only valuable when an 
infringement is prosecuted for violating it because this demonstrates that the patent 
is valid and enforceable.185 Therefore, if competition policies bar the enforcement of 
a patent, it w ill lead to legal uncertainty in terms of right holders' legitimate 
expectation to  exercise their rights.
From a general perspective, it is important that IP protection covers every dimension 
when it comes to policy-making. Apart from technology companies, which benefit 
directly from patents, the policy-making should also consider the welfare o f society
of the CJEU. IIC, 44(5), p. 530.
184SCHREPEL, Thibault (2013). Patent troll through the US and EU antitrust law: when 
co-operation is no longer an option. E.C.L.R., 34(6), p. 320.
185 Ibid.
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in general, since this will eventually be indirectly impacted by intellectual property 
policies.
In its quest to remain competitive in the smartphone market, Apple's ultimate enemy 
is Google, the creator of the Android operating system, which is applied by most 
other mobile manufacturers, like HTC, Samsung and M otorola186. As a matter of 
course, neither Apple nor the Android operating device suppliers will abandon such a 
lucrative business; therefore, patents are the best method to ensure the circulation 
of the ir products and, more importantly, block others from introducing alternative 
products. Ideally, from the perspective o f the whole information society, the more 
suppliers there are o f a specific device, the more choices are available for consumers; 
however, patents, which were meant to  encourage innovation, have become the 
means to restrict it.
The ideal solution to the contradiction between the legal interests protected by IP 
law and competition law is not as simple as reducing or sacrificing any legal interest. 
IP right holders expect to  acquire effective protection and a reasonable financial 
reward to  recoup the ir investment.187 Hence, IP law secures this expectation asked 
by right holders. This is also the core essence of the patent system. It is evident that 
global technology w ill be hugely impacted if right holders' expectations cannot be 
met because no company wants to work for nothing.188 It is certainly true that the 
current patent policy-makers should pay attention to the problem of patent abuse; 
however, it is also important to prevent them from overdoing it.
186 ILTAN, Cigdem (2011). Waging a patent war. Maclean's, Vol. 124, Issue 31, p. 36.
187 TOTH, Andras (2008). Protection of investments in European abuse of dominance cases. 
E.C.L.R., 29(12), p. 711.
188 ANN, Christoph (2011). Patents, piracy and competition. ICC, 42(8), pp. 877-878.
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4.5. Brief conclusion
Patent litigations among famous smartphone suppliers do not only impact the 
parties involved. In the aforementioned case, Samsung regretted the verdict that 
awarded Apple more than a billion dollars as compensation and stated, "Today's 
verdict should not be viewed as a win for Apple, but as a loss for the American 
consumer/'189 It also proposed that the impact o f the verdict could lead to fewer 
choices, less innovation, and potentially higher prices. Moreover, it is believed that 
the victory in this case encouraged Apple to file more patent litigations against its 
rivals.190
In order to ensure patent protection and simultaneously preserve the public interest, 
the employment of competition regulations to defuse the conflict between private 
patent right and public interests should stand by the principle o f minimising the 
damage to patent. Standardising patents is one of the methods to  cope w ith the 
patent fragmentation in the smartphone industry; yet there have been many cases 
regarding the enforcement o f SEPs (discussed in subsequent chapters), which 
manifest the sign that this regime may preclude the effective dissemination of 
patents.
Due to the importance o f SEPs in the market, the patent ambush problem they cause 
is worse than non-SEPs. Accordingly, when an SEP holder file a patent litigation
189 The full statement from Samsung is available via
http://www.theverge.com/2012/8/24/3266653/samsung-todavs-apple-trial-statement-loss- 
american-consumer. Last access on 1 May 2013.
190 HABENICHT, Jeffery (2012). Apple Inc. v. Samsung Electronics Co., LTD.. Available from 
http://iolt.law.harvard.edu/digest/patent/apple-inc-v-samsung-electronics-co-ltd.Last access
3 May 2013.
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and/or request injunction relief, it is necessary to examine its motives if it does not 
benefit other honest rivals in the market. It is especially crucial when the defendant 
is in a weaker position in the license negotiation. W ith regard to those who already 
have a certain influence in the market, like the major smartphone companies, it is 
true that their patent should be ensured like all others; however, the urgent task is to 
monitor their conduct which may unduly expand their patents and endanger the 
entire industry.
66
Chapter 5
Current policy drivers and the relationship with competition law
5.1. Introduction
The efforts in practice that tend to increase the accessibility o f patents. In the 
standardisation section, the European approach w ill be taken as the main example 
since its Horizontal Guidelines have explicitly given an indication of the application of 
competition law. The difficulties to obtain a licensing agreement will also be 
illustrated and then the justification for refusing a license w ill be introduced. This 
section will also establish a foundation for the compulsory licensing remedy in 
Chapter 7.
5.2. Standard essential patent in the ICT industry
5.2.1 Background -  How does standards influence competition?
In view of the variety of smartphone devices and services provided by different 
suppliers, standards are required to facilitate the quality, safety, interoperability and 
compatibility o f each product or service.191 These are described as aspects of 
technology that enable devices to work together; such as 3G, Wi-Fi and Bluetooth.192 
From the perspective o f smartphone consumers, SEPs enable products and services 
from different developers to work together and increases substitutability. It facilitates
191 ZHANG, Liguo (2010). Refusal to license intellectual property rights under article 82 EC in 
the light of standardisation. E.I.P.R, 32(8), p. 402.
192 MAIR, Carl (2013). The uneasy interface between patent law and competition policy. 
[Online] Available from:
http://leidenlawblog.nl/articles/the-uneasv-interface-between-patent-law-and-competition- 
policy. Last accessed on 7 April 2014.
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the overall size of the smartphone market to have more comprehensive economies 
of scale.193 In terms of smartphone devices providers, standardisation creates an 
opportunity to  pool technological information by virtue of assembling the expertise 
of a variety o f specialities, and it also assists the convenience and efficiency o f 
innovative activities. Therefore, technical standards are considered pro-competition 
and supposed to be welcomed by market participants and even consumers because 
they enhance the value o f products and the return on investment.194
However, IP rights protection grants right holders exclusive rights; on the contrary, 
standards seek to establish a "common pool o f knowledge" so that the standardised 
information can be applied by everyone.195 While standard-setting indicates the 
characteristics a product must have to be compatible w ith the uniformed market 
demand, it is inevitable that it also covers the proprietary rights that are protected by 
patent law. Thus, holders o f SEPs occupy a dominant position in the downstream 
market, and w ith their potential to prohibit market participants from using the 
technology, their market power becomes a means o f "turning the standard from an 
open to a closed standard."196 In this way, standards can cause anticompetitive 
concerns.
5.2.2. Legal basis of standardisation
Standardisation reflects the antitrust requirements in the TFEU. The Regulation o f
193 BONADIO, Enrico (2013). Standardization agreements, intellectual property rights and 
anti-competitive concerns. Q.M.J.I.P., 3(1), p.3.
194 MARINIELLO, Mario (2011). Fair, reasonable and non-discriminatory (FRAND) terms: a 
challenge for the competition authorities. J.C.L. & E., 7(3), p. 523.
195 ZHANG, Liguo (2010). How the IPR policies of telecommunication standard-setting 
organisations can effectively address the patent ambush problem. IIC, 41(4), p. 383.
196 BONADIO, Enrico (2013). Standardization agreements, intellectual property rights and 
anti-competitive concerns. Q.M.J.I.P., 3(1), p. 4.
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the European Parliament and of the Council on European standardisation gives legal 
basis to  use European standards for identifying ICT technical specifications and 
confirms that standards brings positive economic effect, increase competition and 
benefits economics as a whole.197 The concept of promoting competition also 
exists in US antitrust law. The Telecommunications Industry Association (the "TIA") is 
the accredited SSO by the American National Standards Institute in order to  enhance 
the industry standards in ICT in the US.198 As for the relationship to  IP, pursuant to 
the ETSI Guide on Intellectual Property Rights, its IP rights policy minimised this 
tension and therefore identified the involvement of IP rights policies in 
standardisation procedures.199
Apart from the above regional standard institutes, there is also a global standard 
institute, the International Telecommunication Union (the "ITU") which plays a 
leading role in the standardisation o f ICT and improves it to be accessible to 
worldwide. In cases of IP rights hold-up, although some SSOs adopt IP polices to 
ensure the disclosure o f SEPs and the accessibility o f patent licenses under 
reasonable conditions, these IP polices are not necessarily available in every SSO.200 
Nevertheless, the TIA, ETSI and ITU decide the major mobile telecommunication 
standards in the world and they all adopt the IP rights policy in the standardisation 
process.201 This reveals the inescapable fact that competition law and IP law should
197 Paragraph 3 of the Regulation (EU) No. 1025/2012 of the European Parliament and of the 
Council of 23 October 2012 on European standardisation.
198 Telecommunications Industry Association. [OnlinejAvailable from: 
http://www.tiaonline.Org/standards/.Last accessed on 25 Sep 2013.
199 ETSI Guide on Intellectual Property Rights (IPRs), 2011. [online] Last accessed 25 Sep 
2013 from http://www.etsi.org/images/files/IPR/etsi-guide-on-ipr.pdf.
200 ZHANG, Liguo (2010). Refusal to license intellectual property rights under article 82 EC in 
light of standardization context. E.l.P.R, 32(8), pp. 403-404.
201 ZHANG, Liguo (2010). How the IPR policies of telecommunication standard-setting 
organisations can effectively address the patent ambush problem. IIC, 41(4), p. 387.
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be simultaneously considered in order to address the hold-up and ambush problems 
in the technology industry.
5.2.3. Confliction between patent and competition in standard-setting
The standards in the mobile telecommunication industry are said to be especially 
significant and complex.202 This is due to the fierce competition in the smartphone 
market where companies invest in a high level o f R&D and the patenting intensity 
which makes such patents fragmented into numerous exclusive ownerships. 
Contrarily, in line w ith the purpose of standard-setting, patents sometimes have to 
be accessible to every participant in the market, especially those that are essential 
and cannot be bypassed when applying a standard. These are so-called SEPs.203
Standards are normally formulated by SSOs, which are composed of industry-specific 
participants.204 A technology is selected from several alternatives in the industry to 
be the standard o f a certain smartphone component or network service. However, if 
the chosen technology is patented, there is a risk that the patent holder will block its 
competitors from entering the market by hold-up SEPs or ask for exorbitant fees; this 
problem highlights the tension between patent protection and competition law.205
5.2.4. FRAND commitments and the Horizontal Guidelines
Being aware o f the problem of patent hold-up, patentees are often required to 
license their patents under proper terms before a technology is adopted as a
202 Ibid., at p 384.
203 CARRIER, Michael A (2012). A roadmap to the smartphone patent wars and FRAND 
licensing. CPI Antitrust Chronicle, April (2), p. 2.
204 Ibid.
205 TORTI, Valerio (2012). IPRs, competition and standard setting: in search of a model 
address hold-up. E.C.L.R., 33(9), p. 387.
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standard. The normal accepted terms of licensing a SEP in the EU are known as 
FRAND, which is an acronym for fair, reasonable and non-discriminatory.206 The main 
aim of the FRAND terms is to ensure that patentees will forfe it their right to refuse to 
license essential patents or only license patents when they w ill gain an advantage.207
FRAND licensing does not merely consider patent rights, but also anti-competitive 
issues.208 According to the IP policies o f the SSOs, IP right owners, especially those 
who owns SEPs in the industry, should grant irrevocable licenses w ith a FRAND 
license commitment to other participants in the industry. Confirmation that a FRAND 
commitment assists standard-setting is provided in the European Commission's 
Horizontal Guidelines,209 in which it is indicated that the SSO "would need to ensure 
effective access to the standard on fair, reasonable and non-discriminatory 
terms." 210 Unfortunately, there is no clear definition of what constitutes fair, 
reasonable, and non-discriminatory.211
Despite the lack of an explicit definition of FRAND terms, the implication o f these 
terms can always be deduced from relevant regulations, commentaries and case law. 
To begin with, the fairness in FRAND has been defined to  mean that a dominant
205 CARRIER, Michael A (2012). A roadmap to the smartphone patent wars and FRAND
licensing. CPI Antitrust Chronicle, April (2), p 2.
207 MARINIELLO, Mario (2011). Fair, reasonable and non-discriminatory (FRAND) terms: a 
challenge for competition authorities. J.C.L. & E., 7(3), p. 524.
208 CARRIER, Michael A (2012). A roadmap to the smartphone patent wars and FRAND 
licensing. CPI Antitrust Chronicle, April (2), p. 5.
209 Guidelines on the applicability of Article 101 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the 
European Union to horizontal co-operation agreements. Available from: 
http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriSe rv/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:52011XC0114(04):EN:NQT#to 
£>. Last accessed 3 Jan 2013.
210 Paragraph 283 of the Horizontal Guidelines.
211 SATTLER, Sven (2011). Standardisation under EU competition ru les-the Commission's 
new horizontal guidelines. E.C.L.R., 32(7), p. 347.
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company does not impose any irrelevant obligation as a cost o f applying its 
patents.212 In addition, right holders must not refuse to license SEP unless they have 
objective justification to do so.213
Next, FRAND requires the standard commitment to be "reasonable" which mainly 
concerns the matter of royalties. According to the provision o f the TFEU, imposing 
"unfair purchase or selling prices or other unfair trading conditions" is deemed to be 
the abuse of a dominant position.214 On the other hand, the Horizontal Guidelines 
forbid right holders to request unfair or unreasonable fees by charging discriminatory 
royalty fees,215 and this is accompanied by a note that "unreasonable fees" means 
excessive charges. Therefore, charging excessive fees w ithout a reasonable 
relationship to the product's economic value constitutes the abuse of a dominant 
position.
With regard to the non-discriminatory requirement, the provision o f the TFEU states 
that imposing dissimilar conditions on the equivalent transactions o f other trading 
parties is regarded as being the abuse of a dominant position;216 fo r example, 
charging one of the participants a certain fee while charging another a higer fee. In 
fact, when a right holder has the ability to impose discriminatory conditions on its 
rivals, it has a certain level o f market power. This requirement is to  prevent right 
holders from obtaining a competitive advantage over disfavoured parties.
212 ZHANG, Liguo (2010). How IPR policies of telecommunication standard-setting 
organisations can effectively address the patent ambush problem. IIC, 41(4), pp. 397-398.
213 ROTONDO, Elisabetta (2012). European Commission initiates proceedings against 
Samsung for abuse of dominance by failing to license its standard-essential patents on fair, 
reasonable and non-discriminatory terms. E.C.L.R., 33(8). p. 349.
214 Article 102(a) of the TFEU.
215 Paragraph 287 of the Horizontal Guidelines.
216 Article 102(c) of the TFEU.
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However, being adopted as SEPs does not necessarily constitute abuse of dominant 
position, albeit SEPs holders do have some level of market power. The Horizontal 
Guidelines provide exceptions in addition to the application o f FRAND commitments, 
which state that standardisation agreements do not fall under the prohibition of 
restrictive agreements in Article 101 o f the TFEU. One of these is that there should 
be no obligation to comply w ith the standard in the agreement,217 while another is 
that that participation in standard-setting should be unrestricted so that every 
affected competitor is able to select the standard.218 Finally, the Guidelines also 
mention that the procedure for adopting the standard should be transparent and 
therefore allow stakeholders to be informed about the pertinent work in good tim e 
at each stage o f the standardisation.219 This ensures that the standardisation 
agreement does not conflict w ith competition rules and can be applied to respond to 
the demands of each participant. These exceptions are commonly regarded as a 
"safe harbour" that permits standardisation agreements to  create market power 
w ithout damaging market competition.220
5.2.5. Discussion
5.2.5.I. The lack of FRAND definition
The significance o f standard-setting in communication technologies was affirmed by 
the Vice President of the European Commission responsible for Competition Policy in
217 Paragraph 280 of the Horizontal Guidelines.
218 Paragraph 281 of the Horizontal Guidelines.
219 Paragraph 282 of the Horizontal Guidelines.
220 BONADIO, Enrico (2013). Standardization agreements, intellectual property rights and 
anti-competitive concerns. Q.M.J.I.P., 3(1), p. 6.
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a speech early in 2012.221 He also noted the phenomenon of companies using 
patents as a strategy to acquire market power and hence increase their 
competitiveness. In this respect, the current standard-setting mechanism seems to 
be lacking. Article 101 of the TFEU is a good example of this, since it does not require 
SSOs to verify that the licensing agreement between participants meets FRAND 
conditions, but merely relies on participants' negotiation and self-assessment.222 This 
may raise a risk that licensees may still have to compromise w ith specious FRAND 
terms, which are actually not, in order to access a SEP.
It has been said that, from the perspective o f patent holders, the patent system is 
"based on something o f a lottery principle" because inventors have to bear the risk 
o f failure, yet they "hold out the prospect o f monopoly" if  the patent is successful.223 
To demonstrate the inconsistency o f the FRAND terms, Apple composed a letter to 
the ETSI, proposing that three elements should be considered to ensure the 
transparency and consistency o f the application of FRAND terms.224 One of these was 
to  defer to an appropriate royalty rate on the basis o f reflecting the portfolio o f SEPs
221 Joaquin Almunia, Vice President of the European Commission responsible for 
Competition Policy Industrial policy and Competition policy: Quo Vadis Europa? New 
Frontiers of Antitrust 2012- Revue Concurrences Paris, 10 February 2012. [Online] Available 
from: http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release SPEECH-12-83 en.htm?locale=en. Last accessed 
5 Jan 2013.
222 ROTONDO, Elisabetta (2012). European Commission initiates proceedings against 
Samsung for abuse of dominance by failing to license its standard-essential patents on fair, 
reasonable and non-discriminatory terms. E.C.L.R., 33(8), p. 349.
223 Areeda and Kaplow (1997). Cited from: ZHANG, Liguo (2010). How IPR policies of 
telecommunication standard-setting organisations can effectively address the patent ambush 
problem. IIC, 41(4), p. 399.
224 Original version available via MULLER, Florian (2011). 11-11-11 Apple letter to ETSI on 
FRAND. [online ]Avalable from :
http://zh.scribd.com/doc/80899178/ll-ll-ll-Apple-Letter-to-ETSI-on-FRAND. Last accessed 
16 Jan 2013. See also ROTONDO, Elisabetta (2012). European Commission initiates 
proceedings against Samsung for abuse of dominance by failing to license its 
standard-essential patents on fair, reasonable and non-discriminatory terms. E.C.L.R., 33(8), 
pp. 349-350.
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and their economic value to the industry. Another suggestion was that royalty fees 
should be no higher than the average price in the same industry, and while this 
suggestion has been adopted by the Horizontal Guidelines and the relevant US 
department, the third suggestion has not been advocated in the industry.225 This was 
that no injunction should be imposed on patent holders' competitors in case those 
competitors have to pay an unreasonable amount for the license. This suggestion is 
arguable because it seems to overlook the protection o f patent holders and deprive 
the ir legitimate rights granted by patents.
On the other hand, it is argued that FRAND conditions are insufficiently effective 
because potential licensees may be deterred by the complex and uncertain economic 
terms, which could confuse them about which standard is going to be licensed to 
them. In this case, market participants would avoid becoming involved in 
standard-setting affairs. This may further reduce the ir motivation to launch 
innovative activities because the products they create may become subjected to law 
suits if they become SEPs or they have to apply such patents.226
5.2.5.2. Good faith Disclosure requirement
The IP right policy of standardisation indicated by the Horizontal Guidelines requires 
participants to  disclose the ir IP rights in good faith on an ongoing basis so that the 
industry w ill have an informed choice o f technology to  enable effective access to  a 
standard.227 This obligation also requires "reasonable endeavours" to  identify IP right
225 Ibid.
226 TORTI, Valerio (2012). IPRs, competition and standard setting: in search of a model 
address hold-up. E.C.L.R., 33(9), p. 390.
227 Paragraph 286 of the Horizontal Guidelines.
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reading on future IP rights. The significance of the good faith disclosure to the 
development o f technological standards can be reflected in the prominent Rambus 
case, which is considered as patent ambush, in both the European Commission and 
the FTC in the US. Rambus was found to have abused its dominant position by 
concealing its patents and asking for high royalties after it was adopted as standard 
and widely applied in the industry.228 (This case will be analysed in Chapter 6.)
This reveals that the disclosure o f IP right information is important to  both SSO 
participants and IP right holders when the right at issue is essential to an industry. 
The risk o f patent ambush remains because IP right policies do not normally provide 
an explicit requirement of disclosure; the right holder's intentional deception by 
hiding its IP rights would enable it to evade its FRAND commitments.229 On the 
other hand, it has been argued that searching patents under the disclosure obligation 
is costly; it especially burdens a patent holder with a large portfo lio.230 Even if  patent 
holders manage to do so, it cannot be guaranteed that the disclosed IP information is 
essential to the industry.
An example can be seen from the UK High Court o f Justice, when its patent court 
ruled in Nokia vs. Interdigital Technology that three out o f four essential patents 
claimed by the defendant were not essential to the 3G mobile telecommunication 
standards in Europe.231 A similar problem may also arise in the disclosure o f future 
patent claims and pending applications. Patent examination is a complex and long
228 SATTLER, Sven (2011). Standardisation under EU competition ru les-the Commission's 
new horizontal guidelines.EC.L/?.,32(7), pp. 346-347.
229 Ibid.
230 ZHANG, Liguo (2010). How IPR policies of telecommunication standard-setting 
organisations can effectively address the patent ambush problem. IIC, 41(4), p.388.
231 Nokia Corp v Interdigital Corp [2007] EWHC 3077 (Pat).
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procedure, and patent holders may be limited by policies, such as the secrecy of 
patent application and the alteration o f patent claims, and thus unable to provide 
elaborate information. There is also no guarantee that a patent would eventually be 
granted to the applicant.232 In general, the disclosure is regarded as exacerbating 
the uncertainty o f standardisation and is not always helpful for standardising 
essential patents.
5.2.5.3. Summary
Although the setting of standards addresses the problems o f patent hold-ups and 
patent ambush, it should also be emphasised that the standardisation o f a patented 
work does not automatically lead to the abuse of a dominant position. According to 
the German Federal Supreme Court, if licensors have objective and justified reasons 
to refuse a license or charge different fees for different trade parties fo r equivalent 
transactions, it will not be considered to be ambushing.233
The standardisation o f essential patents relies on the careful selection o f appropriate 
technical standards to be scrutinised on a case-by-case basis in consideration of 
FRAND terms. Furthermore, the relevant authorities should clarify the terms for 
applying a standard in order to provide participants w ith a clear idea and ensure fair 
competition in the market.
232 BONADIO, Enrico (2013). Standardization agreements, intellectual property rights and 
anti-competitive concerns. Q.M.J.I.P., 3(1), p.16, note 79.
233 German federal Supreme Court, Standard Tight-Head Drum (Standard-Spundfass), 36 IIC 
No.6 (2005), 747.
77
5.3. Patent licensing in the patent thicket
5.3.1. Patent pool and cross-licensing
The ability of patents to stimulate innovation comes w ith the adverse effect 
associated with hold-up problems. This crisis is even more serious in the patent 
thickets where innovators have to hack their way through multiple patents. In 
addition to the licensing regimes imposed on SEPs and patent holders, which is 
essential to the market, there also other strategies to make essential patents 
accessible to others. This particularly applies where multiple patent holders may hold 
complementary patents and block a potential product from gaining access.
When two companies own patents that need to be applied to each other's products, 
a cross-license can ensure access to these patented works. Rather than risking patent 
infringement and the burden of litigation, the two parties can negotiate acceptable 
royalties on cross-licensing patents or even agree a royalty-free arrangement.234 Both 
parties are free to compete w ithout worrying that high royalty rates will be extracted 
from each unit they sell. Cross-licensing is normally believed to be pro-competitive.
On the other hand, if two or more companies own patents that are essential to 
produce a product while the actual or potential producers do not hold any o f them, a 
jo in t patent licensing programme may be launched and the companies can license 
their patents as a package to other members in the pool or any third party who is 
willing to pay to access the patents.235 Licensing all the patents in the patent pool can
234 SHAPIRO, Carl (2001). Navigating the patent thicket: Cross-licenses, patent pools, and 
standard-setting. Innovation Policy and Economy, Volume 1. p. 9.
235 Ibid., pp. 9-10.
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contribute to the acquisition of complementary patents and ease licensees' burden, 
since they only need to engage in one-stop shopping to access the patents they need, 
which is welcomed in a patent thicket environment.
5.3.2. Cooperation in the smartphone industry?
Both cross-licensing and patent pools are constructive strategies to circulate patents, 
since they not only expedite horizontal cooperation among patent holders in an 
industry, but also accommodate licensees. Since the cost of paying fo r two or more 
separate patent licenses is considerably higher than the charge for obtaining them all 
at once, this helps to reduce possible royalty stacking that accumulates with 
numerous royalty charges. In addition, a patent can be used more effectively if it has 
to be applied w ith another patent included in the same license agreement to 
demonstrate its function.
However, there is a perception that patent pools are likely to reduce innovation, and 
this is especially true when the patent in the pool is essential to industry. Although 
they can be used to help establish compatibility standards, there is still a risk that 
they may block the entry of other alternative technologies.236 Such essential patents 
are generally complementary, and it is necessary for the technology that the pool is 
firm ly based and therefore should not be held by anyone within or outside the pool. 
According to  the agreement, members of the pool are entitled to obtain royalties in 
return; therefore, they may not be inclined to license the ir patents outside the pool. 
This will block inventors who have not joined the pool, thereby restraining the ir 
innovative activities.
236 LANG, John Temple (2011). Patent pool and agreements on standard. E.L.Rev., 36(6). pp. 
887-888.
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Cross-licensing and patent pools are moderate strategies to  reduce the damage of 
patent hold-up. They preserve the patent holder's reward and exclusivity and make 
useful information available to  licensees. Both licensors and licensees o f pooled 
patents are voluntary participants in the licensing agreement w ith a satisfactory 
amount o f royalty. This is certain to encourage potential inventors and has a positive 
effect on innovation; yet, one o f the very first premises to be met is that patent 
holders want to join the pool, accept the terms and conditions, and are willing to 
divide the proceeds with other holders, and in some cases, this may be hard to 
achieve.
Some patent holders such as non-practicing entities do not utilise their patents but 
simply benefit from them by demanding high royalties. Since they do not actually 
apply them to new or advanced innovations, there is no point in cross-licensing w ith 
other patent holders or joining a patent pool and sharing the revenue w ith other 
participants. Moreover, patents are sometimes regarded as being a means to  exclude 
competitors' products so that the holding company can expand its market share, and 
these patent holders may not intend to license their patent. Even if  they do, another 
potential danger is a consortium consisting of patent holders o f leading technologies, 
since this forms an even stronger barrier to accessing patents based on the essential 
patents they own. Thus, patent pools and cross-licensing be o f limited assistance in 
facilitating the circulation of patents. An example o f this is the consortium "Rockstar", 
which comprised many famous companies and which acquired a large portfolio from 
the bankrupted company, Nortel. Rockstar alleged that the operating system of 
Google infringed the myriad patents it had obtained from the auction, thus
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substantially raising the costs of Google and its Android partners.237
Furthermore, hardware and software suppliers may have diverse specialities in 
industries like the smartphone industry. Microsoft owns remarkable patent portfolios 
in the field o f software and Apple focuses on user interface, while other companies 
may hold essential patents in the field o f wireless telecommunication. Since the 
respective patents held by each company do not apply to other's technology, it is 
hard to envisage that they would be attracted by other's patents and license the ir 
own patents in order to access those o f others.238
5.3.3. Essential facilities doctrine in exceptional circumstances
The TRIPS Agreement instructs its WTO Members that limited exceptions can be 
made to  a patentee's exclusive right when third parties' legitimate interests are taken 
into account as long as this does not unreasonably conflict or prejudice the patent 
holder's legitimate interests.239 In Europe, the ECJ clarified in early case law that an 
obligation imposed on IP right holders to license their right, even in return fo r a 
reasonable royalty, would demean the substance of the right holder's exclusivity; 
thus, a refusal to license could not be deemed as being an abuse of a dominant 
position. However, the court also noted that the exercise o f an exclusive right may be 
prohibited by the EC Treaty.240 In the flowing meaningful cases, the European court
237 LANE, Matthew Cameron (2013). Patent wars: How the government can best address 
anticompetitive patent accumulation by updating the Horizontal Merger Guidelines. 
Available from SSRN: http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm7abstract id=2225990. p.13; 
Last accessed 9th February 2014.
238 MAIER, Timothy J. (2011). Diving into the patent pool. Intellectual Property Magazine. 
Available from:
http://www.maierandmaier.com/documents/Timothv-J-Maier-IPM-Qctober-2011-Diving-lnt 
o-the-Patent-Pool.pdf. Last accessed 27th February 2014.
239 Article 30 of the TRIPS Agreement.
240 AB Volvo [1988] E.C.R. 6211. Paras 8 and 9.
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acknowledged that intellectual property should be made available to  specific third 
parties in exceptional circumstances.
Two decades ago, in the M agill case, the ECJ confirmed the concept that IP right 
holders' refusal to license their right does not in itself constitute anti-competitive 
conduct, and this concept applies even if the right holder is in a dominant 
position.241 As mentioned in Chapter 3, in this case, the ECJ also established an 
exceptional circumstances test to  consider if a right holder should be regarded as 
having abused his dominant position. Ten years later in the case o f IMS Health, the 
ECJ confirmed the exceptional circumstances test and further elucidated that three 
cumulative conditions should be satisfied to determine if IP right holders' refusal to 
grant a license to give access to work that is indispensable for continuing a business, 
constitutes abusive conduct. The conditions were concluded that, if the refusal 
prevented the emergence of a new product for which there is a potential consumer 
demand, the refusal is objectively unjustified.242 The court also emphasised that 
refusal to license can be classified as abusive conduct if it leads to the competition in 
the downstream market being eliminated.
Although these cases did not particularly refer to patent disputes, they paint a 
clearer picture of the exception o f IP protection, especially the right of exclusivity 
granted by IP law. In M agill and IMS Health, the ECJ stressed tha t products that 
require access to IP rights should be "new" to constitute abuse of a dominant 
position if the right holders refuse to issue a license. Namely, they argued that right 
holders' exclusivity should be excluded if the product was not provided by IP right
241 Magill [1995] E.C.R.1.1-743. Paras 46-49.
242 IMS Health v NDC (C-418/01)[2004]E.C.R. 1-5039. Paragraph 38.
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holders and there was a consumer demand in the downstream market.243This 
concept was initially applied to tangible rights and required a dominant firm  who 
controlled the essential facilities to which a licensee needed access to provide a new 
product.244 This essential facilities doctrine is now applied, at least in some European 
courts, to justify a legitimate exception to an IP right.
The essential facilities doctrine is useful in cases where the public interest protected 
by ensuring competition is outweighed by the private right granted by IP. However, in 
the ICT sector, where interoperability is significant for innovation, the Court o f First 
Instance in the EU (the "CFI", now the "General Court") advocated the application of 
the doctrine established by the ECJ in an appellate case only if it employed a lower 
standard to examine the four criteria for intellectual property licensing.
In the case o f Microsoft, Microsoft's PC operating system had become standard in 
the industry because of its high market share, and its competitor, Sun Microsystems, 
asked to access Microsoft's workgroup server information to make its product 
interoperable in the market. Microsoft refused and Sun Microsystems complained to 
the Commission.245 The Commission ruled that Microsoft had abused its dominant 
position and imposed the highest fine ever recorded at the time on M icrosoft.246 
This case was appealed to the CFI where the Commission's decision was upheld and 
it was confirmed that the interoperability information was indispensable under the
243 Ibid, at paragraph 49.
244 ZHANG, Liguo (2010). Refusal to license intellectual property rights under article 82 EC in 
light of the standardisation context. E.I.P.R, 32(8). p. 408.
245 European Commission, COMP/C-3/37.792 Microsoft [2004] OJ L32/23.
246 GRAEF, Inge (2011). Tailoring the essential facilities doctrine to the IT sector: compulsory 
licensing of the intellectual property rights after Microsoft. C.S.L.R., 7(1), pp. 6-7.
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essential facilities doctrine in this case.247
The CFI indicated that Article 82 o f the EC Treaty does not apply only from the time 
when there is no competition in the market;248 it applies when the refusal of the 
license is liable or likely to eliminate the competition. The CFI confirmed that the 
doctrine established in earlier cases should be taken into account; however, it also 
clarified that all the circumstances o f the refusal in the case should be considered 
because not all circumstances will be the same as in earlier cases. Furthermore, in 
Microsoft, the CFI also pointed out that the "new product" criterion cannot merely 
be established from the judgment or prejudice of consumers under the EC Treaty.249 
In this case, the refusal o f the license would force consumers to  be locked into 
Microsoft's product because its competitor was not able to provide an interoperable 
product, thus limiting consumers' choice.250
The CFI's reasoning for upholding the case was persuasive, since it considered the 
special nature o f the case. The ICT industry creates the environment for a networked 
effect; therefore, Microsoft would increase the entry barrier to its competitors if  it 
failed to make the interoperability information available to them. The strict 
explanation of the essential facilities doctrine may be appropriate in other cases; 
however, the lenient application applied in the Microsoft case was fair and 
reasonable in the specific circumstances of the ICT industry. The essential facilities 
doctrine may be welcomed by competitors who seek access to essential technology, 
but it is controversial in terms of economic growth and strict IP protection because it
247 Microsoft v Commission (T-201/04) [2007] E.C.R. 11-3601.
248 Ibid. Para 561.
249 Article 82 (b) of the EC Treaty which equivalent to Article 102 of the TFEU.
250 Microsoft v Commission (T-201/04) [2007] E.C.R. 11-3601. Paras 650- 652.
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contravenes the exclusive right awarded to patent holders, which is deemed to 
encourage innovation.
5.3.4. Summary
5.3.4.I. Adverse opinions on the doctrine
Compared to  the EU court, the essential facilities doctrine has never been expressly 
recognised in the US to justify the refusal to supply essential patents; nor has 
compulsory licensing, which is the implementation o f the doctrine, been adopted as 
a remedy in such cases in the public interest. It is found that a company's unilateral 
refusal to license can hardly constitute the basis o f liability in the US courts because 
the right to exclude others is at the heart of IP rights.251 The US court establishes 
more stringent requirements for injunction relief, as demonstrated in the eBay case 
in Chapter 4, to address the accessibility o f necessary patents o f other users. The 
doctrine is more accepted in Europe than in the US, albeit the US Supreme Court did 
apply certain theories analogous to the doctrine to address the elements when 
determining the liability o f refusal to supply essential facilities.252
The adverse opinions o f the doctrine are normally based on reasons of investment 
incentives. In the US, the DOJ and FTC clarify that the market power of the IP holder 
does not impose an obligation to license the use o f IP to others.253 As for the EU, in
251 YU, Qiang (2014). Software interoperability information disclosure and competition law. 
E.C.L.R., 35(3), p.240.
252 MCI communications v AT&T, 708 F.2d 1081 (7th Cir.1983). 464 US 891 (1983).
253 U.S. Department of Justice and the Federal Trade Commission (1995). Antitrust 
Guidelines for the Licensing of Intellectual Property, p. 4. Available at: 
http://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/attachments/competition-policv-guidance/0558.pdf.
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the Bronner case the court made a statement that followed the same viewpoint that 
"... the mere fact that by retaining a facility for its own use a dominant undertaking 
retains an advantage over a competitor cannot justify require access to it."254 The 
essential facilities doctrine apparently goes against these concepts and has an 
adverse impact. Although the subject matter in the Bronner decision in Europe 
concerned tangible assets, the court indicated a stricter justification for the 
application of the doctrine. The market elimination and objectively justified 
requirement in the previous M agill case seemed not to be sufficient since it merely 
showed the inconvenience o f duplicating the facility. According to the court, the 
threshold to the essentiality o f a facility can only be demonstrated when the facility 
is "indispensable" to  carry on the potential licensee's business for which there is no 
substitute in the market.255
5.3.4.2. Licensing regime in patent protection
In the emerging technology business, innovative goods normally compete w ith 
existing innovations, and substitutive and competitive products are stimulated to be 
introduced in this way and thereby promote the dynamic efficiency o f the 
development and economic growth o f this industry. Examples o f this phenomenon 
normally exist in industries like mobile phone operating systems and web browser 
software.256 It is true that depriving the exclusive right to a patent w ill reduce this 
dynamic efficiency due to the lack o f incentive to both monopolists and competitors
254 Oscar Bronner GmbH &Co KGV Mediaprint Zeitungs und Zeitschriftenverlag GmbH & Co 
KG (C7/97) [1998] E.C.R. 1-7791; [1999] 4 C.M.L.R. 122. Cited from CHOI, Jay Pil (2010). 
Compulsory licensing as an antitrust remedy. W.I.P.O.J., 2(1), p78.
255 Ibid., at paragraph 41.
256 YU, Qiang (2014). Software interoperability information disclosure and competition law. 
E.C.L.R., 35(3), p.238.
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to  invest in innovation. However, it has always been a scabrous task to strike the 
balance between ex-post competition and ex-ante investment incentives, and it 
seems that there is not yet a scheme that satisfies both aspects, or indeed ever will 
be. At this stage, mandatory access to essential patents w ith reasonable 
compensation to  holders is the regime that brings less obstruction to patent 
exclusivity and is the best possible way to be applied in practice.
The best rate o f compensation to patent holders in compulsory licensing is a task for 
antitrust authorities and is thus not the concern of patent law. The essential question 
to be considered here is how to minimise the risks that accompany compulsory 
access to the patents. Since the absence of generally agreed decisive elements to  the 
essential facilities doctrine remains, the priority is to  employ cautious scrutiny o f the 
doctrine for sure. The court in the aforementioned Microsoft case is deemed to  have 
demonstrated a good example o f construing the doctrine based on the particular 
facts of the case.257 This may be an optimal way to apply the doctrine when its 
explanations are not completely certain but it has been applied to decide the 
threshold o f competitive intervention. This theory not only reduces innovative 
incentives, but it also creates uncertainty to patent holders, since it is hard to  predict 
when and how they will be deemed to have abused the ir dominant position. Hence, 
the application o f the essential facilities doctrine should, in principle, be strictly 
justified in order to preserve the exclusivity o f patents.
The implementation o f this doctrine, which is normally presented in compulsory 
licensing, w ill be discussed in the Chapter 7.
257 GRAEF, Inge (2011). Tailoring the essential facilities doctrine to the IT sector: compulsory 
licensing of the intellectual property rights after Microsoft. C.S.L.R., 7(1), p. 9.
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Chapter 6
What is the current state of patent law and competition law in practice?
6.1. Introduction
The practical approaches of patent law are observed in this chapter in conjunction 
with competition law in the EU and US. The chapter begins w ith an analysis o f the US 
patent system w ith two famous cases as examples, which demonstrate how patent 
ambush is measured in the ICT industry. Next, it moves on to the EU patent system 
and the recently-adopted unitary patent system.
Smartphone provides the communication functions o f traditional mobile phones and 
the data processing functions of computers. Two cases given here are related to the 
data process technologies (the Rambus case) and wireless telecommunication 
technologies (the Qualcomm case) that can be deployed on smartphone. The 
approaches to the two cases are analysed to determine how the abuse hardware and 
communication technology patents were ruled to  identify the most urgent task for 
both EU and US anticompetitive authorities.
Finally, whether or not the major smartphone companies' aggregation o f patents can 
enhance the development o f the smartphone industry is discussed by referring to  
the investigation in the EU and US of the conspicuous merger between Google and 
Motorola.
6.2. US dimension
The exercise of exclusive right is especially contentious when the patent is SEP. For
89
the same reason, a misleading standardisation process can be deemed as harming 
competition, since it disturbs the determination of an SSO and distorts the best 
standard that can be applied to the market. This creates the potential danger of 
turning the standardisation o f technology into a tactical approach to collect 
bargaining power.
6.2.1 Rambus case in the US
The Federal Trade Commission (hereafter the "FTC") in the US has made a significant 
decision in a series o f suits concerning the acquisition of bargaining power by 
concealing patent information during standard-setting proceedings. In the case of 
Rambus258, the company, which owns the patent o f reduce electronic memory's 
impact on process speed, failed to disclose its IP holdings in accordance w ith the 
policy o f the SSO, the Joint Electronic Device Engineering Council ("the JEDEC"), as it 
was required to do. Rambus revealed its patent after its patents were adopted as 
standard in dynamic random access memory (known as "DRAM") products. It then 
asserted its patents against manufacturers who applied its technologies in DRAM and 
chipsets; however, the JEDEC and its members believed that the technologies should 
be in the public domain.
According to the FTC, the failure of Rambus to reveal its patent in good time enabled 
it to charge supra-competitive royalty rates because users were locked into its 
technologies, which had been selected as standard. Therefore, the FTC concluded 
that Rambus's conduct violated the prevention of monopolisation in the Sherman Act
258 Docket No. 9302. Cited from [Online] Available from:
http://www.ftc.gov/news-events/press-releases/2006/08/ftc-finds-rambus-unlawfullv-obtai 
ned-monopolv-power. Last accessed 6th December 2013.
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and the prohibition o f unfair methods or deceptive acts or practices that affect 
commerce expressed in the FTC Act.259 The Commission reasoned that, had Rambus 
not concealed the patent, it would have had to compete w ith other rival 
technologies and would thus have offered reasonable rates when negotiating the 
license w ith users. Likewise, the JEDEC would have chosen other technologies as 
standard if it had been aware of the existence o f Rambus's patent.
The Court of Appeal for the D.C. Circuit rejected the FTC's decision in 2008.260 It 
reversed the FTC's opinion and held that the failure o f Rambus to disclose the patent 
information did not constitute anti-competitive conduct. The FTC failed to prove that 
the JEDEC would have chosen to  standardise other technologies to replace those o f 
Rambus if it had known about the patent. For this reason, the court viewed this 
price-increasing conduct as being w ithin the scope of the lawful practice o f the 
monopoly right granted by the patent, even if it enabled Rambus to acquire higher 
license fees.261
The judgment o f the appellate court in the Rambus case was obviously contrary to 
the precedent established by the Third Circuit in a prior case of Broadcom Corp. vs. 
Qualcomm Inc., which was brought slightly earlier than the appellate court's 
decision.
6.2.2. Broadcom Corp. v. Qualcomm Inc. in the US
Qualcomm is a US chipset manufacturer that owns patents related to  3G
259 According to the FTC, Rambus's conduct constituted exclusionary conduct in Section 2 of 
the Sherman Act and Section 5 of the FTC Act(Also known as Title 15 US Code section 45).
260 Rambus, Inc. v. FTC, 522 F.3d 456 (D.C. Cir. 2008).
261 Ibid., at paragraphs 464-465.
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telecommunication technologies, some of which have been standardised in the ETSI. 
Broadcom asserted that Qualcomm sought to monopolise the market o f wideband 
code division multiple access (known as "WCDMA") for mobile telephony, which is a 
kind o f cellular network that forms an air interface standard in the 3G mobile 
telecommunication network, o f which it holds the patent. Broadcom alleged that 
Qualcomm induced the ETSI to adopt its patented technologies as some o f the UMTS 
standards by making a commitment to license its patent on FRAND terms; it then 
demanded discriminatory royalties from users who did not use the its chipset.262
Although the District Court held that Qualcomm had lawfully excluded competition 
in virtue of the monopoly awarded by the patent, the case was appealed to the Third 
Circuit Court o f Appeal and reversed in 2007.263 The appellate court referred to the 
FTC's decision in the Rambus case and upheld the patent holder's inducement by 
promising to license his patents on FRAND conditions in standardising proceedings; 
however, it found that its breach of the commitment after being adopted as standard 
was actionable anti-competitive conduct. The court estimated that Qualcomm had 
breached the Sherman Act and remanded the case to the District Court for further 
proceedings.
6.2.3. Discussion
The Court o f Appeal's decision in Rambus provided several concepts, one of which 
worth considering most is the interface between a patent and antitrust protection. 
The court's determination was based on the idea that Rambus's deceptive conduct 
did not make it immune to market competition; although it deprived members'
262 US D.C. Civil No.3:05-cv-03350.
263 Broadcom Corp. v. Qualcomm Inc., 501 F.3d 297 (3d Cir 2007).
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chances to negotiate licensing terms at the pre-competitive stage, it was not 
detrimental to the competitive process. Besides, price-increasing conduct in this case 
was regarded as a concomitant of monopolistic power granted by the patent, which 
is approved by antirust regulations. Despite not being expressly defined, it can be 
assumed from the decision that, according to the court, antitrust interference should 
be minimised in the patent system.264
It seems that the Appeal Court's consideration is beneficial for patent holders and 
acts as an inducement to attract potential inventors in the US. However, it is 
necessary for US antitrust law to  interfere in the case o f Rambus's deceptive conduct 
concerning the adoption o f a standard in order to facilitate efficient standard-setting 
and increase the competitiveness of most o f the providers o f the same product. The 
Appeal Court overlooked the competitive environment in this case, in which 
Rambus's patent was the SEP and industry members are locked in it. Even if there 
was no evidence that the SSO would choose another technology if it was conscious 
o f Rambus's patent, it was evident that adopting its patent would be considerably 
detrimental to members' chance to  negotiate a licensing price.
6.3. European dimension
6.3.1. Milestone progress of a unitary patent in Europe
Rather than collecting a bundle of patents from these countries to  ensure that 
patents are enforceable in the whole of Europe, two remarkable draft regulations
264 CHRONOPOULOS, Apostolos (2009). Patent Standards -  a case for US antitrust law or a 
call for recognizing immanent public policy limitations to the exploitation rights conferred by 
the Patent Act? ICC, 40(7), pp. 789-790.
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and an agreement regarding an EU patent package were adopted by the European 
Parliament in December, 2012, in relation to a unitary patent and Unified Patent 
Court (hereafter the "UPC")in the European patent system.265 A unitary patent is a 
European patent "granted by the EPO under the rules and procedure o f the 
European Patent Convention upon the request o f the patent proprietor...."266 This 
significant breakthrough makes it possible to acquire patent protection in 26 EU MSs 
by means o f one simple administrative step.267
One of the aforementioned regulations is for the purpose o f creating an instrument 
o f the implementation of unitary patent protection268, while the other relates to  the 
application o f the language regime of the unitary patent.269 Both o f these regulations 
came into force in January, 2013. As for the Unified Patent Court, this w ill be 
established on the basis o f an international treaty, the Agreement on Unified Patent 
Court. The agreement was signed in February, 2013 and w ill be adopted as soon as it 
has been ratified by more than 13 contracting states including Germany, France, and 
the UK.270 The two regulations w ill be applicable after the agreement enters into 
force.271 If a question arises regarding Union law, the Unified Patent Court will follow
265 EPC (2012). European Patent Office welcomes historic agreement on unitary patent. 
[Online] Available from: http://www.epo.org/news-issues/news/2012/20121211.html. Last 
accessed 29 September 2013.
266 EPC. What is the unitary patent? [Online] Available from:
http://www.epo.Org/law-practice/unitarv/faq.html#faq-630. Last accessed 19 October 2013.
267 The unitary patent is effective throughout the EU except Spain and Italy due to a 
disagreement about the language used.
268 Regulation (EU) No. 1257/2012 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 17 
December 2012 implementing enhanced cooperation in the area of the creation of unitary 
patent protection [2012] OJ L361/1.
269 Council Implementing Regulation (EU) No. 1260/2012 of 17 December 2012 
implementing enhanced cooperation in the area of the creation of unitary patent protection 
with regard to the applicable translation arrangements, 2012 OJ L361.
270 EPC. Agreement on a Unified Patent Court 2013. [Online] Available from: 
http://www.epo.Org/law-practice/unitarv/faq.htm l#faq-630. Last accessed 19 October 2013.
271 EPC. When will the "patent package" enter into force? [Online] Available form:
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the example of the national courts o f the EU, namely refer it to the CJEU for a 
preliminary ruling.272
6.3.2. Merits and demerits of the unitary patent in Europe
The implementation of a unitary patent system means that a transnational patent 
application can be filed in any language of the MSs, although a translated version in 
the official languages o f the EPO, namely English, French, and German, needs to be 
filed if the application is not in any one of these official languages. The unitary patent 
system limits the cost of translation and validation and considerably reduces it from 
36,000 to  approximately 5,000 Euros.273 Moreover, a proposed computer-generated 
translation enables applicants to  translate online free o f charge.274 When the 
machine translation covers all the EU official languages and several non-EU languages, 
the translation o f a patent application will take less tim e and be less o f a financial 
burden.
Indeed, the unitary patent system makes European member countries an indivisible 
entity and validates the exclusive right in this single territory. It also enables the 
aggregation of complex infringements based on one intention. It is valuable fo r cases 
in which a single infringer commits the same infringement in more than one 
European country, or a supranational patent infringement which is constituted by
http://www.epo.Org/service-support/faq/procedure-law/faq.html#faq-635. Last accessed on 
13 April 2014.
272 EPC. What are the main features of the Unified Patent Court?[Online] Available from: 
http://www.epo.Org/law-practice/unitarv/faq.html#faq-636. Last accessed 19 October 2013.
273 European Commission. What is the "unitary patent package?"[Online] Available from: 
http://ec.europa.eu/internal market/indprop/patent/faqs/index en.htm#maincontentSecl. 
Last accessed 20 October 2013.
274 WEST, Alexandra et al. (2013). Unitary patents and the Unified Patent Court. C.T.L.R.,
19(4), p.107. Also see [Online] Available from:
http://www.epo.org/searching/free/patent-translate.html. Last accessed 27 October 2013.
cross-border contributory infringement. 275 This decreases the possibility of 
contradictory decisions being made by different national courts, as well as assuring 
patent holders' competitors and defendants of legal certainty in patent cases 
because of the existence o f a unitary patent and a unified patent court.
Since EU Member MSs are commercially and politically integrated, a uniform 
community patent is deemed to be essential for the benefit o f the internal market.276 
The lack o f a unitary patent protection not only lessens inventors' willingness to 
publish useful information, but also prevents market participants from utilising 
valuable knowledge; thus, it is detrimental to the transfer of information in the 
internal market. A unitary patent system more efficiently fosters innovation than the 
intricate process of having to  obtain a bundle o f European patents.
The high cost of patent litigation deterred many potential inventors in the past, 
especially when the invention could possibly be distributed geographically. This new 
system is particularly advantageous for individual inventors, SMEs, and start-up 
companies that have much less funding than large businesses like Apple, Google and 
Samsung. In the future, the unitary patent and its exclusive court will create a 
friendlier environment for research and market participation. It can also contribute 
to the incentives to innovative activities in the Europe and fu rther foster the 
competitiveness of the internal market against Asia and the US.277
275 ROMANDINI, Roberto and KLICZNIK, Alexander (2013). The territoriality principle and the 
transnational use of patented inventions-the wider reach of a unitary patent and the role of 
the CJEU. IIC, 44(5), p.532.
276 SCHADE, Jurgen (2010). Is the Community (EU) patent behind the times? Globalisation 
urges multilateral cooperation. IIC, 41(7), pp. 810-811.
277 EPC (2012). European Patent Office welcomes historic agreement on unitary patent. 
[Online] Available from: http://www.epo.org/news-issues/news/2012/20121211.html. Last 
accessed 29 September 2013.
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With regard to ICT sector, the influence o f a unitary patent system is a huge step 
forward. By their nature, telecommunication innovations are not only applied to  a 
sole device like a single computer or mobile phone; rather they are usually 
implemented in a network of domestic and transnational devices, in which the 
standardisation o f a technology is the key mechanism to  ensure their interoperability 
and compatibility. The utilisation becomes even harder to control when these 
devices are connected to the internet. The server of an invention circulation can be 
located in any place and provide the innovation to numerous clients.278 If the patent 
is infringed, the patent holder has to lodge a claim in various national courts w ith the 
risk o f inconsistent jurisdiction and decisions. Since the application o f such 
technology is growing substantially, the European patent regime can be regarded as 
facilitating the practice of telecommunication inventions in the EU.
However, there may be some doubt as to  whether the unitary patent system is as 
comprehensive as it was proposed to be. Here it w ill focus on the possible negative 
impacts in the smartphone industry.
Firstly, the lower expenditure scheme in the system may not be deemed to be 
attractive to some inventors. Some patent holders may rather look fo r a bundle o f 
patents from the national courts and enforce them in the designated nations to 
maximise the ir benefits.279 For example, statistics show that very few SMEs would
278 ROMANDINI, Roberto and KLICZNIK, Alexander (2013). The territoriality principle and 
transnational use of patented inventions-the wider reach of a unitary patent and the role of 
the CJEU. IIC, 44(5), p. 527 and p. 539.
279 WEST, Alexandra et al. (2013). Unitary patents and the Unified Patent Court. C.T.L.R.,
19(4), p.107.
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ask for patent protection in all EU MSs.280 Unlike large corporations, the majority of 
whose business is international; SMEs normally have patent disputes at the national 
level. A unified Patent Court would require them to pursue legal actions abroad, and 
those who are not able to speak one of the three official languages adopted in the 
unitary system, would have to translate their claims. In this regard, the new system 
does not considerably reduce the cost o f patent litigation, as it is assumed.281 Rather 
SMEs would face more financial difficulties if they have patent disputes against large 
corporations.
Next, patent protection ensures that patentees can expand the ir business at a 
national and international level. However, the patent activities may vary in each MS 
in the EU due to the different industrial ecosystems and economic activities. 
Economic policies in an individual MS are vital to achieving the patent's aim. Since 
the EPO and the UPC have the exclusive competence to determine patentability and 
patent litigation respectively, their decisions have a unitary effect in all MSs, The 
unitary system deprives national courts and legislators of the opportunity to 
recognise the needs o f industries in their national market and make the optimal 
adjustment to  their economic policies.282 This would lead to  patents being 
determined by the legal standards and principles o f the Unified Patent Court w ithout 
taking account o f national states and their people's needs, albeit that they are the 
ones who will be directly affected by the Court's decision.
Furthermore, since patentees are able to practice the ir patent under a single
280 XENOS, Dimitris (2013). The European Unified Patent Court: Assessment and implication 
of the federalisation of the patent system in Europe. SCRIPTed, 10:2, p273.
281 Ibid., at pp. 273- 274.
282 Ibid., at, pp. 246-247 and pp. 253-254.
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enforcement and the results have an EU-wide effect, it creates risks to patent holders 
and unwitting infringers. The adverse impact o f a unitary system can be observed 
when plaintiffs are non-practicing entities. It would enable them to  acquire an 
EU-wide decision by a single action and thus they would have an even stronger 
bargaining position in royalty negotiations. Also, patentee's competitors or other 
third parties can also ask fo r patent revocation w ithout the need to  take so many 
irritating steps and incur high costs; therefore, their patents will become invalid in 
pan-European territo ry because based on one court's decision.283 This especially 
disadvantages patentees if revocation is filed for the purposes o f crippling the ir 
competitiveness. What is more, a unitary system would also enable opportunistic 
plaintiffs to do forum shopping; namely, they would be able to choose to  file 
litigation in whatever court would be most sympathetic to  the ir interests.
According to  the aforementioned facts, it is fair to say that a unitary patent should be 
welcomed in the EU; however, whether it will actually bring as many benefits as the 
European Union predicts remains to be seen.
6.3.3. European Commission's Investigations of patent ambush
While some significant complaints in Rambus and Qualcomm have been investigated 
in the by the US FTC and the Federal Court o f Appeal, the European Commission has 
also considered the same cases, and the solutions from the two continents have 
sometimes been dissimilar despite being based on the same facts. The following 
analysis o f the EU's investigation o f these cases will reveal the different 
considerations in the EU and US.
283 WEST, Alexandra et al. (2013). Unitary patents and the Unified Patent Court. C.T.L.R., 
19(4), pl07.
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6.3.3.1. The Rambus case in the EU
As mentioned earlier, the US DRAM developer, Rambus, withheld its patent 
information during the standard-setting proceedings in the JEDEC and charged 
royalties for using its patented technologies. Two of the DRAM manufacturers in the 
case filed the same complaint w ith the European Commission, which is the European 
antitrust authority in the case o f ambush in the EU, several months after the FTC's 
complaint against Rambus's conduct in the US.
The Commission alleged that Rambus had abused its dominant position, as 
stipulated in Article 102 o f the TFEU.284 Different from the US antitrust law, the actus 
reus o f Article 102 is objective and the actor's intent does not have to be proven.285 
The wording in the provision indicates that the EU competitive law prohibits the 
abuse of a dominant position. Since using the anticompetitive instrument to  obtain 
market power does not breach the provision, the Commission did not make its 
conclusion by accusing Rambus of intentionally not disclosing its patent and patent 
application during the standardisation process in the JEDEC; rather, it indicated that 
Rambus had abused its dominant position because it asked for unreasonable 
royalties after it acquired the dominant position through its deceptive conduct.
Unlike the US approach, which prohibits monopoly or attempts to  monopolise, the 
TFEU in the EU considers the abuse of a dominant position. The Commission
284 European Commission, COMP/38.636, December 9, 2009.
285 SCHREPEL, Thibault (2013). Patent troll through the US and EU antitrust law: when 
co-operation is no longer an option. E.C.L.R., 34(6), p.323.
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prudentially considered Rambus's manipulating conduct in the standard-setting 
process and charged excessive fees, contrary to the TFEU. In this regard, the 
Commission made a statement o f objections against Rambus in 2007.286 However, 
when Rambus made a commitment to cap the maximum royalty rates o f future 
products that applied the JEDEC standards, the Commission closed the investigation 
in 2009.
It is regrettable that the Commission failed to provide guidance on consistent SEPs 
licensing principles since the case ended up with a settlement.287
6.3.3.2. The Qualcomm case in the EU
Qualcomm also faced the complaint in the European Commission o f inducing the 
ETSI to  adopt its technologies as WCDMA standards for mobile telephony by making 
a false commitment in the US. This was lodged by six firms in the mobile phone 
equipment market, namely Ericsson, Nokia, Texas Instruments, Broadcom, NEC and 
Panasonic. The Commission initiated formal proceedings for in-depth investigation in 
2007.288
286 European Commission (2007), Antitrust: Commission confirms sending a Statement of 
objection to Rambus. MEMO/07/330. Available from:
http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release MEMQ-07-330 en.htm. Last accessed 07 December 
2013.
287 GERADIN, Damien (2013). The years of DG competition effort to provide Guidance on the 
application of competition rules to the licensing of standard-essential patent: Where do we 
stand? p. 8. [online] Available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm7abstract id=2204359. Last accessed on 15 
November 2013.
288 European Commission (2007), Antitrust: Communication initiates formal proceedings 
against Qualcomm. MEMO/07/389. Available from:
http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release MEMO-07-389 en.htm. Last accessed 10 December 
2013.
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In this case, Qualcomm's patent was essential for the WCDMA standard. The 
complainants alleged that the terms and conditions for licensing the standards 
imposed by Qualcomm breached the FRAND commitment and thus violated Article 
82 of the EC Treaty. According to the allegation, this could result in higher prices of 
mobile handsets, which would be detrimental to consumers, hamper the 
standardisation process, and eventually impede the economic efficiency o f the 
mobile telecommunication market.
This case demonstrates the lack of criteria for inspecting the royalty rates o f a SEP to 
ascertain if they are fair and reasonable. 289 When patent holders are accused of 
breaching the anticompetitive rules in the TFEU by charging excessive fees, the 
Commission faces the predicament o f demonstrating that they have, in fact, 
breached this provision. Although the Commission committed time and resources to 
evaluating the evidence, it is regrettable that it did not take the opportunity to 
establish a proper assessment o f the provision in time. The Commission closed these 
proceedings after a two-year thorough investigation w ithout a chance to  give 
indication on deciding royalty rates due to the withdrawal and intention to w ithdraw 
the complaints following commercial settlements reached w ith Qualcomm in 
2009.290 Some of them withdrew the complaint to the EC due to  a victory over
289 GERADIN, Damien (2013). The years of DG competition effort to provide Guidance on the 
application of competition rules to the licensing of standard-essential patent: Where do we 
stand? pp. 8-9. [online] Available from:
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm7abstract id=2204359. Last accessed 12 December 
2013.
290 European Commission (2009), Antitrust: Commission closes formal proceedings against 
Qualcomm. MEMO/09/516. Available from:
http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release MEMO-09-516 en.htm?locale=en. Last accessed 10
December 2013.
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Qualcomm outside the EU (For example, Ericsson), while others did so based on the 
reason that they had reached a separate settlement against Qualcomm in the US (For 
example, Nokia and Broadcom).
6.3.3.3. Brief conclusion on the Commission's investigations
The Commission's investigations on both Qualcomm and Rambus were closed 
w ithout giving a precise definition o f how to meet FRAND licensing, albeit the 
Commission has been seen to  be increasingly active in tackling anti-competitive 
conduct during the standard-setting process.291 As mentioned in Chapter 5, the 
FRAND commitment is essential to the licensing o f SEPs, since it ensures accessibility 
to SEPs and prevents an adverse impact the SEPs may have on competition.
It is undeniable that defining the licensing price for intellectual property is not an 
easy task. Unlike concrete assets, it is hard to establish an objective criterion to 
assess the value o f a patent. These cases show the complex body o f evidence that 
the Commission has to asses to  verify the abuse of SEPs. The standardisation in the 
information and technology industry is undoubtedly the priority for the Commission 
to address the problem of abuse of SEPs; yet it is not appropriate for an antitrust 
authority like the Commission to be regarded as a rate-setting authority. Since an 
optimal licensing price should consider various industrial and economic elements; 
the Commission is short of certain expertise to consider a balanced interest among 
these demands.292 This concept can be deemed to be affirmed by the General
291 ROTONDO, Elisabetta (2012). European Commission initiates proceedings against 
Samsung for abuse of dominance by failing to license its standard-essential patents on fair, 
reasonable and non-discriminatory terms. E.C.L.R., 33(8). p.348.
292 GERADIN, Damien (2013). The years of DG competition effort to provide Guidance on the
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Court, since it upheld the Commission's decision in the Microsoft case and did not 
oblige the Commission to make an indication of the calculation o f FRAND licensing 
fees.293
It can be seen from the above that, as an antitrust authority, the Commission should 
provide principles for licensing SEPs to prevent patent ambush and exorbitant fees of 
such inventions and ensure compatibility in the market; namely, at this stage, it 
should clarify the definition o f FRAND. Although the "safe harbour" test in the 
Horizontal Guidelines provides the condition that licensing agreements will not fall 
under the abuse of patents, the necessity of a FRAND definition remains to 
strengthen innovators' confidence in standard-setting and prevent SEP holders from 
unduly exercising extra exclusive power.
6.4. Google/Motorola Mobility merger case and FRAND licensing
A significant merger between two major companies in the ICT industry in 2011 
attracted tremendous attention in both the EU and the US. Google announced its 
acquisition o f Motorola Mobility, including approximately 17,000 issued patents and 
6,800 pending applications.294 This acquisition was vital for the industry, since the 
patent portfolio related to wireless communication hardware and some of the
application of competition rules to the licensing of standard-essential patent: Where do we 
stand? p. 9. [online] Available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm7abstract id=2204359. Last accessed on 15 
November 2013.
293 HOEHN Thomas and LEWIS Alex (2013). Interoperability remedies, FRAND licensing and 
innovation: a review of recent case law. E.C.L.R., 34(2), p . l l l .
294 The United States Department of Justice (2012). Statement of the Department of 
Justice's Antitrust Division on its decision to close the investigation of Google Inc.'s 
acquisition of Motorola Mobility Holdings Inc. and the acquisition of certain patents by Apple 
Inc., Microsoft Corp. and Research in Motion Ltd.. Available from:
http://www.iustice.gov/opa/pr/2012/Februarv/12-at-210.html. Last accessed 15 December 
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patents were even determined to be essential to standards in the industry.295 This 
raised the concern that, since Google owned a considerable number of patents after 
the acquisition, it could block its own competitors and those o f Motorola from 
applying Google's Android software, thus controlling access to telecommunication 
standards which were its newly added patents.
Indeed, the patent portfolio seemed to be the most valuable acquisition in this 
transaction since it enabled Google to consolidate its position in the mobile market 
and enhanced its capacity to fight and win the patent battle. W ith the patents 
obtained from Motorola, a hardware manufacturer with a long history, Google was 
able to strengthen its competitiveness and restrain its rivals in the same market. 
Therefore, parallel investigations were launched in the EU and the US to determine if 
there had been any anticompetitive conduct that curbed the accessibility o f Android 
software and SEPs in the smartphone industry after Google's acquisition o f Motorola.
6.4.1. Investigation of the Google/Motorola transaction in the US and the EU
The US and EU investigations were both closed and the acquisition transaction was 
cleared by the European Commission and the US DOJ respectively in early 2012. It is 
worth noting that Google made a commitment to various SSOs to continue licensing 
Motorola's SEPs on FRAND terms and promised to recognise the royalty rates 
Motorola had prepared for its SEPs.296 In addition, it made a commitment to 
negotiate w ith potential licensees so that neither party would file legal proceedings
295 HOEHN Thomas and LEWIS Alex (2013). Interoperability remedies, FRAND licensing and 
innovation: a review of recent case law. E.C.L.R., 34(2), p.101.
296 Case No COMP/M.6381-Google/Motorola Mobility (2012). Paragraph 9 (a) and (b). 
Available from:
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/mergers/cases/decisions/m6381 20120213 20310 22774 
80 EN.pdf. Last accessed 14 December 2013.
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against the other's SEPs and seek injunctions by claiming the ir SEPs in a certain 
reasonable period. Even if the negotiation, which was based on good faith, failed, 
Google pledged that potential licensees would have a chance to  prevent an 
injunction against the ir product if they offered to be licensed w ith Motorola's SEPs 
with certain conditions and provide securities for the payment o f royalties.297
The EC considered that the transaction between the two companies did not have a 
horizontal or vertical effect on the market.298 It fu rther pointed out that the 
acquisition was not likely to lead to a significant impediment, even if Google 
prevented Motorola's competitors from applying the Android operating system or 
offered them a degraded version.299 Meanwhile, the Commission was also aware o f 
the possibility that Google could link Motorola's patents, which were essential to the 
wireless standard, w ith Android devices, which would constitute abusive behaviour. 
It warned that it would keep a close watch on relevant patent litigation.300
The DOJ's Antitrust Division in the US closed its investigation subsequent to the EC's
scrutiny, since it closely cooperated with the EC when investigating the transaction 
between Google and Motorola. When considering if Google would use the patents it 
had acquired to raise competitors' costs or hinder competition, the Division finally 
concluded that it was unlikely to "substantially lessen competition" and "significantly 
change the existing market dynamics".301 The Division took consumers into account
297 Ibid., at paragraph 9 (c) and (d)
298 Ibid., at paragraph 12 to 15.
299 Ibid., at paragraph 95.
300 European Commission (Press release), 2012. Merger: Commission approve acquisition of 
Motorola Mobility by Google. IP/12/129. Available from:
http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release IP-12-129 en.htm. Last accessed 10 February 2014.
301 The United States Department of Justice (2012). Statement of the Department of 
Justice's Antitrust Division on its decision to close its investigation of Google Inc.'s acquisition
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and also considered the intricate issues w ithin the intersection o f intellectual 
property and antitrust protection. Despite closing its investigation o f the acquisition, 
it stated its intention to continue to monitor Google's use of SEPs, which are 
especially important to the smartphone and tablet market and to take antitrust 
enforcement against any abuse.302
As an internet service giant, Google's core business is, in fact, online advertising 
rather than hardware manufacturing. With the development of Google's Android 
operating system, Motorola's patents enabled it to  move from being software and 
design patent-orientated to a combination o f communication technology patents. 
Some people described Google's acquisition o f Motorola as a hardware client being 
acquired by a software client,303 which made Google more influential because o f its 
ability to prevent competitors from entering the mobile handset market. A 
reasonable speculation of its conduct is that it attempted to attract more hardware 
manufacturers to employ an Android operating system, which provides services to 
facilitate users to get online. Since Android is the most prevalent open source, 
Google's online advertising business is enhanced, thereby creating substantial 
income.
Google's CEO, Larry Page, maintained that the acquisition had led to strengthening 
Google's patent portfolio, which increased competition and also protected Google
of Motorola Mobility Holdings Inc. and the acquisition of certain patents by Apple Inc., 
Microsoft Corp. and Research in Motion Ltd.. Available from:
http://www.iustice.gov/opa/pr/2012/Februarv/12-at-210.html. Last accessed 15 December 
2013.
302 Ibid.
303 VARMA, Ashish (2012). Google's Motorola acquisition: A case study. Viewpoint, Volume 3, 
No.2., p.61.
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and its original equipment manufacturer (hereafter the "OEM") from being 
threatened by competitors in the market.304 Both Google and Motorola were 
carefully evaluated before the transaction. Google's incentive was analysed earlier in 
this section; its FRAND commitment made to Motorola's rivals and licensees seems 
to verify that the acquisition was not to foreclose the competition. However, 
according to  the DOJ, its commitments were more ambiguous than those made by 
other major companies for licensing SEPs,305 including Microsoft and Apple, who 
pledged for a free injunction and FRAND patent licensing conditions. This seems to 
reveal that, although Google holds significant patent portfolios in the ICT industry, it 
remains scrupulous when making patent licensing commitments, thereby 
maintaining its superiority. Google's statement does not provide its competitors with 
direct assurance concerning the exercise of newly-acquired patents; rather, it seems 
to allow Google room for excuses if it refuses to license Motorola's patents or 
imposes inequitable licensing conditions.
6.4.2. Acquiring patents rather than engaging in inventive activities
Google's acquisition of M obility certainly provided its Android partners w ith a beacon 
of hope to ease any damage they may have incurred because o f the fierce patent war, 
especially which caused by Android's contenders against Android platform applicants. 
Reinforced by Motorola's patents for telecommunication technology, Google's patent 
portfolios enabled its partners to negotiate w ith other patent holders in the same
304 ORR, Justin R. (2013). Patent aggregation: Models, harms, and the limited role of 
antitrust. Berkeley Technology Law Journal, Vol. 28:525, p. 525, note 2.
305 The United States Department of Justice (2012). Statement of the Department of 
Justice's Antitrust Division on its decision to close its investigation of Google Inc.'s acquisition 
of Motorola Mobility Holdings Inc. and the acquisition of certain patents by Apple Inc., 
Microsoft Corp. and Research in Motion Ltd.. Available from:
http://www.iustice.gov/opa/pr/2012/Februarv/12-at-210.html. Last accessed 15 December 
2013.
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market fo r cross-licensing and other collaboration based on equality and mutual 
benefits. Even if the OEMs who applied Google's operational system were accused of 
patent infringement, Google was able to provide assistance for the ir defence and 
thus mitigate the impact that may have been caused by patent litigation. Therefore, 
many o f its Android partners welcomed this transaction.306
From the perspective o f Android's competitors, such as Apple's iOS and Microsoft's 
Windows Phone, neither o f which has an existing cross-license w ith Motorola, 
Google's declaration to  use Motorola's patents to protect the Android ecosystem and 
enhance innovation is unconvincing. Microsoft doubted Google's assurance that it 
will not use the patents, especially the SEPs, to  prevent others from utilising 
technologies that are essential to the industry fo r anticompetitive purposes.307 
Despite Google being committed to fu lly abiding by Motorola's FRAND obligations, 
the Commission clarified in its decision that "a FRAND commitment cannot be 
considered as a guarantee that the SEP holder will not abuse its market power."308 
Albeit the FRAND obligation can restrain their ability to abuse, the ability to  engage 
in anticompetitive behaviour will not be constrained until it is ruled to  have reached 
the extent of being anticompetitive by the relevant authorities. The risk remains 
because, for example, the SEP holders can threaten to seek an injunction or ask 
faithful competitors or potential licensees for onerous terms, or force non-SEP
306 Google. Google + Motorola: What people are saying. Available from: 
https://www.google.com/press/motorola/quotes/. Last accessed 6 February 2014.
307 PARKHURST, Emily (2012). Microsoft, Apple take on Google. [Online] Available from: 
http://www.biziournals.com/seattle/blog/techflash/2012/02/microsoft-apple-take-on-googl 
e.html?page=all. Last accessed on 15 June 2014.
308 Case No COMP/M.6381-Google/Motorola Mobility (2012). Paragraph 113. Available from: 
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/mergers/cases/decisions/m6381_20120213_20310_22774 
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holders to cross-license the ir patent.309 Therefore, anticompetitive behaviour by the 
dominant player can only not be conducted if competitors have power. This status 
quo foments the tendency of companies to scramble for a patent collection as a 
defence against anticompetitive conduct.
When the injunction has been issued, the faithful licensees' products w ill be 
excluded from the market and according to the Commission, this w ill eventually have 
a negative effect on consumers.310 Another possible scenario is that, even if the 
licensee accepts the unreasonable licensing terms imposed by the SEP holder fo r the 
authorised use of the patents essential to its product, the increased production costs 
will be passed on to downstream manufacturers and even consumers. Given the 
argument that emerged in the case o f the Google/Motorola merger, the 
Commission's decision indicated that there was a chance that SEP holders may abuse 
their patents, even when they have made a FRAND commitment.
In fact, the merger between Google and Motorola was not the first time a technology 
company looked for a tremendous patent portfolio to strengthen its market position. 
Six mobile phone manufacturers, including the famous Apple, M icrosoft and Sony, 
formed a partnership called Rockstar Bidco.311 They won an auction early in the same 
year as Google's acquisition and obtained approximately 6,000 patents related to 
wireless and internet technologies from the bankrupt Nortel Networks Corp.312 The
309 Ibid.
310 Ibid.. Paragraph 107.
311 The six consortium members are Apple, Microsoft, Sony, RIM, Ericsson (which is 
essentially the same company as Sony since they sold devices together previously)
312 The United States Department of Justice (2012). Statement of the Department of 
Justice's Antitrust Division on its decision to close its investigation of Google Inc.'s acquisition 
of Motorola Mobility Holdings Inc. and the acquisition of certain patents by Apple Inc., 
Microsoft Corp. and Research in Motion Ltd.. Available from:
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companies in this alliance already had a number of patents o f the ir own and the 
considerable number they acquired in the auction meant that Rockstar's patent 
portfolio covered many significant technical elements. Some of these are vital to 
smartphone features, such as data networking, and they also include the SEPs for the 
wireless devices industry, in which Nortel was committed to licensing SSOs members.
This fact made it more persuasive for the US DOJ to close the antitrust investigation 
into Google. Google's major competitors were companies that also provided 
operating systems for wireless devices, like the members o f Rockstar. Compared to 
the large portfolios owned by Rockstar members, the 17,000 patents Motorola 
brought to  Google were not likely to reduce the competition in the industry. This 
implies that if there is a big player in the market, competition law will allow smaller 
players to combine to provide a bulwark against its power. Besides, Motorola was an 
old-line device provider w ith a history o f capitalising on its patents; it had also 
recently been involved in the patent war and disputed the patents o f other 
smartphone manufacturers.313 Therefore, the transfer o f patents to Google would 
not substantially change the dynamics of wireless devices and relevant technologies, 
even if Google adopted the same strategy as Motorola's previous one.
6.4.3. Brief conclusion - Do the patents involved in the transaction help to enhance 
communication technology?
It is evident that both the EU Commission and the US DOJ intend to maintain a close 
watch on the circulation o f SEPs in the wireless devices industry to prevent the use o f
http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2012/February/12-at-210.html. Last accessed 15 December 
2013.
313 Ibid.
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SEPs for hold-up purposes or threatening injunctive relief for unreasonable benefits. 
This not only applies to Google's competitors, but also the anticompetitive 
authorities. However, this is not necessarily the only influence on members o f society. 
As far as Android subscribers are concerned, the patents obtained from Motorola 
empower the Android partners to  defend or file countersuits when they are accused 
of patent infringement. This reduces Androids' costs, fo r example, o f compromising 
on expensive licensing fees or creating substitute technology to replace others' 
patented technology. Therefore, Android can continue to  provide free services to 
subscribers.
Google's acquisition o f Motorola may make Android partners feel anxious. Since 
Motorola, a mobile hardware provider, has become part o f Google, it is possible that 
Google's business will favour Motorola's hardware. The partners may also worry that 
Google will operate its hardware business using the resources from Motorola after 
the transaction,314 thus becoming a hardware rival to its Android partners. If a patent 
dispute should occur between Google and a partner, the latter w ill experience the 
disadvantages o f Google's patent portfolio. In fact, some Android partners have 
begun to consider partially turning to  Microsoft's Windows Phone platform, which is 
not particularly locked to its own mobile devices.315 On the one hand, M icrosoft 
bought out Nokia and acquired the latter's mobile devices and services in 2013.316 
This deal allowed Microsoft to license Nokia's patents and consolidate its competitive
314 VARMA, Ashish (2012). Google's Motorola acquisition: A case study. Viewpoint, Volume 3, 
No. 2. pp. 64-65.
315 Ibid.
316 REDMOND and ESPOO (2013). Microsoft to acquire Nokia's devices & services business, 
license Nokia's patent and mapping service. [Online] Available from: 
http://www.microsoft.com/en-us/news/press/2013/sepl3/09-02announcementpr.aspx. Last
accessed on 16 April 2014.
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advantage in the mobile phone market.
Apple, Microsoft and Android partners' conduct will enable them to escape the 
series o f patent litigation Google is facing, and on the other, they can avoid the 
possible disadvantages incurred by the merger. After this point was discussed here, 
Google announced that it would sell Motorola's handset business to Lenovo in 
January 2014,317 and this may serve to reduce its Android partners' anxiety.
From an overall perspective, it cannot be denied that the way in which Google 
utilises the patents acquired from its merger w ith Motorola does have a certain level 
o f influence on the strategies o f mobile companies. However, it is questionable if 
smartphone companies will continue to  purchase patents as weapons to maintain 
the ir competitiveness and create revenue rather than developing new technologies 
for their products. The way these companies acquire and practice the ir patents 
contravenes the aim of a patent, namely to  promote innovation and reward the 
patent holder.
The investigation o f this case by the EU Commission and the US DOJ gives a clue o f 
the impact o f the FRAND commitment made by a SEPs holding company on the 
stability of the availability of a technology and even the tendency of the industry to 
engage in creative research. This probably explains why patent holders are keen to 
have the ir patents selected as SEPs or to buy those that already are. In October 2013, 
the Rockstar consortium suited Google for patent infringement, claiming that its
317 WINKLER, Rolfe and ANTE, Spencer E., 2014. Google sells handset business to Lenovo.
The Wall Street Journal. Available from:
http://online.wsi.eom/news/articles/SB10001424052702303743604579351163997405806.
Last accessed 6 February 2014.
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seven patents regarding technology that enables internet search terms to match up 
advertising or information are based on the terms and other user data were 
in fringed.318 Since Rockstar acquired Nortel's patents and Google obtained 
Motorola's, there has been no substantial breakthrough improvement in mobile 
communication technology; instead, more patent litigations are filed worldwide 
based on these patents. This begs the question of whether the patents the two 
camps are fighting fo r are genuinely used to enhance smartphone technology, and 
regrettably, the answer at this stage is no. It appears that these acquisitions have 
resulted in more smartphone companies seeking to buy patents for anticompetitive 
purposes rather than the development of creative ideas.
318 BBC News, 2013. Patent wars: Tech giants sue Samsung and Google. Available from: 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/technology-24771421. Last accessed 7 February 2013.
114
Chapter 7
Findings and discussion
7.1. Introduction
This chapter firstly verifies the primary issues to be solved to reinforce patent 
protection in smartphone industry. It continues to  identify the anticompetitive 
means in patent law, which this study believes that it is the optimal deal w ith such 
issues, to determine whether or not patent law effectively responds to  social 
interests. Moreover, some possible solutions to  the problems will also be discussed 
in this chapter in an attempt to find an appropriate balance between patent exclusive 
right and the right to access patented works and boost the efficiency o f patent 
system.
7.2. Findings -  the exigent crisis in the smartphone industry and a possible solution
7.2.1. Patent quality
Different from the proprietary right awarded to a tangible asset w ith an explicit 
objective and a relatively precise way to  measure its infringement and damage, a 
patent is the right granted to an intangible work; therefore, the scope of protection is 
less concrete and hard to determine the patent claim. This enables interested parties 
in the industry, including researchers, inventors, manufacturers, sellers and 
consumers, to easily infringe the patent, albeit unintentionally or even if they have 
taken reasonable care to avoid infringement.319 However, a patent is considered to 
be valid as soon as it has been awarded, although the scope of its validity cannot be
319 ORR, Justin R. (2013). Patent aggregation: Models, harms, and the limited role of 
antitrust. Berkeley Technology Law Journal, Vol. 28:525, p. 529.
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ascertained until enforcement is lodged in court; therefore, regardless o f whether 
infringers are aware of the patent or not, as long as they utilise patented work 
w ithout the necessary authority, their action will constitute infringement.
The examiners in the patent office are responsible for deciding whether a work can 
be patented or not. In terms of the process o f patent application, there are 
underlying problems in the patent granting procedure that intensify the inefficiency 
of the patent system. Critics maintain that many patents have been awarded w ith an 
ambiguous scope, which has lowered the quality o f patents,320 and this deficiency 
can be attributed to the myriad patent applications that overload the work o f the 
patent office. The ever-increasing number of applications brought to  the patent 
office and the complexity o f the claims and descriptions not only severely burden the 
patent office, but also decelerate the examining process. Moreover, apart from the 
requirement o f novelty, utility, and non-obvious features, examiners should also 
observe the existence o f prior art; however, due to the number o f cases, they 
sometimes overlook prior art during the examination and issue a patent to  some that 
appear to be invalid.321 They have limited time to undertake a patent examination, 
and the pressure o f accumulated cases means that patents are sometimes issued 
w ith hindsight. Also, it is hard to map the wording in a patent claim to an actual 
technology in many cases, and as a result, the patents issued are too broad due to 
blurred claims and interpretation.322
320 HOVENKAMP, Herbert J. (2012). Competition in information technologies: 
Standard-essential patents, non-practicing entities and FRAND bidding. U Iowa Legal Studies 
Research Paper No. 12-32, p.l.
321 ORR, Justin R. (2013). Patent aggregation: Models, harms, and the limited role of 
antitrust. Berkeley Technology Law Journal, Vol. 28:525. p. 530.
322 OLSON, David S. (2013). Removing the Troll from the Thicket: The Case for Enhancing 
Patent Maintenance Fees in Relation to the Size of a Patent Owner's Non-Practiced Patent 
Portfolio. Boston College Law School Legal Studies Research Paper No. 303, pp. 13-14.
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Furthermore, inventions related to emerging technology normally apply existing 
works to  make substantial improvements or assemble devices w ith new distinctive 
refinements, and there are limited resources to search for prior art in emerging 
technological industries like the smartphone industry.323 Inventors o f component 
technologies often need to apply previous inventions to achieve economic value 
from a new component, and the numerous dubious patents granted by the patent 
office exposes them to the risk of unintentional patent infringement.
More patent applications are filed as individuals and companies begin to realise the 
importance o f collecting patents to defend themselves, and this creates an even 
bigger backlog for the patent office and results in a vicious circle. What is worse is 
that it is suggested that a considerable number o f issued patents have low economic 
value,324 but they are aggregated for defensive or even offensive purposes. As the 
socio-economic pattern evolved from industrial to information, the patent system 
was forced to undergo optimal changes to cater for the new era.
7.2.2. Patent aggregations and non-practicing entities
A great deal o f attention has been paid to communication companies that have 
significant R&D strength and a considerable patent portfolio. In fact, as patent quality 
is deteriorating because of overly broad claims and dubious validity, individual 
inventors and smaller-scale entities have a better chance of obtaining a patent.325
323 OVERWALLE, Geertrui Van and SCHOVSBO, Jens (2007). Policy options for the 
improvement of the European patent system. IIC, 38(7). p. 837.
324 Supra., note 299 at pp. 530-531.
325 LERNER, Josh (2010). The patent system in a time of turmoil. W.I.P.O.J., 2(1). p. 35.
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Since collecting a patent portfolio does not require an arduous effort, it increases the 
chance of speculators alleging a dubious patent against an elaborate product.326 For 
example, individual innovators who hold dubious patents may allege infringement to 
established firms who tend not to choose to risk the uncertainty o f patent litigation. 
As a result, the firms have to  compromise and settle the suit by paying to legally 
access the patent. What is worse is the trend that a considerable number o f patents 
being asserted in the US court have changed hands, sometimes more than once.327 
This means that the plaintiffs who lodge a patent action are neither the real 
inventors nor the original assignees.
Being conscious that claiming patents can be a lucrative business, many individuals 
and entities commit to patent aggregation. How such behaviour can stifle innovation 
and damage competition was illustrated earlier; the concern here is why the current 
patent system allows such a loophole to exist and makes it so difficult for inventors to 
engage in innovation.
Identifying whether a patent is applied by a certain technology or not and 
determining the value of the patent are costly tasks; especially when it comes to 
transitional patent disputes. Patent aggregation is sometimes taken as a strategy to 
prevent or even be able to  defend an infringement assertion and minimise the 
damage it may cause.328 Practicing entities can reinforce the ir patent portfolio by 
means o f patent aggregation; in other words, a robust portfolio gives them a
327 PENG, Yu-Shu and LIANG, l-Chung (2012). An exploratory study of patent litigation 
behaviour: Evidence from the smartphone industry. 2012 Proceedings ofPICMET '12, p.1022.
328 ORR, Justin R. (2013). Patent aggregation: Models, harms, and the limited role of 
antitrust. Berkeley Technology LawJourna\, Vol. 28:525. p. 546.
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stronger defensive ability so that they have the incentive to ask for cross-licensing or 
forego an infringement assertion when they inevitably apply another's patented 
technology. Even if the practicing entity is prosecuted for infringement, its patent 
portfolio becomes a crucial means for striking back w ith a countersuit, and in this 
scenario, aggregation is conducive to the circulation o f patents.
Unfortunately, countersuits do not pose a threat to non-practicing entities. Since 
they do not practice the patents they hold for innovative activities, it is highly 
unlikely that they will apply others' patents; therefore, other parties could hardly file 
a countersuit against them. Rather than making the ir patent available to the public, 
non-practicing entities sometimes conceal the ir patent information and ambush 
practicing companies as soon as the latter have invested a huge sum or adopted the 
claimed patent as an essential part o f their product.
Collecting a bulk patent portfolio has become a trend for both practicing and 
non-practicing entities w ith the result that patent holders have become more 
interested in quantity than quality. The value o f a patent is supposed to be 
determined by the innovative contribution that underlies it. The inability of 
practicing entities to know the substantial content o f dubious patents gives patent 
portfolio holders a disproportionate influence above and beyond the ir actual worth. 
While it is true that the level o f damage awards and the availability o f injunctions in 
the EU are scarcer than in the US, enforcing a patent in Europe before a unitary 
patent system is established is costly. In terms of non-practicing entities, since they 
are solely bent on making a profit, if the targeted company attracts substantial 
revenue and is likely to be willing to compromise to preserve its investment, it is
worth taking a risk to assert a patent against the company after an evaluation.
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In late 2013, the European Commission approved Microsoft's acquisition o f the 
majority of Nokia's mobile handset business after the acquisition had been approved 
in the US, although, when issuing the approval of this acquisition, the Vice-President 
o f the Commission, Joaquin Almunia, expressed his concern about Nokia's next step. 
He warned Nokia not to  attempt to extract a higher return on its leftover patents and 
behave like a patent tro ll.329 This case, again, illustrates the underlying danger o f a 
company that does not (or not anymore) run a mobile phone business acting like a 
patent-asserting entity as it merely makes remuneration by licensing its patents. The 
Nokia case is even more high-profile due to  the fact that its SEPs is on mobiles. 
Since it has no phone business, it is very likely that Nokia will license such patents in 
a litigious way rather than in fair conditions and obtain a profit from other 
companies.
7.2.3. Compulsory licensing
In principle, patent holders are entitled to make an autonomous decision concerning 
the practice of the ir patent; for example, using the patent for the ir own work or 
licensing it to other inventors and acquiring an agreed fee in return. Patent holders 
are not obliged to license their rights to others. However, as illustrated in previous 
chapters, a patent holder may refuse to supply a patent that is essential to an 
industry; and in this case, the government and the competent court w ill force the 
patent holder to authorise the use o f the patent and accept a remuneration in 
return.
329 REGISINGER, Don (2013). EU to Nokia: Don't be a "patent troll". [Online] Available from: 
http://www.cnet.com/uk/news/eu-to-nokia-dont-be-a-patent-troll/. Last accessed on 10 
April 2014.
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The criteria o f essential facilities doctrine set by the ECJ and CFI are the standards for 
considering if the refusal to supply IP information is abusive conduct, and if the 
abusive conduct intends to block substitution and harm competition, a compulsory 
license can be awarded. In this way, the doctrine helps by imposing a compulsory 
license as an obligation o f right holders.330
However, it should be noted that the theory of block substitution to the downstream 
market cannot be the sole consideration in every case, since IP protection grants a 
variety o f exclusive rights to  different intellectual efforts, such as patents, copyright 
and trademarks, and the criterion applied in copyright cases may not necessarily be 
adequate in patent cases. The doctrine can merely be taken as a basic principle, and 
the intrinsic IP protection granted to each work should be based on the facts of 
specific individual cases. An evidence of this is the different implementation o f the 
doctrine in the cases of M ogill and IMS Health and M icrosoft A significant principle is 
that an IP right is a reward for right holders' investment in innovation; yet, this does 
not guarantee that right holders w ill recoup their investment in R&D. While it is 
certain that IP protection ensures right holders' legitimate exercise of the ir right, if 
that exercise exceeds the scope of the protection granted by IP, a compulsory license 
is an exceptional means o f protection to enable recovery from the damage brought 
by the excessive exercise o f rights.331
It goes w ithout saying that, in the ICT industry, products need to  be interoperable to
330 CHOI, Jay Pil (2010). Compulsory licensing as an antitrust remedy. W.I.P.O.J., 2(1). P. 79.
331 ZHANG, Liguo (2010). Refusal to license intellectual property rights under Article 82 EC in 
the light of standardisation. E.I.P.R, 32(8). pp. 410-411.
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be accepted by consumers, and this barrier to entry increases the importance of 
licensing to  access existing products. To refer back to  patent issues, patent protection 
seeks to  promote the overall interests o f society by protecting the inventor's private 
right, namely the right to exclude, which would not exist w ithout the invention. If this 
private right needs to be forfeited to promote the wellbeing o f society, it should be 
accepted that the interests o f society outweigh the private right inherent in the 
patent. In short, when patent holders refuse subsequent inventors a voluntary 
license and this refusal can be seen as being an abuse of the ir right, after carefully 
weighing the needs of both sides, competition means should intervene to  compel 
patent holders to authorise access to the patent. However, this may dampen patent 
holders' aspiration to devote themselves to further innovation if they know they will 
be forced to allow competitors to use the ir patent. Therefore, compulsory licensing 
must be imposed with deliberate inspection and should be very discreetly invoked in 
order to prevent abuse but simultaneously maintain a pro-competitive IP policy.
The TRIPS Agreement provides a legal basis fo r a compulsory license, which restrains 
the legal right granted by patent law.332 Its provision enables patented work to be 
used w ithout the holder's permission, but third parties using such a patent need to 
be authorised by the government. What matters here is that it is also stressed that 
such use is permitted to be an anti-competitive remedy, as confirmed in a judicial or 
administrative process, and anti-competitive concern should be taken into account 
when determining the remuneration.333 Despite the fact that the TRIPS sanctions the 
legitimacy o f compulsory licensing, there are diverse opinions as to whether or not it 
contravenes the goal o f patent protection, which is to  encourage innovation.
332 Article 31 of the TRIPS Agreement.
333 Ibid, section (k).
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In terms of critics of this regime, the disagreement w ith compulsory licensing mainly 
stems from the purpose of the patent system, which is to incentivise innovation. 
Compulsory licensing will significantly weaken patent holders' right, thereby reducing 
the ir opportunities to exclusively practice their patent and benefit from financial 
rewards; thus, inventors w ill be reluctant to invest time and money in new inventions 
because they are not likely to  profit from the patent. This is especially true when the 
potential inventors are individuals or small start-ups w ithout a sound financial 
background; financial rewards may be the decisive instrument to induce them to 
continue their innovative activities. In addition, since the imposition o f a compulsory 
license constrains the practice o f patents, it is limited in its enforcement and the 
ability to call for an injunction. This creates a risk that opportunistic users will infringe 
the patent when the holder lacks the ability to file for infringement litigation and 
acquire an injunction. The user can then ask for compulsory licensing to acquire 
authorisation and legalise his speculative behavior if the strategy fails.334 Potential 
licensees' gaming o f the compulsory licensing system is another concern during its 
implementation. The regime gives licensees the opportunity to free-ride patent 
holders' intelligence fru it, and in order to enjoy the results w ithout paying high costs, 
the form er may deliberately conceal better licensing terms and wait for a compulsory 
license obligation to  be imposed to  the patent holders. In this case, the patent holder 
loses its chance to negotiate advantageous licensing terms.
On the other hand, many believe that a compulsory regime has more merits than 
disadvantages, and this seems to make more sense from an overall perspective,
334 NG, Elizabeth Siew Kuan (2009). Patent trolling: innovation at risk. E.I.P.R., 31(12). p. 601.
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especially in smartphone industries, in which product production depends on 
interdisciplinary information.
It cannot be denied that compulsory licensing can weaken patent holders' ability to 
benefit from their patent. However, it is acknowledged in the TRIPS Agreement that 
the need to deter anti-competitive behaviour should be considered when 
determining remuneration. This means that patent holders w ill obtain the 
appropriate royalties based on the level o f anti-competitiveness; in addition, a 
regime that forces patent holders to grant a license to  competitors can encourage 
them to  voluntarily engage in cross-licensing so that they can utilise the patents in 
the same market and take reasonable advantage from each other. This will accelerate 
development in the industry rather than hindering it. In terms of the right to  require 
an injunction, since the refusal to license needs to be deemed as being 
anti-competitive before a compulsory license can be imposed, it is very likely that 
granting an injunction to the patent holder will also raise the same concern. This can 
be proved by the non-practicing entities that act as patent trolls and ask for excessive 
fees.
Although compulsory licensing is a necessary exception to ensure competition, there
are still no complete policies to regulate its imposition. The TRIPS Agreement merely
provides a principle to allow it, but member nations need to establish a structure to
impose it. The essential facilities doctrine is not an exhaustive list to verify the abuse
of a dominant position. The doctrine should be applied flexibly to respond to the
passage of time and the changing patterns of industry. Although the public interest
should always take priority over private right, since compulsory licensing deprives
patent holders o f their legitimate right, it should only be invoked after seriously
124
evaluating the situation and ruling out all other possible solutions. It should be 
regarded as being the very last resort, which is why it is rarely applied in practice.
7.3. Conclusion
7.3.1. Does patent law enhance the information society?
It has been noted that strategic patents have been filed worldwide and that these 
make a very limited contribution to  scientific and technological development.335 In 
addition, the problematic patent system is criticised for causing more obstacles to 
innovation rather than encouraging it.336 The theory o f patent promotes innovation 
is merely an assumption to approve the aim of the patent system but the results 
remain unclear. If this theory is simply an ideal but is inaccurate, the information 
society will suffer unnecessary loses, such as the negative influence on competition 
derived from the patent system and the high price o f products controlled by 
monopolistic right holders.337 For this reason, the theory is not convincing.
Therefore, in terms of the original purpose of a patent, it is argued that patents 
should not solely seek to encourage innovation; instead, the patent system should 
play the role o f assisting the enhancement o f the public interests via innovative 
activities. Basically, the improvement o f innovation is too abstract to be defined; 
there is no way to measure the degree to  which patents encourage innovation, and 
even if there was, it would be hard to prove that it was patents that stimulated the
335 SCHADE, Jurgen (2010). Is the Community (EU) patent behind the times? Globalisation 
urges multilateral cooperation. IIC, 41(7). p. 812.
336. LERNER, Josh (2010). The patent system in a time of turmoil. W.I.P.O.J., 2(1). p. 36.
337 Shaver, Lea (2012). Illuminating innovation: from patent racing to patent war. Wash. & 
Lee L. Rev.,69, p. 9.
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enhancement o f technology.
When making an overall inspection o f the effectiveness and omissions o f the patent 
system, it is unfair to conclude that patents completely fail to  enhance the 
information society. Patent problems are much more complex in the smartphone 
industry than in other industries, since it contains a variety o f sectors, such as 
network operators, device manufacturers and component manufacturers.338 
Smartphones are currently in great demand, so it could be said that the patent 
system enhances the development of telecommunications in some aspects. The 
potentially massive profits make smartphone companies eager to be at the leading 
edge of this technology, which undoubtedly improves the quality o f smartphones 
and its relevant services and benefits the dynamics o f the technology economy.
In terms of whether the patent system enhances the information society, the answer 
is yes, it does, but it is not sufficiently effective because it is doubtful if this offsets 
the competitive risks involved. The potential competitive strategy that underlies the 
patent system appears to bring convenience and quality of life to the information 
society; yet, it contains the danger o f patented works being monopolised, and this 
w ill lim it the growth of technological research. Because of these problems, patents 
may harm the information society in the long term if feasible auxiliary measures are 
not implemented to address its deficiencies. This demand is especially urgent when 
anticompetitive measures remain vague and are applied inconsistently.
7.3.2. Recommendations and future work - How should patent law enhance the
338 ZHANG, Liguo (2010). How IPR policies of telecommunication standard-setting 
organisations can effectively address the patent ambush problem. IIC 41(4), p. 382.
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information society and communication technology?
While some may say that policy-makers should balance the costs and benefits of 
patent exclusivity, unfortunately, this would involve the same problem of the absence 
of an objective standard to justify their value. This task appears to  be unworkable 
due to the absence of effective justification of the patent system, as well as the 
difficulty o f evaluating the costs and benefits it generates.339
A similar consideration can also be applied to the idea of making valuable patents 
approachable by limiting the duration o f exclusivity, which means deciding the 
patent protection based on the efficacy o f the patent in the market. The most 
dubious aspect of this idea is that there is hardly any criterion to evaluate a patent's 
efficacy in terms of improving technology, and another point to consider is unequal 
protection. Patent protection should be non-discriminatory to every patent holder so 
that patents can be accessible to every innovative person.
The idea o f limiting the duration o f exclusivity appears to be irrational if it is 
implemented alone; however, many commentators propose that compulsory 
licensing should be regarded as settling the abuse of a dominant position.340 It 
requires essential patent right holders to  release the ir patents to other innovators 
during the twenty-year period of the patent and obtain licence fees or royalties in 
return, and this is especially meaningful if the patent is selected to be a SEP in the 
industry. Although this seems to be a relatively satisfying approach after reviewing 
ideas that are problematic at some level, relying on anti-competitive means
339 Shaver, Lea (2012). Illuminating innovation: from patent racing to patent war. Wash. &
Lee L. Rev.,69. p. 12.
340 CHOI, Jay P. (2010). Compulsory licensing as an antitrust remedy. W.I.P.O.J., 2(1), pp.
74-75.
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inevitably constrains patent holders from practicing their legitimate right. In addition, 
prudent observation when granting an injunctive relief to patent holders, as 
demonstrated in the eBay case, is also crucial to encourage voluntary patent 
licensing and reduce non-practicing entities' assertion o f patent infringement; 
namely, the court should consider whether or not the claimed infringement causes 
actual damage to the patent holder, as well as the possible influence to  the infringing 
entity and the welfare of society.
Albeit applying the assistance o f competition law in order to achieve the goal of 
patents to stimulate innovation, adopting an ex-ante solution to  deal w ith the 
inherent problems in the patent system is more fundamental than seeking 
anti-competitive means for an ex-post remedy. In this respect, monitoring the quality 
o f the patent system is definitely a priority.
The patent system is supposed to  reward patent holders fo r the ir investment in 
research and development, including the ir financial investment. The limited length of 
protection is criticised for being out o f proportion w ith the effort and investment 
devoted, the lengthy preparation o f a patent application, the long wait for the results, 
and patent disclosure to  the public. Unfortunately, this problem seems to be 
intensified because of the territoria l nature o f patent protection and the continuous 
expansion o f the cross-border trade environment,341 which impose patent holders or 
potential patent applicants w ith the burden of considerable costs and time to  have 
the ir work patented or the ir patents enforced in various countries.
341 DESCHAMPS, Carole (2011). Patenting computer-related inventions in the US and in 
Europe: the need for domestic and international legal harmony. E.I.P.R., 33(2). p. 105.
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This goal is now applied in Europe and will sharply ease the cost and troublesome 
proceedings in patent application and enforcement. W ith regard to the international 
dimension, it may be hard to  achieve a global unitary patent system. Since patent 
issues in smartphone industries are generally transnational and multinational, the 
industry could at least establish a neutral forum to provide suggestions on the 
necessity o f patent enforcement and where and how to file a patent application. In 
this industry, patent holders can be giant companies in various countries; therefore it 
is essential that suggestions should be provided by mutual experts in patents and in 
smartphone-related technologies from random countries. Even if these suggestions 
have no legal force and their adoption completely depends on the claimant's 
autonomous decision, yet they may go some way to effectively increasing the 
efficiency o f patent application and reducing the number of unnecessary patent 
lawsuits.
On the other hand, low-quality patents that are merely marginally important to 
technological improvement form a blockage to  R&D that could, in fact, contribute to 
future innovation. Some commenters call fo r the reform of the patent system to 
reinforce its function o f encouraging innovation;342 fo r example, tailoring distinctive 
rules to regulate the patenting o f particular innovations, such as genetic inventions, 
which may cause moral controversy and precision industries, in which the application 
o f an invention generally requires a connection w ith prior patents or standardised 
technology.
Notwithstanding the need for the current patent system to be updated to
342 SCHREPEL, Thibault (2013). Patent troll through the US and EU antitrust law: when 
co-operation is no longer an option. E.C.L.R., 34(6). pp. 320-321.
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accommodate emerging industries and maximise their accessibility w ithout overly 
interfering w ith patent holders' privilege, it is inappropriate to lead patent law in 
divergent directions at this point. Since the patent system is currently suffering from 
a vicious circle o f granting bad patents, the proposed divergence may simply 
exacerbate this chaos. This is not to say that tailoring specialised protection for each 
type o f innovation is not a solution to patent ambush and hold-up problems in the 
technology industry; nonetheless, rectifying the inherent systematic problems of 
patent law is more realistic than considering a specialised patent at this stage.
Certain efforts have been made in Europe, where a report was presented by the 
Scientific Technology Options Assessment body of the European Parliament 
(hereafter the "STOA") in 2007 related to the way in which the work o f the European 
patent system could be improved.343 This report was based on an independent, 
policy-orientated investigation and presented in the form of "Policy options for the 
improvement o f the European patent system".
In this report, the STOA noted the problem that patent quality lowered the bar for 
obtaining a patent. It was suggested that the current European patent system should 
improve the quality of patents in respect of standards of patentability and the 
procedure to  grant patents.344 Some o f the proposals made to enhance patent 
quality included filtering applications and refusing those that required an unduly 
prolonged examination procedure, establishing appropriate mechanisms for 
searching for prior art, and raising the standard o f examination by providing
343 European Parliament Scientific Technology Options Assessment (2007). Policy options for 
the improvement of the European patent system. (IP/A/STOA/FWC/2005-28/SC16). 
(Manuscript completed in 2007).
344 Ibid., p. 36.
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sufficient means and management to ensure a predictable and consistent 
decision.345 Above all, the fundamental concept, as indicated in the STOA report, 
should emphasise that patent office grant patents to  serve the general interests of 
society, not those of the specific applicants. The purpose o f granting inventors 
exclusive rights is to incentivise innovation, and the primary task to  accomplish it is 
to maximise the accessibility to prior art w ith reasonable rewards to patentees. The 
first step toward this aim should be improving the patent examination system w ith a 
comprehensive prior art database, clear standards of examination, and a precise 
scope of patent rights to assist subsequent inventors to avoid unwitting 
infringement.
W ith respect to the US, according to a USPTO report, some progress has also been 
made in improving the patent issuance procedure. This includes alleviating the 
backlog in the USPTO by providing more effective training for examiners and 
enhancing the ir knowledge and skills regarding procedures and legal topics.346 In 
addition, the USPTO has also increased its collaboration w ith patent applicants, 
which enables applicants to better control the speed of the examination procedure 
because examiners can work more efficiently and deploy their resources to  meet 
innovators' demands.
It is undeniable that the IP policy has a complicated net effect on related dimensions 
like the technology industry and the global economy.347 To prevent a patent from
345 Ibid.. pp. 36-37
346 United States Patent and Trademark Office (2011), Performance and Accountability 
Report Fiscal Year 2011. Available from:
http://www.uspto.gov/about/stratplan/ar/USPTQFY2011PAR.pdf. Last accessed on 15 
February 2014.
347PUGATCH, Meir Perez (2011). Intellectual property policy-making in the 21st century.
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merely being a profit-seeking tool rather than an investment to advance useful arts, 
IP policy-making, especially patent policy, needs to  consider a host of elements that 
can not only promote innovative investment in the short term, but also maximise the 
long-term interests o f the majority of society. Competition law and patents have 
always had the same goal, since they both seek to ensure the diffusion o f useful 
products and services for the public interest. Competition law plays a crucial role to 
boost the effective exploitation o f patents in an age where compatibility and 
interconnection are necessary to market a product. It is essential to ease the 
inherent problems of patent law and thereby improve the quality of patent issuance 
and unify patent examination and enforcement. This is also important to deal with 
subsequent speculative behaviour when a patent has been granted by means o f 
competition law.
Patent problems are extensive and profound. This study only explores those derived 
from the current status o f smartphone patent wars. However, since technology is 
further developed every day, it is envisioned that more complex patent disputes will 
appear in the future. Some smartphone companies have begun to settle litigation 
and collaborate w ith each other; for example, Nokia and HTC settled all their pending 
litigation and agreed to cooperate on patent and technology in February 2014.348 It is 
good to  see a more peaceful and constructive ending to smartphone patent disputes. 
Yet, it is important to monitor further patent collusion problems led by such 
collaboration. On the other hand, as a unitary patent system is adopted in the EU
W.I.P.O.J., 3(1), p. 71.
348 NOKIA (2014). Nokia and HTC signed a patent and technology collaboration agreement. 
[Online] Available from:
http://companv.nokia.com/en/news/press-releases/2014/02/07/nokia-and-htc-signed-a-pat 
ent-and-technology-collaboration-agreement. Last accessed on 15 April 2014.
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with a Unified Patent Court, it is also worth observing how it can influence patent 
practice in the smartphone industry. W ith the continual advancement of smartphone 
functions and new patent policies, legislators, policy-makers and antitrust authorities 
are facing formidable challenges ahead.
(Total 29,972 words)
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